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Vol. III

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AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

A Reference Review with Documents,
Chronology and Bibliography

Also

Counting Noses in the Soviet Union - - - - Rose M. Somerville

Resettlement of Population Under the Third Five-Year Plan - M. Sonin

Results of the 1939 Census

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HARRIET MOORE, *Editor*

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AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE USSR

A Reference Review, with Chronology and Bibliography

By HARRIET MOORE

I.

America and Russia met across the Pacific: The colonial explorers of the new continent were pushing their way across the western lands, while Russian traders pressed eastward in search of furs, trade and a route to China, crossing the frontier lands of Siberia to the Pacific and thence across the narrow straits to Alaska. Through the State-chartered Russian-American Company, Russia's counterpart of the East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company, trade posts were operated in Alaska and from there the Russians had started south into California.¹

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

The country of the autocratic Tsar did not hasten to establish diplomatic relations with the American colonies, which had revolted against the British Monarchy. The early years after the establishment of the United States saw a number of hopeful missions sent by the Americans to St. Petersburg, but not until 1809 were contacts made and envoys exchanged; John Quincy Adams was sent as the first American representative to the court of the Tsar. From that time on, American-Russian relations were curiously cordial. In spite of the vast distances separating their capitals in those days of slow communications and in spite of the complete divergence in their political philosophy, they were drawn together by an identity of interest—fear of Great Britain. Russia even went so far as to seek American membership in the Holy Alliance; it offered mediation in the War of 1812, and in 1822 it was the Tsar who arbitrated the claims arising out of that war.

Not that the relations of the early years were completely unruffled: expansion of Russian colonization and trading activities south along the Pacific coast soon collided with American expansion westward and one of the first agreements between the two

1. S. Okun, *Rossiisko-Amerikanskaia Kompaniia*. Ogiz, Moscow, 1939.

countries grew out of this problem. In 1824 they signed a treaty defining 54°40' as the northern limit for American colonization and at the same time giving Americans trading rights north of this line where previously Russia had claimed the north Pacific as a "closed Russian sea." As will be readily seen, this move was part and parcel of the American effort during that period to prevent further European encroachment on the Western Hemisphere, signalized by Monroe's famous statement of December, 1823.

Following the settlement of this question, a commercial treaty was signed in 1832 which was to govern the intercourse between the two countries until the second decade of the twentieth century.

The American Civil War

The American Civil War, following as it did close on the heels of the Crimean War in Europe, again highlighted the common anti-British position of Russia and America. The Tsar's government stated its favor for the North clearly, while the United States reciprocated by refusing to join in protests against Russia's treatment of the Poles. Just as the North feared intervention by Great Britain on behalf of the South, so did the Tsar fear possible interference to help the Polish rebels. As a demonstration of this sympathy, two Russian naval squadrons visited the United States in September of 1863, one stopping in San Francisco and one in New York. There were even rumors that they had orders to intervene on the side of the Union if the British or French came to the aid of the Confederacy. In any case this token of moral support was long remembered in the United States and on it was based much of the tradition of friendship that persisted through the years. The visit itself was returned three years later when Assistant-Secretary of the Navy Fox was sent to Russia to carry a message of congratulations to Alexander II on his escape from an assassin. In treating of this period, reference is usually made to the fact that Russia freed the serfs in 1861 and therefore had perhaps further bonds of sympathy for the North. Whether or not this was a factor, it probably was of very little importance as compared with the parallelism of interest in the diplomatic sphere.²

2. M. Malkin, *Grazhdanskia Voina v S.Sh.A. i Tsarskaia Rossiia*. Ogiz, Moscow, 1939.

The Sale of Alaska

As a sequel to the Civil War, came the sale of Alaska to the United States. Although the Russians were not unaware of the riches of Alaska, its gold and furs, the Russian-American Company was in financial difficulties and the Russian Government was in no position to salvage it. Moreover, there was increasing danger that the British, through Canada, might seize Alaska, something which the Russians could do little to prevent. Therefore, although a proposal to sell the territory to the United States in 1859 was turned down by Russia, on March 29, 1867, the deal was consummated, with the United States paying \$7,200,000, an insignificant sum in view of the richness of the territory, but even so, perhaps a larger figure than would have been the case but for the gratitude of the Americans for Russia's moral support during the Civil War.

The United States and the Russo-Japanese War

Just as the sale of Alaska was the last important point in Russo-American relations which was dictated primarily by the attitudes of the two countries toward Britain, so the part played by the United States in the Russo-Japanese War was the first clear reflection of the part that considerations of Far Eastern diplomacy were to play in their relations during the twentieth century. The aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 had brought Russia into the forefront as a pretender to dominance in Manchuria. As a result of the Li-Lobanov Treaty, virtually an alliance between China and Russia directed against Japan, Russia had acquired most of the spoils of war which Japan had been forced to disgorge by pressure from the other Western powers.^{2a} It was against just such a contingency that America's "Open Door Policy" stood, and consequently the United States looked to Japan at the turn of the century as a possible counter-poise to Russia in Manchuria. It lent encouragement to Japan in the events leading up to Japan's undeclared war on Russia in 1904, and it acted as representative of Japan's interests in Russia, following the severance of diplomatic relations. However, Japan's unexpected and overwhelming victories threatened so to reverse

2a. Russia obtained a lease on the Liaotung Peninsula, as well as railroad rights in Manchuria generally.

the balance of power that President Roosevelt moved to use his good offices to bring about an early settlement. In the negotiations, held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1905, the United States played a very real part in securing modification of Japan's demands in regard to an indemnity, etc., and thus succeeded in restoring a kind of balance between Japan and Russia, giving neither complete hegemony in the Far East. This it was able to do because of the limitations of Japan's economic resources which would have militated seriously against its chances of winning a long-drawn-out war such as might have followed a breakdown of the Portsmouth negotiations, and because of the revolutionary situation in Russia.

In spite of the fact that the United States had been openly pro-Japanese at the outset of the war, the assistance it rendered Russia in the peace settlement again revived the flame of friendliness between the two peoples.

Abrogation of the Commercial Treaty of 1832 in 1911

This warmth was soon, however, to be dissipated by the controversy which arose out of the Russian Government's anti-Semitic policy. The United States had already had considerable difficulty with Russia over the fact that the latter refused to recognize the expatriation of its citizens who wished to become American citizens and held them for military service when they visited Russia. Real popular clamor was not aroused over this, but in the opening years of the twentieth century another issue came to a head. Under Russian laws Jews, other than bankers and representatives of large commercial firms, were refused visas or were restricted in their travel to certain parts of Russia. The claim in the United States was that insofar as these laws affected American citizens of Jewish extraction they were in contravention of Article I of the 1832 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which guaranteed the citizens of each country equal treatment in visiting and residing in the other. The Russians countered that immigration restrictions were a question of internal policy and therefore in no way subject to American interpretation, especially as they did not discriminate as between

American Jews and Jews who were citizens of other countries.³ They also pointed to the American regulation of Oriental immigration as a matter of the same kind in which Russia could claim discrimination against Russian citizens of Oriental race. Nonetheless popular sentiment in the United States was aroused to such an extent by the atrocities of the Russian pogroms in the early nineteen hundreds that passage seemed imminent of a strongly worded resolution by the Senate demanding the termination of the 1932 Treaty. This was forestalled by the State Department, which, having failed to achieve modification of the Russian regulations through negotiation, served notice of the treaty's abrogation on the grounds that it was out-of-date and needed revision. Russia's reply was to institute some trade restrictions on American goods which previously had enjoyed most-favored-nation treatment under the treaty. American efforts to negotiate a new commercial agreement were unsuccessful before the outbreak of the war.⁴

Pre-War Commercial Relations

In the first half of the nineteenth century the United States had an unfavorable balance of trade with Russia and the bulk of its shipments for many years consisted of re-exports. The United States sold a little cotton, tobacco, rice and dyestuffs, while its purchases included considerable quantities of semi-manufactured iron products, sail duck, and flax products. Imports from Russia remained between one and three million dollars until 1890.

By the middle of the century the balance began to shift in favor of the United States and domestic products far outweighed re-exports in the total American sales; shipments of cotton made the difference, but some manufactures such as agricultural machinery were appearing in the trade returns. From 1850, American sales to Russia rose rapidly from \$1,600,000 in that year to \$16,000,000 in 1880, a figure not to be duplicated until 1902.

3. For the Russian statement of the case, see B. P. Egert, *The Conflict Between the United States and Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1912.

4. For an account of American cultural contact with Tsarist Russia, see Anna M. Babey, *Americans in Russia 1776-1917: a Study of the American Travelers in Russia from the American Revolution to the Russian Revolution*, The Comet Press, New York, 1938.

The turn of the century found the United States buying raw materials almost exclusively—hides and skins, wool, flax and licorice, and the volume had grown steadily from \$2,887,000 in 1880 to \$7,246,000 in 1899/1900 and \$16,559,000 in 1906/07. On the export side, after a slump from 1890 to 1904, sales were keeping just ahead of purchases and the United States shipped \$19,778,000 in goods to Russia in 1906/07. (The annual figures for the years since 1910 are given at the end of this article.) This upward trend was continued right on to 1914, but at no time was the trade to constitute an important item in the totals of either Russia or the United States.

II. Revolution and Intervention

The March Revolution

The United States, still on the side-lines of the Great War when Tsardom fell, greeted the Revolution of March, 1917, with wide acclaim. With the bad taste of the anti-Semitic controversy still in their mouths and the well-known facts of the reactionary nature of the Tsar's regime, Americans welcomed a new democratic government. The more so, as relations had already been broken with Germany and it was but a matter of weeks before the United States was to enter the war "to make the world safe for Democracy"; the Revolution had admittedly removed one embarrassment to this program—namely the prospect of fighting as an ally of one of the world's most undemocratic governments. This made for a quick response to events in Russia, and within a week of the abdication of the Tsar the United States had accorded official recognition to the Provisional Government. From that time until the end of the war on the Western Front, American and Allied activity in Russia centered on the problem of keeping the Russians in the war, for by 1917 the Tsar's army was already collapsing. Two American missions were soon dispatched to Russia in June, 1917, to stimulate friendly relations and cooperation: the Root Mission of good-will, and the Stevens Mission to aid in reestablishing railway transport.

The October Revolution

Quite naturally the Allies and America did not welcome the October Revolution which brought the Bolsheviks to power under the slogan of "Peace, Bread and Land." Apart from the reaction to the decrees on nationalization of industry and cancellation of Tsarist debts which were later to be the reason for friction with the new regime, the vital question was war or peace. Imperial Russia had been bound to its Allies by a treaty committing it not to make a separate peace; for the Bolsheviks, however, a drive for peace was essential to their program. This dramatic struggle was carried on right down to the hour of the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which Lenin delayed for several days, awaiting a reply as to the specific aid which would be forthcoming should the Soviets reject the Treaty.

Space does not permit a full development of the multifarious incidents of this chaotic period, but they are easily accessible in the great number of first-hand accounts written by those who took part in them and in the publication of the official documents of the period. For purposes of this review, a limited summary will be given of the phases through which American-Russian relations passed from November, 1917 to 1920.⁵

The months before the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk peace were marked by the efforts of the Bolsheviks to obtain a general peace settlement. One of the first decrees passed by the Congress of Soviets on November 8 was the Decree of Peace, calling for a general settlement without annexations or indemnities. This was communicated to the warring Powers but only met with indirect protests in reply. The Soviets went ahead with their armistice negotiations with Germany, commencing in December, 1917,⁶ but the efforts to get a general peace conference were not abandoned. Twice the Russians suspended the conversations to give the Allies the opportunity to send representatives, and on December 29, 1917, they served final notice that if the Allies would not join the negotiations, they would go ahead to conclude a separate peace. Although some of the American diplomatic staff in Russia believed that the Bolsheviks were German agents, other

5. For a useful summary, see the Introduction in *Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920*, compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit. Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920.

6. For a detailed account of Brest-Litovsk, see, John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk, March, 1918*. William Morrow & Company, 1939.

Americans there, both official and semi-official, such as Colonel Raymond Robins, who retained some contact with Bolshevik leaders, felt that the Allies still had something to gain by relations with the Bolsheviks, whose peace moves they saw were dictated by the realities of the situation in Russia. They also recognized that the peace campaign was having a revolutionary effect both in Russia and abroad. To counteract this effect, Edgar Sisson, representative in Russia of George Creel's Committee on Public Information, cabled to Washington on January 3, 1918, that a restatement of Allied war aims was necessary.

The result was President Wilson's famous speech of January 8, 1918, keyed directly to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and containing his 'fourteen points.'⁷ In it no reference was made to the possibility of a negotiated peace; President Wilson said that "for such arrangements and covenants [referring to the fourteen points] we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved." Lloyd George's speech a few days before had also omitted mention of any prospect for the immediate termination of the war. The Soviet demand for a general settlement was unavailing and further delay was no longer possible. Under force of arms, the Soviets accepted the German ultimatum and signed on March 3, 1918. Yet even then Colonel Robins and Bruce Lockhart were approached to find out what aid might be forthcoming if the Bolsheviks failed to ratify the peace. There was no answer from the home governments and ratification was passed March 16. Russia was out of the war.

The next period in American-Russian relations leads up to Allied Intervention. The Soviet acceptance of the peace made for charges that the Bolsheviks were German agents; by early summer Allied troops, soon to include Americans, had been landed in Murmansk to prevent seizure by the Germans of military stores.⁸ At the same time the problem of the Czech

7. The Sixth Point concerned Russia: "The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy." p. 71, *Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920, op. cit.*)

8. For a study of American intervention in North Russia, see Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia* (1918). Princeton University Press, 1937.

troops, making their way across Siberia to join the war on the Western Front, was suddenly complicated by rumors of the arming of German prisoners of war in Siberia. The Allies were urging intervention in the Far East in the Czech's behalf. At first the United States was firmly opposed to sending more troops into Russia, on the ground that it would only serve to alienate further the Russian people. But finally President Wilson was persuaded, and on August 3, 1918, he invited the Japanese Government to participate in a military expedition to protect the Czechs and to guard military stores, stating carefully that there would be no interference in the internal affairs of the country.⁹ The intervention was protested by the Soviets and from the close of 1919 on, they addressed appeal after appeal to the Allies and the United States, seeking a basis for peace negotiations.

Versailles and After

When peace came to the Western Front and the Versailles Conference was convoked in January, 1919, the question of Russia had to be met one way or another. Despite the French die-hard attitude toward the Bolsheviks, two attempts were made to find a common ground for negotiations. In January, President Wilson's proposal to invite representatives of all groups in Russia to a conference on Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmora was adopted, only to be rejected by all the anti-Bolshevik groups in Russia except the Lettish and Esthonian Governments. The Soviets who had received the invitation indirectly by radio accepted and offered what appeared to be a reasonable basis for negotiation. Shortly after this, President Wilson sent the Bullitt Mission¹⁰ to obtain information for him personally as to the terms on which the Bolsheviks would negotiate. He too returned with proposals closely approximating those which he had taken with him, but nothing came of them, nor was Dr. Nansen more successful in his effort in April to get the Allies to open relations with the Bolsheviks. Thus the Versailles Conference ended with the blockade still in force against Russia, although

⁹ For a full account of American Far Eastern Intervention, see, Graves, William S., *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920*. Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931.

¹⁰ See, Bullitt, William C., *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*. B. W. Huebsch, 1919.

it was raised in regard to the Central Powers.¹¹ The United States had never formally accepted the blockade, as it was contrary to its concept of international law to permit the search of neutral vessels in a "pacific blockade." But in effect the United States had cut off all trade with Soviet Russia through a series of measures dating from November, 1917, requiring the licensing of all exports to Russia and in practice refusing to issue such licenses.

In the meantime, the Allies had been giving aid to various anti-Bolshevik groups to carry on the Civil War. The United States did not join its Allies in recognizing Admiral Kolchak supreme ruler of Russia in the summer of 1919, but in fact it advanced more aid, financial and material to Kolchak than did the Allies. Moreover, the operations of the Stevens railway commission in the Far East under the protection of the American and Japanese Intervention forces in effect redounded to the advantage of the Whites, since it was over this line that Kolchak and other anti-Bolshevik forces were receiving supplies.

In the United States there was a great wave of anti-Bolshevik propaganda¹² emanating not only from White groups, but further stimulated by the publication in September, 1918, by the Committee on Public Information of the "Sisson Documents," purporting to prove that the Bolsheviks were German agents. Ludwig Martens, sent to America early in 1919 to represent the Soviets, was soon subjected to deportation proceedings and forced to leave. (See below p. 15.) Yet, at the same time, there was growing popular concern over the continuance of American intervention in Siberia. On June 23, 1919, a Senate Resolution was passed asking information on the expedition, to which President Wilson replied two days later, stating that the troops were simply protecting the Stevens Railway mission and were not interfering in Russian internal affairs. Great difficulties had already been encountered by the Americans in charge of the

11. The terms of the Armistice with Germany on Nov. 18, 1918, had provided for the evacuation of Russian territory by the Germans "as soon as the Allies shall consider this desirable, having regard to the interior conditions of those territories." It also annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Versailles Treaty Art. 116 annulled all the treaties and agreements made by Germany with the Bolsheviks and other Russian groups and recognized as "inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on Aug. 1, 1914." See Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

12. See, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, "A Test of the News," *The New Republic*, August 4, 1920 (supplement); also, Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*. Macmillan Company, New York, 1927.

expedition in their dealings with the Japanese and White forces because of the American effort to carry out the letter of their commission. By January, 1920, the situation became untenable and President Wilson announced the withdrawal of the American troops from North Russia.

In summarizing this confusing period of American relations with Russia, some of the conflicting tendencies of the time have to be borne in mind. The United States had entered the war in the name of Democracy and it took the position that Democracy could be assured only by a complete victory, leading to the removal of the group in control in Germany. A negotiated peace was not considered. The emergence of more liberal groups in Russia, following the overthrow of the Tsar, was welcomed by America, but the need of the Russian people for peace presented a serious problem, since the maintenance of the Eastern Front was regarded as a vital link in the Allied pressure on Germany. Several courses were open by which an attempt could be made to bolster the Russian line: The Allies could try to persuade the new groups in Russia to remain in the war; or try to restore the Old Regime which was committed to continuing the fight; or they could reestablish a front by direct intervention with foreign troops. The first attempts were directed toward obtaining cooperation from the new government, even to the extent of feeling out the possibilities of military aid. Missions of friendship were dispatched; friendly messages were addressed to the Soviets. As it became increasingly likely that Russia would drop out of the war, the other methods for keeping alive the Eastern Front were applied, both by lending support to the anti-Bolshevik forces and by armed intervention. Thus, the popular feeling of sympathy for the Russians inspired in America by the March Revolution was soon dispelled by the anti-Bolshevik campaign initiated in the interests of the "fight-to-the-finish" against Germany.

Again in the case of American participation in Far Eastern Intervention, a conflict of interests was apparent. When first suggested, President Wilson firmly opposed sending troops on the ground that it would serve no useful military purpose and would alienate the Russians. Yet in the end he undertook to invite Japan and the other Powers to join in Far Eastern Intervention. The official documents of the period indicate that this

reversal was due to fear that Japan might intervene alone and for purposes other than those which the United States could countenance. Consequently President Wilson was persuaded that it would be better to have international intervention with specifically limited objectives over which the United States could have some control. Although the Soviets, in 1933, recognized this motivation (see Litvinov's note, page 40), the practical effects of intervention served only to drive a further wedge between the Russian and American peoples, as President Wilson had feared. It was the attitudes developed during this period that permitted the United States to remain the "last bulwark" of hostility toward the USSR long after economic and diplomatic necessity had brought other countries into relations with the Soviet Union.

III. The Period of Non-Recognition: 1920-1933

The withdrawal of the American troops from Siberia and the termination of the railway mission ended active American interference in Russia and opened the thirteen-year period of non-recognition. Following the Allied lifting of the blockade in January, 1920, American restrictions on trade with the RSFSR were removed, as well as some of the limitations on financial transactions. This marked the end of any question as to which group was in control in the Soviet Union, although the United States continued until June 30, 1922, to recognize Boris Bakhmeteff, who had been appointed Ambassador by the Provisional Government in June, 1917, as the official representative of Russia in Washington. After his resignation, Russian affairs were entrusted to Serge Ughet, also an appointee of the Provisional Government. And it was not until May, 1933, that the State Department publicly stated that it was "cognizant of the fact that the Soviet regime is exercising power and control in territory of the former Russian Empire."¹³

The basis for the American attitude toward the Soviet regime was to be outlined early by the State Department in a statement the gist of which was repeated regularly in support of the American Government's refusal to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In August, 1920, in reply to an inquiry from the Italian Embassy as to whether or not America wanted to

13. *The United States and the Soviet Union*. The American Foundation, 1933, p. 41.

participate in an international endeavor to settle the Polish-Soviet War, Secretary of State Colby stated that the United States could not do so, because such an effort "would in all probability involve two results, from both of which this country strongly recoils, viz., the recognition of the Bolshevik regime and a settlement of the Russian problem almost inevitably upon the basis of a dismemberment of Russia."¹⁴ In regard to the latter point, he reiterated American refusal to recognize the independence of the Baltic states and added that the United States would favor independence only of ethnic Poland (up to the so-called Curzon line), Finland and Armenia. On the first point—the recognition of the "Bolshevik regime"—his objections rested on charges that it was unrepresentative, and secondly that it believed in world revolution and through the Comintern was actively engaged in promoting it. That this was indeed the established view held in the United States was sharply illustrated by the story of Ludwig Martens. Caught up in the hysteria of the Lusk and Palmer raids, he was tried for deportation. The decision of the Department of Labor, handed down December 15, 1920, was that he was liable for deportation on the sole ground of his employment by the Soviet Government.¹⁵

Colby's statement contained all but one of the points on which American policy toward Soviet Russia stood: namely, non-dismemberment of the Russian Empire and non-recognition of the Bolshevik regime because of moral abhorrence and objection to its connection with the world revolutionary movement. The third point was to be added shortly by Secretary of State Hughes. When the Republicans came to office under Harding, the Soviets again appealed for the establishment of diplomatic relations to facilitate trade. Hughes replied through the American representative in Reval: "It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property, and the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labor."¹⁶ In the ensuing years these two statements were to be repeated in

14. Frederick L. Schuman, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*. International Publishers, 1929, p. 345.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

varying forms by the representatives of the United States in reply to inquiries regarding Soviet relations, whether addressed by the Soviet Government, American Senators, or private individuals. They were also to find reflection in American foreign policy.

International Relations

The first case in which the problem of dealing with the Soviets arose was the Washington Conference at the end of 1921. Both the Soviet Government and the Government of the Far Eastern Republic^{16a} protested against being excluded, but the American Government refused to consider inviting them, on the grounds that they did not represent the Russian people. (Boris Skvirsky was allowed to attend as an unofficial representative of the Far Eastern Republic.) On the other hand the United States took it upon itself to protect the Russian interests and proclaimed that the conference must have a "moral trusteeship" of the "legitimate Russian interests." This implied securing a further assurance from Japan that its troops would be withdrawn from Russian territory, since the American Government felt responsible for initiating Far Eastern intervention. It also involved making arrangements about the Chinese Eastern Railway and two resolutions regarding it were adopted at the close of the conference, later to be protested by the Soviets. The first of these, signed by China and the Powers, merely stated that the railroad needed better management and protection. The second, signed by all the Powers except China, held the Chinese Government responsible for the obligations to foreign investors and creditors of the CER Company. It was on the basis of this that the United States protested the Chinese-Soviet agreement of 1924 regarding the CER.

Since the United States declined to attend the Genoa and Hague conferences in 1922, called to try to adjust relations with the Soviets, it was not until the disarmament conferences of later years that representatives of the two countries found themselves at the same conference table. There, despite considerable agreement in views on the general principles of disarmament, mutual hostility and suspicion continued, which colored all their other relations. Friction developed in the Far East when the

16a. The Far Eastern Republic existed as a buffer state between the RSFSR and Japan from April 6, 1920 to November 14, 1922. It was then taken into the USSR. Its territory extended from Lake Baikal to the Pacific in the section south of what is now the Yakutsk ASSR.

Soviets elevated their representative in China to the rank of Ambassador and there followed the petty quarrel over the keys to the Embassy. And again this antagonism flashed into prominence in 1929 when the United States sought to remind the USSR of its obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact during the conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway. It will be recalled that, following incidents on the railway infringing the rights of Soviet administrators, fighting spread to the Manchurian border. Soviet troops then entered Manchuria to reestablish the *status quo ante*. After the defeat of the Manchurian armed forces, the Soviet troops evacuated Manchurian territory and negotiations were carried out for a settlement. The second American note (and identical notes from France and England) was delivered to the Soviets on December 3, 1929, after hostilities had ceased and negotiations had been undertaken. The Soviet reply expressed extreme resentment at American interference, especially in view of the fact that the United States refused to have diplomatic relations with the USSR.¹⁷ And so the official pin-pricks continued right down to the time of recognition.

But in many unofficial ways there was closer contact between the two countries. The outstanding example of this was the American Relief Administration in its work to alleviate the suffering from the famine in Russia during 1921, 1922 and 1923. In August, 1921, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Government and the A.R.A. on the condition that any Americans held in Soviet prisons would be released; that the A.R.A. could work without Soviet interference but would be assured transport and housing; and that in return it would administer relief to all and would not engage in anti-Soviet propaganda. This project was carried out completely successfully despite the anomalous situation of the semi-official status of the A.R.A. The head of the A.R.A. was Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce; some of the funds were appropriated by Congress; surplus products were turned over from the War Department; \$10,000,000 in Soviet gold was accepted in the account of the A.R.A. for purchase of foodstuffs without question as to its title. Through the services of the A.R.A. some 90 per cent of the relief was administered and its offices collected over \$66,000,000 for these purposes.¹⁸

17. *Sovetsko-Amerikanskii Otnosheniia 1919-1933*. NKID, Moscow, 1934.

18. See H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia 1919-1923: Operations of the American Relief Administration*. The Macmillan Company, 1927.

Commercial Relations

The World War had catapulted American sales to Russia during 1915-1917, but following the Revolution the figures came to represent only trade with the sections of the country not under Soviet control. It was not until the blockade was lifted in 1920 that normal trading was resumed and even then, in 1921 and 1922, the figures were inflated by shipments to the A.R.A. Beginning in 1924, American trade with the Soviet Union began to develop rapidly. When the internal economy of the country was for the first time permitted to develop under peace-time conditions, extensive imports were demanded to restore the existing industries, decimated by more than seven years of warfare.

The nature of American trade with the Soviet Union since 1924 has been fairly constant, with one notable exception. Until 1930, the Soviets purchased vast quantities of American cotton, but since the development of Soviet cotton acreage in Central Asia this item has dwindled to the vanishing point. Mention should also be made of the fact that for a number of years the USSR was also a purchaser of American grain. Aside from these two raw materials, American sales have been predominantly machinery and manufactured goods. Within this category there have been many shifts in the items purchased, as the Soviet economy concentrated first on one aspect of its industrial set-up and then on another. In some years, the Soviets have been the largest foreign customers of certain American industries: as has been stressed frequently, the USSR, in the midst of its first Five-Year Plan of plant expansion, played a very tangible part in tiding the American machine-tool industry over the worst years of the depression. In 1930 and 1931 the Soviet Union took 18.3 per cent and 27.5 per cent of total American exports of industrial equipment, and as much as 36.3 per cent and 66 per cent on agricultural machinery exports.¹⁹

American imports from the Soviet Union have also continued constant: furs, crabmeat and fish products, and manganese ore have been the large items.

Foreign trade was made a state monopoly in the USSR in April, 1918, and since then has been handled by government or cooperative agencies. Early in 1924 the Amtorg Trading Corpora-

19. For further figures on this point, see, *Handbook of the Soviet Union*. American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, 1936. pp. 361-362.

tion, amalgamating two earlier Soviet commercial organizations in this country, was organized under the laws of the State of New York to effect the bulk of the purchases in the United States. There have also been many special buying commissions sent here by various branches of Soviet industry and agriculture which have negotiated purchases independently of Amtorg, but this practice has been declining in recent years. To facilitate commercial relations, the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce was reorganized in 1926 by American firms doing business with the Soviets, and from 1927 until the spring of 1940 it maintained an office in Moscow as well as in New York.

Two factors served to expand Soviet-American commercial intercourse in the years of non-recognition. The first of these was American participation in foreign concessions granted by the USSR under the New Economic Policy. While American business did not share in this to the extent of British capital, there were several large enterprises: The W. A. Harriman & Co. concession (1925) on the Chiaturi Manganese Mines, the Hammer Pencil Concession and American participation in the Lena Goldfields concession.²⁰

Most of the contracts lapsed or were bought out by the Soviet Government, so that by 1931 there were only twenty-seven in existence. In December, 1937, the Chief Concessions Committee was liquidated and the few remaining concessions, such as the Japanese coal and oil concession of Sakhalin, were put under the Commissariat of Foreign Trade.

American participation was much more substantial in the technical assistance contracts which were initiated at the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928. Sixty, or one-third of the total, were held by American concerns. Among the best known were: Hugh L. Cooper and Co. for the Dnieper hydroelectric project; International General Electric; Ford Motor Co. with the Austin Co. for the Gorky automobile plant; Curtiss-Wright Corporation; Sperry Gyroscope Co., etc.²¹ The total value of the contracts of this sort is not generally available, but that it was very substantial is well known. By the end of the

20. For further information on the concessions, see *Exports, Imports and Concessions of the Soviet Union*, Moscow; Butkovskii, V., *Inostrannye Kontsessii*, Moscow, 1928; Bron, Saul G., *Soviet Economic Development and American Business*. Horace Liveright, New York, 1930.

21. *Handbook of the Soviet Union*, op. cit. p. 377; Bron, op. cit. p. 144.

second Five-Year Plan almost all of these had expired and there were few foreign technical experts working in the USSR.

Despite the rapid rise of American trade with the Soviet Union during the years before recognition, there were serious obstacles affecting its development, first by hindering credit facilities in the United States and second by blocking Soviet sales in the American market which would have made available further Soviet purchasing power here.

From 1920 until the establishment of diplomatic relations, the United States Assay Office refused to accept Soviet gold, on the grounds that its title was in dispute. All gold presented at the mint had to be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the owner "does hereby represent and warrant that said gold is not of Bolshevik origin, and has never been in the possession of the so-called Bolshevik Government of Russia."²² In the years immediately following the Revolution this was a particularly serious obstacle to Soviet purchases in this country, as the USSR was in no position to export sufficient goods to pay for its imports, but it had considerable gold stocks.

As to credit arrangements after 1920, the United States took the position that while it would put no obstacles in the way of ordinary credits for exchange of goods, it opposed the floating of Soviet securities in the American market or the issuance of loans secured by Soviet railways and other property against which pre-war loans had been issued.²³ Furthermore, commercial bills and acceptances of Amtorg could not be discounted or rediscounted in the banks of the Federal Reserve System. Accordingly, only in cases of transaction with large American firms could the Soviets get anywhere nearly as favorable credit terms as in European countries where they had received general government-guaranteed credits.

Two small Soviet gold bond issues were marketed in the United States: an issue of \$1,000,000 in 1932 and an issue of \$10,000,000 in 1933 by the Soviet-American Securities Corporation. And, finally, on the eve of recognition in July, 1933, the R.F.C. advanced funds to Amtorg for cotton purchases in the American market.²⁴

22. *The United States and the Soviet Union. op. cit.* p. 250.

23. See statement of Secretary of State Kellogg on April 14, 1928. Schuman, *op. cit.* p. 354.

24. For terms of the loan, see *The United States and the Soviet Union, op. cit.* p. 187.

The imposition of bans or prohibitive duties on certain Soviet exports to this country arose out of charges of dumping or the employment of convict labor. Although only two of these bans stood after court investigation (on pulpwood and lumber from the Soviet north, February 10, 1931, and on matches, May 10, 1930), the sale of many products was interrupted for months or even years while investigations were being carried on. Among the more important products so affected—none of which incidentally could be produced in the United States in sufficient quantities—were asbestos, manganese, and apatite. All of these proceedings were instituted after the 1929 crash and seem to have been just recrudescence of extreme protectionism. Finally, imports of Soviet anthracite coal were subject to a special tax under the Revenue Act of 1932 as being imported from a country which sold more coal to the United States than it bought here. It was such a series of hindrances to American-Soviet trade that were having an effect on the volume of trade and accounting in large part for the drastic decline after 1931. The lack of a trade agreement, even without recognition, was keenly felt.

IV. Recognition

Soon after the Democrats came to office under Roosevelt in 1933 there were indications of a change in attitude toward relations with the USSR. In March, the President broke precedent by addressing a communication directly to M. Kalinin in his proposal to fifty-four nations on disarmament and economic reconstruction. This was followed by Soviet participation in the World Economic Conference in London. Then came the R.F.C. loan mentioned above and finally on October 10, President Roosevelt addressed an invitation to M. Kalinin to send a representative to this country to establish diplomatic relations. (See p. 27.) This action has generally been attributed to a desire to improve trade relations and to the exigencies of the Far Eastern situation, where Japan's attack on China had already impaired American interests in Manchuria and had led to clashes along the Soviet border. The common threat from Japan seemed to be as compelling a force as had been fear of Britain in the early nineteenth century in acting to draw the two countries together.

By November 16, a formal exchange of notes had taken place between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov, and soon Ambassador Bullitt and Ambassador Troyanovsky were in their new posts.

Debt Negotiations

Almost immediately negotiations were opened on the debt question. American governmental claims arose out of advances to the Provisional Government totalling \$187,729,750; \$406,082 for surplus war materials; and \$4,465,465 for the A.R.A., making a grand total of \$192,601,297 on principal. The interest amounted to over \$8,000,000 per year, bringing the amount up to about \$325,000,000 in 1933.²⁵

In addition to this sum, there were the private claims. An estimate made in the American Foundation Report, quoted above (p. 103) places this figure at \$400,000,000 including \$86,000,000 in American holdings of the repudiated Tsarist bonds; \$58,875,000 in capital investments in the confiscated properties; and the balance in losses sustained by American citizens resident in Russia during the war. Of all these claims, only that of the International General Electric had been settled, in connection with its technical aid contract, signed in 1928.

The Soviet decrees of April 28, 1918 (on confiscation) and of February 3, 1918 (on repudiation of the Tsarist debts) gave rise to these claims. At no time has the Soviet Government admitted the legality of the claims as such, declaring it within the competence of a Revolutionary Government to repudiate the debts of its predecessors, and of any government to confiscate property, especially as these decrees applied equally to its own citizens and to foreigners. It has, however, almost from the outset been willing to discuss some kind of compensation as a *quid pro quo* in making a settlement with other countries. In his reply to the invitation to the Prinkipo Conference, on February 4, 1919, Foreign Commissar Chicherin offered to make some settlement of the debt question; to pay interest on the loans in return for deliveries of raw materials, and to arrange some compensation for foreign capitalists by granting them liberal

25. *The United States and the Soviet Union*, op. cit. p. 93.

concessions on their former properties. Bullitt brought to Paris Lenin's peace proposals, including a statement of willingness to recognize the financial obligations of the Russian Empire to the foreign states and their citizens which entered an agreement with the Soviets. They also came both to Genoa and the Hague with similar offers of a *quid pro quo* adjustment of the debt question. By the Rapallo Treaty in 1922 the situation was changed somewhat by the fact that Germany renounced its claims provided that the USSR did not "satisfy similar claims made by any third state," thus setting an important precedent in recognizing the Soviet decrees on confiscation and repudiation.

Nonetheless, the United States and the USSR entered into negotiations on much the same *quid pro quo* basis. In the notes exchanged at the time of the establishment of relations, the Soviets had waived their counter-claims arising out of the American Siberian expedition and had transferred their claims against individual Americans to the United States Government. This left only the counter-claims from the Archangel expedition. The negotiations were carried on throughout 1934, but no public statement has ever been made on the reason for their breakdown. It is assumed that the matter hinged on the nature of the credits or loans to be made by the United States in return for an adjustment of the debt claims. The breakdown of the conversations was an inauspicious beginning for the new relations, and further, it had repercussions in the sphere of hoped-for trade expansion. The Johnson Act, passed in 1934, prohibiting government credits to countries in default on their debts, was interpreted to cover the USSR and thus immobilized the Export-Import Bank which had been set up a few months before to facilitate Soviet-American commerce.

A second discordant note was sounded in the summer of 1935 when the United States Government protested to the Soviets on speeches made at the Comintern Congress by an American Communist Party leader. The United States claimed that it was in contravention of the agreement regarding interference in the internal affairs of the other country. Other governments had made similar protests to the Soviet Union in the past and it is therefore worth noting the Soviet reply that the Government of the USSR has never assumed any obligations with regard to the

Communist International.²⁶ The United States replied that the agreement covered the Comintern.

On the credit side of the ledger of the new relations was the cordiality arising out of such things as the Trans-Polar flights, Ambassador Davies' tours of Soviet industrial centers, Soviet participation in the New York World's Fair, to name but a few instances.²⁷ But even more telling were the developments in the international scene. First the resurgence of the Far Eastern war alarmed both countries; at the behest of the United States the Soviet Union was invited to attend the Nine-Power Conference at Brussels in 1937. Then with frightening speed came the developments in Europe and the two countries more than once exchanged notes on the need for peace and the dangers of the spread of war. (cf. Hull's statement of July 16, 1937 and the Soviet reply, August 8, 1937; Litvinov's statement of March, 1938; the exchange of notes between President Roosevelt and Kalinin in April, 1939.)

At the same time, trade was slowly expanding. Beginning in July, 1935, a trade agreement has been negotiated each year, under the first two of which the Soviet Union guaranteed to buy \$30,000,000 of American goods in return for the tariff concessions granted under the reciprocal trade agreements. Since 1937, the agreements have given the USSR most-favored-nation treatment in return for a guarantee of purchases amounting to \$40,000,000. Lack of credit facilities has continued to hamper trade expansion.

Relations Since September, 1939

The perspective of time does not yet allow any thorough treatment of the new situation, growing out of the European war, nor does the quick shifting of current events permit of any conclusions as to future trends, but it is perhaps worthwhile to enumerate the episodes which have exacerbated Soviet-American relations during the past year.²⁸

In October, 1939, scarcely six weeks after the outbreak of war, the American ship, *The City of Flint*, was brought into Mur-

26. *New York Times*, August 28, 1935; see also in Stalin's interview with Roy Howard, in which he says: "The point is that official persons in either country must refrain from interfering in the internal life of the other country. Our officials are honestly fulfilling this obligation. If any of them has failed in his duty, let us be informed about it."

27. For fuller treatment of cultural relations, see, H. Moore, "Five Years of American-Soviet Relations," *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, January, 1939.

28. For a detailed chronology see the issues of *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*.

mansk with a German crew which had seized it for carrying contraband. The United States demanded its release under the care of the American crew, but the Soviet Government ordered it to leave Murmansk with the Germans in charge. It appears that the Soviets were within their rights under international law,²⁹ nonetheless the ill-will engendered by the handling of this incident was considerable. This was followed by a verbal passage of arms when Molotov charged the United States with interference in the Soviet-Finnish negotiations and President Roosevelt reissued the exchange of notes between himself and Kalinin in April.

The outbreak of the Finnish war in December brought matters to a head. The Soviets considered that interference by foreign countries in the negotiations had aggravated the situation. The United States, for its part, applied three "moral embargoes" to the Soviet Union—on sales of airplanes, materials for the manufacture of airplanes, and technical equipment for refining high-test gasoline. It also extended aid to Finland through a R.F.C. credit and encouraged all possible aid of public and private nature. The atmosphere became acrimonious; there were demands for breaking relations with the USSR; attitudes became somewhat reminiscent of 1919-1920.

After the conclusion of peace, the moral embargoes remained in force and do so to this day as far as is known publicly. Further trading difficulties arose out of the American wartime regulations,³⁰ such as the embargo on shipments of machine tools and the regulations of the Maritime Commission. As a result, when the trade pact was renewed in August, the Soviets qualified their purchase guarantee by reserving the right to suspend it if American restrictions interfered with shipments.

As efforts were being made to straighten out some of these difficulties, the issue of the Baltic states came up. Since the United States had never recognized Rumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia, the State Department made no comment on Soviet repossession of this territory. However, the admission into the USSR of the Baltic States, whose independence the United States had reluctantly recognized in 1922, some four years after the Soviets had done so, was received quite differently. Just prior to

29. See *New York Times*, October 25, 1939 for Dr. Jessup's opinion.

30. For fuller treatment, see *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, July 19, 1940.

the amalgamation of Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania in the USSR, the United States Treasury "froze" their funds and property in this country and the State Department condemned the action.

In recent weeks conversations have been resumed in Washington between the State Department and the Soviet Ambassador regarding these points of dispute. Some shipments of Soviet purchases of machine tools have been released for export, and Amtorg has been able to charter a number of ships to carry the freight.

In reviewing the past two years of American-Soviet relations, it appears that up to the outbreak of the European War, American-Soviet relations were gaining in their cordiality, trade was expanding and in no areas were their interests in conflict. Since September, 1939, the two countries have both remained neutral, but their attitudes toward the war have differed. The United States through its avowed sympathy for the Allied cause has become increasingly involved in extending aid to Britain. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, while retaining its attitude of neutrality, has regulated its relations with Germany under the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August, 1939. The differences arising out of the European situation have been offset to some extent in another sector of the world, in the Far East. There the United States and the USSR have come to follow somewhat the same course in giving aid, in varying degrees, to China. The new Tri-Partite Alliance, bringing Japan into a military alliance with Germany and Italy, has increased American concern in the Far Eastern struggle, both in China and in its extension to other areas in southeastern Asia. There are at present some indications that the Soviet Union and Japan may succeed in normalizing their relations to the extent of signing a non-aggression pact along the lines suggested by the Soviets for some time past. Such a contingency has already been rather generally discounted and is not expected to change the basic position of the Soviet Union or the United States in that area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The White House
Washington, October 10, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

Since the beginning of my administration, I have contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia.

It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practical method of communicating directly with each other.

The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are serious but not, in my opinion, insoluble; and difficulties between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations. If you are of similar mind, I should be glad to receive any representatives you may designate to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our countries.

Participation in such a discussion would, of course, not commit either nation to any future course of action, but would indicate a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems involved. It is my hope that such conversations might result in good to the people of both our countries.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Mr. Mikhail Kalinin,
President of the All-Union Central Executive Committee,
Moscow.

* * *

Moscow, October 17, 1933.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of October tenth.

I have always considered most abnormal and regrettable a situation wherein, during the past sixteen years, two great republics—the United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics—have lacked the usual methods of communication and have been deprived of the benefits which such communication could give. I am glad to note that you also reached the same conclusions.

There is no doubt that difficulties, present or arising, between two countries, can be solved only when direct relations exist between them; and that, on the other hand, they have no chance for solution in the absence of such relations. I shall take the liberty further to express the opinion that the abnormal situation, to which you correctly refer in your message, has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned, but also on the general international situation, increasing the element of disquiet, complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace.

In accordance with the above, I gladly accept your proposal to send to the United States a representative of the Soviet Government to discuss with you the questions of interest to our countries. The Soviet Government will be represented by Mr. M. M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who will come to Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MIKHAIL KALININ.

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

**Exchange of Communications between President Roosevelt
and Mr. Litvinov, November 16**

The White House

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. Litvinov:

I am very happy to inform you that as a result of our conversations the Government of the United States has decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to exchange ambassadors.

I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world.

[28]

I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Mr. Maxim M. Litvinov,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* * *

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

I am very happy to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is glad to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the United States and to exchange ambassadors.

I, too, share the hope that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* * *

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two Governments it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions.

2. To refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or

propaganda having as an aim the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

3. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group—which makes claim to be the Government of, or makes attempt upon the territorial integrity of, the United States, its territories or possessions; not to form, subsidize, support or permit on its territory military organizations or groups having the aim of armed struggle against the United States, its territories or possessions, and to prevent any recruiting on behalf of such organizations and groups.

4. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group—which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF,
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* * *

The White House
Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. Litvinov:

I am glad to have received the assurance expressed in your note to me of this date that it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

[Here follow points 1, 2, 3 and 4 as in Mr. Litvinoff's Note above.]

It will be the fixed policy of the Executive of the United States within the limits of the powers conferred by the Constitution and

the laws of the United States to adhere reciprocally to the engagements above expressed.

I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

* * *

The White House

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. Litvinov:

As I have told you in our recent conversations, it is my expectation that after the establishment of normal relations between our two countries many Americans will wish to reside temporarily or permanently within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and I am deeply concerned that they should enjoy in all respects the same freedom of conscience and religious liberty which they enjoy at home.

As you well know, the Government of the United States, since the foundation of the Republic, has always striven to protect its nationals, at home and abroad, in the free exercise of liberty of conscience and religious worship, and from all disability or persecution on account of their religious faith or worship. And I need scarcely point out that the rights enumerated below are those enjoyed in the United States by all citizens and foreign nationals and by American nationals in all the major countries of the world.

The Government of the United States, therefore, will expect that nationals of the United States of America within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be allowed to conduct without annoyance or molestation of any kind religious services and rites of a ceremonial nature, including baptismal, confirmation, communion, marriage and burial rites, in the English language, or in any other language which is customarily used in the practice of the religious faith to which they belong, in churches, houses, or other buildings appropriate for such service, which they will be given the right and opportunity to lease, erect or maintain in convenient situations.

We will expect that nationals of the United States will have the right to collect from their co-religionists and to receive from abroad voluntary offerings for religious purposes; that they will be entitled without restriction to impart religious instruction to

their children, either singly or in groups, or to have such instruction imparted by persons whom they may employ for such purpose; that they will be given and protected in the right to bury their dead according to their religious customs in suitable and convenient places established for that purpose, and given the right and opportunity to lease, lay out, occupy and maintain such burial grounds subject to reasonable sanitary laws and regulations.

We will expect that religious groups or congregations composed of nationals of the United States of America in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be given the right to have their spiritual needs ministered to by clergymen, priests, rabbis or other ecclesiastical functionaries who are nationals of the United States of America, and that such clergymen, priests, rabbis or other ecclesiastical functionaries will be protected from all disability or persecution and will not be denied entry into the territory of the Soviet Union because of their ecclesiastical status.

I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

* * *

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to your letter of November 16, 1933, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a fixed policy accords the nationals of the United States within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the following rights referred to by you:

1. The right to "free exercise of liberty of conscience and religious worship" and protection "from all disability or persecution on account of their religious faith or worship."

This right is supported by the following laws and regulations existing in the various republics of the Union:

Every person may profess any religion or none. All restrictions of rights connected with the profession of any belief whatsoever, or with the non-profession of any belief, are annulled. (Decree of Jan. 23, 1918, art. 3)

Within the confines of the Soviet Union it is prohibited to issue

any local laws or regulations restricting or limiting freedom of conscience, or establishing privileges or preferential rights of any kind based upon the religious profession of any person. (Decree of Jan. 23, 1918, art. 2)

2. The right to "conduct without annoyance or molestation of any kind religious services and rites of a ceremonial nature."

This right is supported by the following laws:

— A free performance of religious rites is guaranteed as long as it does not interfere with public order and is not accompanied by interference with the rights of citizens of the Soviet Union. Local authorities possess the right in such cases to adopt all necessary measures to preserve public order and safety. (Decree of Jan. 2, 1918, art. 5)

Interference with the performance of religious rites, in so far as they do not endanger public order and are not accompanied by infringements on the rights of others is punishable by compulsory labor for a period up to six months. (Criminal Code, art. 127)

3. "The right and opportunity to lease, erect or maintain in convenient situations" churches, houses or other buildings appropriate for religious purposes.

This right is supported by the following laws and regulations:

— Believers belonging to a religious society with the object of making provision for their requirements in the matter of religion may lease under contract, free of charge, from the Sub-District or District Executive Committee or from the Town Soviet, special buildings for the purpose of worship and objects intended exclusively for the purposes of their cult. (Decree of April 8, 1929, art. 10)

Furthermore, believers who have formed a religious society or a group of believers may use for religious meetings other buildings which have been placed at their disposal on lease by private persons or by local Soviets and Executive Committees. All rules established for houses of worship are applicable to these buildings. Contracts for the use of such buildings shall be concluded by individual believers who will be held responsible for their execution. In addition, these buildings must comply with the sanitary and technical building regulations. (Decree of April 8, 1929, art. 10.)

The place of worship and religious property shall be handed over for the use of believers forming a religious society under a contract concluded in the name of the competent District Executive Committee or Town Soviet by the competent administrative department or branch, or directly by the Sub-District Executive Committee. (Decree of April 8, 1929, art. 15)

The construction of new places of worship may take place at the desire of religious societies provided that the usual technical building regulations and the special regulations laid down by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs are observed. (Decree of April 8, 1929, art. 45.)

4. "The right to collect from their co-religionists . . . voluntary offerings for religious purposes."

This right is supported by the following law:

Members of groups of believers and religious societies may raise subscriptions among themselves and collect voluntary offerings, both in the place of worship itself and outside it, but only amongst the members of the religious association concerned and only for purposes connected with the upkeep of the place of worship and the religious property, for the engagement of ministers of religion and for the expenses of their executive body. Any form of forced contribution in aid of religious associations is punishable under the Criminal Code. (Decree of April 8, 1929, art. 54)

5. Right to "impart religious instruction to their children either singly or in groups or to have such instruction imparted by persons whom they may employ for such purpose."

This right is supported by the following law:

The school is separated from the Church. Instruction in religious doctrines is not permitted in any governmental and common schools, nor in private teaching institutions where general subjects are taught. Persons may give or receive religious instruction in a private manner. (Decree of Jan. 23, 1918, art. 9)

Furthermore, the Soviet Government is prepared to include in a consular convention to be negotiated immediately following the establishment of relations between our two countries provisions in which nationals of the United States shall be granted rights with reference to freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion which shall not be less favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by nationals

of the nation most favored in this respect. In this connection, I have the honor to call to your attention Article 9 of the Treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, October 12, 1925, which reads as follows:

Nationals of each of the Contracting Parties . . . shall be entitled to hold religious services in churches, houses or other buildings, rented, according to the laws of the country, in their national language or in any other language which is customary in their religion. They shall be entitled to bury their dead in accordance with their religious practice in burial-grounds established and maintained by them with the approval of the competent authorities, so long as they comply with the police regulations of the other Party in respect of buildings and public health.

Furthermore, I desire to state that the rights specified in the above paragraphs will be granted to American nationals immediately upon the establishment of relations between our two countries.

Finally, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while reserving to itself the right of refusing visas to Americans desiring to enter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on personal grounds, does not intend to base such refusals on the fact of such persons having an ecclesiastical status.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* * *

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

Following our conversations I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government is prepared to include in a consular convention to be negotiated immediately following the establishment of relations between our two countries provisions in which nationals of the United States shall be granted rights with reference to legal protection which shall not be less favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by

nationals of the nation must favored in this respect. Furthermore, I desire to state that such rights will be granted to American nationals immediately upon the establishment of relations between our two countries.

In this connection I have the honor to call to your attention Article 11 and the Protocol to Article 11, of the Agreement Concerning Conditions of Residence and Business and Legal Protection in General concluded between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 12, 1925.

ARTICLE 11

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to adopt the necessary measures to inform the consul of the other Party as soon as possible whenever a national of the country which he represents is arrested in his district.

The same procedure shall apply if a prisoner is transferred from one place of detention to another.

FINAL PROTOCOL

Ad Article 11

1. The Consul shall be notified either by a communication from the person arrested or by the authorities themselves direct. Such communications shall be made within a period not exceeding seven times twenty-four hours, and in large towns, including capitals of districts, within a period not exceeding three times twenty-four hours.

2. In places of detention of all kinds, requests made by consular representatives to visit nationals of their country under arrest, or to have them visited by their representatives, shall be granted without delay. The consular representative shall not be entitled to require officials of the courts or prisons to withdraw during his interview with the person under arrest.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[36]

The White House
Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. Litvinov:

I thank you for your letter of November 16, 1933, informing me that the Soviet Government is prepared to grant to nationals of the United States rights with reference to legal protection not less favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by nationals of the nation most favored in this respect. I have noted the provisions of the treaty and protocol concluded between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 12, 1925.

I am glad that nationals of the United States will enjoy the protection afforded by these instruments immediately upon the establishment of relations between our countries and I am fully prepared to negotiate a consular convention covering these subjects as soon as practicable. Let me add that American diplomatic and consular officers in the Soviet Union will be zealous in guarding the rights of American nationals, particularly the right to a fair, public and speedy trial and the right to be represented by counsel of their choice. We shall expect that the nearest American diplomatic or consular officer shall be notified immediately of any arrest or detention of an American national, and that he shall promptly be afforded the opportunity to communicate and converse with such national.

I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

* * *

In reply to a question of the President in regard to prosecutions for economic espionage, Mr. Litvinov gave the following explanation:

"The widespread opinion that the dissemination of economic information from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is allowed only in so far as this information has been published in newspapers or magazines, is erroneous. The right to obtain economic information is limited in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as in other countries, only in the case of business and production secrets and in the case of the employment of forbidden methods (bribery, theft, fraud, etc.), to obtain such information. The category of business and production secrets naturally

includes the official economic plans, in so far as they have not been made public, but not individual reports concerning the production conditions and the general conditions of individual enterprises.

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has also no reason to complicate or hinder the critical examination of its economic organization. It naturally follows from this that every one has the right to talk about economic matters or to receive information about such matters in the Union, insofar as the information for which he has asked or which has been imparted to him is not such as may not, on the basis of special regulations issued by responsible officials or by the appropriate state enterprises, be made known to outsiders. (This principle applies primarily to information concerning economic trends and tendencies.)"

* * *

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

Following our conversations I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that, preparatory to a final settlement of the claims and counter claims between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and the claims of their nationals, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not take any steps to enforce any decisions of courts or initiate any new litigations for the amounts admitted to be due or that may be found to be due it, as the successor of prior Governments of Russia, or otherwise, from American nationals, including corporations, companies, partnerships, or associations, and also the claim against the United States of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, now in litigation in the United States Court of Claims, and will not object to such amounts being assigned and does hereby release and assign all such amounts to the Government of the United States, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be duly notified in each case of any amount realized by the Government of the United States from such release and assignment.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further agrees, preparatory to the settlement referred to above, not to make any claim with respect to:

[38]

- (a) judgments rendered or that may be rendered by American courts in so far as they relate to property, or rights, or interests therein, in which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its nationals may have had or may claim to have an interest; or,
- (b) acts done or settlements made by or with the Government of the United States, or public officials in the United States, or its nationals, relating to property, credits, or obligations of any Government of Russia or nationals thereof.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* * *

The White House

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. Litvinov:

I am happy to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 16, 1933, in which you state that:

[Here follows, in direct quotation, Mr. Litvinoff's above note beginning:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that, preparatory to a final settlement of the claims and counter claims . . ."]

I am glad to have these undertakings by your Government and I shall be pleased to notify your Government in each case of any amount realized by the Government of the United States from the release and assignment to it of the amounts admitted to be due, or that may be found to be due, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of the amounts that may be found to be due on the claim of the Russian Volunteer Fleet.

I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

Washington, November 16, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that, following our conversations and following my examination of certain documents of the years 1918 to 1921 relating to the attitude of the American Government toward the expedition into Siberia, the operations there of foreign military forces and the inviolability of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that it will waive any and all claims of whatsoever character arising out of activities of military forces of the United States in Siberia, or assistance to military forces in Siberia subsequent to January 1, 1918, and that such claims shall be regarded as finally settled and disposed of by this agreement.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* * *

The White House,

Washington, November 16, 1933

Joint Statement by the President and Mr. Litvinov

In addition to the agreements which we have signed today, there has taken place an exchange of views with regard to methods of settling all outstanding questions of indebtedness and claims that permits us to hope for a speedy and satisfactory solution of these questions which both our Governments desire to have out of the way as soon as possible.

Mr. Litvinov will remain in Washington for several days for further discussion.

[Source: *Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1933]

1940 TRADE AGREEMENT

The text of the identic notes exchanged at Moscow between the American Chargé, Mr. Walter C. Thurston, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. I. Mikoyan, is as follows:

Moscow, August 6, 1940

Excellency:

In accordance with the conversations which have taken place, I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government the agreement which has been reached between the Governments of our respective countries that the agreement regarding commercial relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recorded in the exchange of notes of August 4, 1937, between the Ambassador of the United States of America and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which came into force on August 6, 1937 on the date of proclamation thereof by the President of the United States of America and approval thereof by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which was renewed on August 5, 1938, and August 2, 1939, shall continue in force until August 6, 1941. The present agreement should be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Accept [etc.]

WALTER C. THURSTON

The following text is that of the agreement of August 4, 1937:¹

With reference to recent conversations which have taken place in regard to commerce between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to confirm and to make of record by this note the following agreement which has been reached between the Governments of our respective countries:

One. The United States of America will grant to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment in all matters concerning customs duties and charges of every kind and in the method of levying duties, and, further, in all matters concerning the rules, formalities and charges imposed in connection with the clearing of

1. Executive Agreement Series No. 105.

goods through the customs, and with respect to all laws or regulations affecting the sale or use of imported goods within the country.

Accordingly, natural or manufactured products having their origin in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall in no case be subject, in regard to the matters referred to above, to any duties, taxes or charges other or higher, or to any rules or formalities other or more burdensome, than those to which the like products having their origin in any third country are or may hereafter be subject.

Similarly, natural or manufactured products exported from the territory of the United States of America and consigned to the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall in no case be subject with respect to exportation and in regard to the above-mentioned matters, to any duties, taxes, or charges other or higher, or to any rules or formalities other or more burdensome, than those to which the like products when consigned to the territory of any third country are or may hereafter be subject.

Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity which has been or may hereafter be granted by the United States of America in regard to the above-mentioned matters, to a natural or manufactured product originating in any third country or consigned to the territory of any third country shall be accorded immediately and without compensation to the like product originating in or consigned to the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It is understood that so long as and in so far as existing law of the United States of America may otherwise require, the foregoing provisions, in so far as they would otherwise relate to duties, taxes or charges on coal, coke manufactured therefrom, or coal or coke briquettes, shall not apply to such products imported into the United States of America. If the law of the United States of America shall not permit the complete operation of the foregoing provisions with respect to the above-mentioned products, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reserves the right within fifteen days after January 1, 1938, to terminate this agreement in its entirety on thirty days' written notice.

It is understood, furthermore, that the advantages now accorded or which may hereafter be accorded by the United States

of America, its territories or possessions, the Philippine Islands, or the Panama Canal Zone to one another or to the Republic of Cuba shall be excepted from the operation of this agreement.

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption of measures prohibiting or restricting the exportation or importation of gold or silver, or to prevent the adoption of such measures as the Government of the United States of America may see fit with respect to the control of the export or sale for export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war, and, in exceptional cases, all other military supplies. It is understood that any action which may be taken by the President of the United States of America under the authority of Section 2 (b) of the Neutrality Act of 1937 in regard to the passage of title to goods shall not be considered as contravening any of the provisions of this agreement relating to the exportation of natural or manufactured products from the territory of the United States of America.

Subject to the requirement that no arbitrary discrimination shall be effected by the United States of America against importations from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in favor of those from any third country, the foregoing provisions shall not extend to prohibitions or restrictions (1) imposed on moral or humanitarian grounds, (2) designed to protect human, animal, or plant life, (3) relating to prison-made goods, or (4) relating to the enforcement of police or revenue laws.

Two. On its part the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will take steps to increase substantially the amount of purchases in the United States of America for export to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States of America.

Three. This agreement shall come into force on the day of proclamation thereof by the President of the United States of America and of approval thereof by the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which proclamation and approval shall take place on the same day. It shall continue in effect for twelve months. Both parties agree that not less than thirty days prior to the expiration of the aforesaid period of twelve months they shall start negotiations regarding the extension of the period during which the present agreement shall continue in force.

The following communications, exchanged between the American Chargé and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, concern the amount of purchases which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intends to make in the United States during the next twelve months in connection with the commercial agreement entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union on August 6, 1940:

Moscow, August 6, 1940

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to our recent conversations in regard to the commerce between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to ask you to let me know the value of articles, the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States of America, which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intends to purchase in the United States of America during the next twelve months for export to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Accept [etc.]

WALTER C. THURSTON . .

[Translation]

Moscow, August 6, 1940

Mr. Chargé d'Affairs:

In reply to your inquiry regarding the intended purchases by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States of America in the course of the next twelve months, I have the honor to inform you that the economic organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intend to buy in the United States of America in the course of the next twelve months American goods to the value of at least \$40,000,000.

If, however, restrictions imposed on exports by the Government of the United States should render it difficult for Soviet economic organizations to satisfy their needs in the United States, it may be impossible for these organizations to carry out their intentions. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is therefore not in a position at the present time to guarantee the above-mentioned value of its purchases in the United States.

Accept [etc.]

A. I. MIKOYAN

[44]

[Released to the press August 10]

The commercial agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed on August 6, 1940, was proclaimed by the President on August 7. On the same day, the agreement was approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[Source: *The Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 10, 1940]

UNITED STATES TRADE WITH RUSSIA AND THE USSR

Year	Total U. S. Imports	Total U. S. Exports (Including Reexports)
1910	13,828,265	19,533,761
1911	15,899,258	25,458,033
1912	28,346,870	27,315,137
1913	24,377,070	26,009,707
1914	14,569,397	27,956,337
1915	3,086,595	169,993,904
1916	8,618,695	470,508,254
1917	14,514,431	424,510,459
1918	10,760,007	17,335,518
1919	9,663,088	82,436,185
1920	12,480,586	28,727,718
1921 ¹	1,311,623	15,584,038
1922 ¹	963,932	29,894,920
1923 ¹	1,619,397	7,617,580
1924	8,168,701	42,103,713
1925	13,236,673	68,906,060
1926	14,121,992	49,905,642
1927	12,876,791	64,921,693
1928	14,024,525	74,091,235
1929	22,551,434	85,011,847
1930	24,385,786	114,398,537
1931	13,206,392	103,716,832
1932	9,735,411	12,640,891
1933	12,114,000	8,997,000
1934	12,337,000	15,011,000
1935	17,809,000	24,743,000
1936	20,517,000	33,427,000
1937	30,768,000	42,892,000
1938	24,034,000	69,691,000
1939	25,023,000	56,638,000
1940 (9 mos.)	17,309,998	62,613,639

¹ Including the Far Eastern Republic.

[Source: *The United States and the Soviet Union*. The American Foundation, 1933, p. 204, and *Trade of the United States with the USSR* in 1939, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1940, and U. S. Dept. of Commerce Release, Nov. 9, 1940.]

CHRONOLOGY

of

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- 1732 Mikhail Gvozdev, a trader, is the first Russian to reach American shores across the Pacific.
- 1799—July 8—The Russian-American Company is founded.
- 1809 Diplomatic relations are established between the Russian Empire and the United States.
- 1823—Dec. 2—The Monroe Doctrine is formulated.
- 1824—April 17—American-Russian convention establishing 54° 40' as the northern limit of American colonization.
- 1832—Dec. 18—American-Russian Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.
- 1854—July 22—American-Russian Convention as to the rights of neutrals at sea.
- 1863—Sept. 11—Admiral Popov visits San Francisco with a naval squadron.
- 1863—Sept. 24—Admiral Lessovski visits New York with a naval squadron.
- 1866—Aug. —Assistant Secretary of Navy Fox visits Russia.
- 1867—Mar. 29—The United States purchases Alaska for \$7,200,000.
- 1894 American-Russian agreement on fur-seal hunting along Russian Pacific coast and islands.
- 1905—Sept. 5—The Treaty of Portsmouth is signed, ending the Russo-Japanese War.
- 1911—Dec. 17—The United States gives notice of the termination of the 1932 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation as of Jan. 1, 1913.
- 1911 Joint fur-seal convention is signed by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan.
- 1917—Feb. 3—United States breaks relations with Germany.
- 1917—Mar. 15—The Tsar abdicates.
- 1917—Mar. 22—The United States recognizes the Provisional Government
- 1917—April 6—The United States enters the war.
- 1917—June —The Root and Stevens Missions arrive in Russia.
- 1917—July 5—Boris Bakhmeteff arrives in Washington to represent the Provisional Government.
- 1917—Nov. 7—The Provisional Government is overthrown and the Soviets come to power.
- 1917—Nov. 8—Decrees on peace and nationalization of resources and land are adopted by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
- 1917—Nov. —The United States forbids unlicensed trade with Russia.
- 1917—Nov. 25—Edgar Sisson arrives in Russia to represent the Committee on Public Information.
- 1917—Dec. 5—German-Russian truce is concluded.
- 1917—Dec. 29—The Soviets issue a peace appeal to all belligerents and announce that they will sign a separate peace if joint action is not undertaken.
- 1918—Jan. 8—President Wilson's speech outlining the "Fourteen Points."
- 1918—Feb. 3—Decree repudiating the debts of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments.
- 1918—Mar. 3—Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is signed.
- 1918—Mar. 16—Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is ratified.
- 1918—April 22—The monopoly of foreign trade is established.
- 1918—June 28—Decree nationalizing large-scale industry and commerce.
- 1918—July 2—Anglo-French forces land at Murmansk.
- 1918—July 25—The American Embassy moves from Vologda to Murmansk.
- 1918—Aug. 3—American intervention in North Russia and the Far East.
- 1918—Sept. 4—American troops land at Vladivostok.

- 1918—Sept. —“The Sisson Documents” are made public by the Committee on Public Information.
- 1919—Jan. 2—Ludwig Martens is appointed representative of the Soviet Government in the United States.
- 1919—Jan. 22—Invitation to the Prinkipo Conference is issued.
- 1919—Jan. 29—*The United States recognizes Poland.*
- 1919—Feb. —The Stevens Commission arrives in Siberia to supervise the Trans-Siberia railway.
- 1919—Feb. 4—The Soviet Government accepts the invitation to the Prinkipo Conference.
- 1919—Feb. —The Bullitt Mission is sent to Russia to sound out the Bolsheviks as to peace terms.
- 1919—June 12—Marten’s office is raided.
- 1919—June 26—American troops evacuate North Russia.
- 1919—June 26—President Wilson makes a statement to the Senate on American Intervention in Siberia.
- 1919—Oct. 15—The United States refuses to recognize Lithuania as an independent republic.
- 1920—Jan. 16—The Allied Supreme Council lifts the blockade on Russia and opens trade relations with Russian cooperatives.
- 1920—Jan. 16—The United States announces the withdrawal of its troops and railway mission from Siberia.
- 1920—July 7—*The United States lifts restrictions on Soviet trade.*
- 1920—Aug. 10—The Secretary of State Colby sends a note to Italian Ambassador stating the United States position in regard to Russia.
- 1920—Dec. 15—The U. S. Department of Labor issues a deportation ruling on Martens.
- 1920—Dec. 18—The United States removes restrictions on short-term credits and financial arrangements directly related to Russian trade transactions.
- 1921—Mar. 21—Kalinin addresses a note to President Harding suggesting the establishment of diplomatic relations.
- 1921—Mar. 25—Secretary of State Hughes replies to Kalinin, refusing negotiations.
- 1921—June 19—The Soviets protest their exclusion from the Washington Conference.
- 1921—Aug. 11—The New Economic Policy is introduced.
- 1921—Aug. 19—An agreement is signed between the Soviet Government and the American Relief Administration.
- 1921—Nov. 2—The Soviets protest their exclusion from the Washington Conference.
- 1922—Feb. 4—The Washington Conference adopts two resolutions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 1922—April 22—The Genoa Conference opens.
- 1922—May 15—Senator Borah introduces a resolution asking recognition of the Soviet Government.
- 1922—June 30—The United States ceases to recognize Boris Bakhmeteff as representative of Russia.
- 1922—July 27—The United States recognizes the Baltic States.
- 1922—Dec. 30—The first All-Union Congress of Soviets establishes the USSR.
- 1923—Spring —The last American Consul is withdrawn from Vladivostok.
- 1923—Aug. 21—The Chief Concessions Committee is established in the USSR under the Sovnarkom.
- 1923—Dec. 16—Foreign Commissar Chicherin sends a note to President Coolidge proposing the resumption of relations.
- 1923—Dec. 18—Secretary of State Hughes rejects the Soviet proposal.
- 1924—May 3—The United States protests the Sino-Soviet Agreement relating to the CER.

- 1924—May 27—The Amtorg Trading Corporation is incorporated in New York.
- 1925—April 4—The last Japanese troops are evacuated from Northern Sakhalin.
- 1927—May 4—The Dnieper Power Project is started with American technical assistance.
- 1927—Oct. 25—The Soviet Government protests its exclusion from the International Radio-Telegraph Conference in Washington.
- 1927—Dec. 1—Litvinov submits the Soviet proposal for complete disarmament to the Geneva Preparatory Conference on Disarmament.
- 1928—Mar. 6—The U. S. Secretary of Treasury forbids the Assay Office to accept a shipment of Soviet gold.
- 1928—Aug. 27—The Soviet Union adheres to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
- 1928—Oct. —An agreement is signed with the International General Electric to supply the USSR with equipment on five-year credits.
- 1929—May 31—An agreement for technical aid is signed by the Ford Motor Company.
- 1929—Nov. 1—The "Land of the Soviets" arrives in New York after a flight from Moscow.
- 1929—Dec. 2-3—The United States and the Soviet Union exchange notes through the French Embassy in regard to the Sino-Soviet Conflict on the CER.
- 1930—May 23—The United States puts prohibitive duties on Soviet matches on charges of dumping.
- 1931—Feb. 10—The United States puts a ban on the import of pulp wood and lumber from Northern Russia on charges of the employment of convict labor.
- 1932—Jan. 1—The Gorky Automobile Plant, built under the contract with Ford, starts operations.
- 1932—June 22—Litvinov supports the American disarmament proposal.
- 1933—June 20—The Soviet delegation to the World Economic Conference in London submits draft protocol on economic non-aggression.
- 1932—Aug. 25—Colonel Hugh L. Cooper and members of his staff are decorated by the Soviet Government for their work on Dnieprostroi.
- 1933—Jan. 1—Beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan.
- 1933—May 16—President Roosevelt addresses a note to the USSR, along with 53 other countries, regarding disarmament and economic reconstruction.
- 1933—July —The RFC arranges a loan to Amtorg for the purchase of surplus American cotton stocks.
- 1933—Oct. 10—President Roosevelt invites Kalinin to send a representative to discuss American-Soviet relations.
- 1933—Nov. 16—Diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are established.
- 1934—Jan. 24—Secretary of the Treasury lifts trade restrictions on Soviet gold shipments, lumber, pulp wood and matches.
- 1934—Feb. 12—An Export-Import Bank is established to facilitate Soviet-American trade.
- 1934—April 3—The first Soviet ship, the motorship *Kim*, arrives in New York.
- 1934—May 7—Attorney General Cummings rules that the Johnson Act applies to the Soviet Union and therefore makes impossible the functioning of the Export-Import Bank.
- 1934—April 12—The rescue of the *Cheliuskin* Party is completed with American aid.
- 1934—Sept. 15—The Soviet Union is invited to join the League of Nations.

- 1935—Jan. 31—The U. S. State Department announces the breakdown of American-Soviet debt negotiations.
- 1935—July 14—The first American-Soviet annual Commercial Agreement is signed.
- 1935—Aug. 9—The Fifteenth International Physiological Congress opens in Leningrad.
- 1935—Aug. 25—Ambassador Bullitt protests to the Soviet Union on speeches made at the Congress of the Third International.
- 1936—July 12—The Soviet-American Trade Agreement is extended for one year.
- 1936—Aug. 26—Ambassador Bullitt is transferred to Paris.
- 1936—Nov. 21—Joseph E. Davies is appointed American Ambassador to the USSR.
- 1937—June 20—The first Soviet Trans-Polar fliers land in Vancouver.
- 1937—July 14—The second Trans-Polar plane lands in California.
- 1937—July 21—The International Geological Congress is held in the Soviet Union.
- 1937—Aug. 6—American-Soviet Commercial agreement is renewed with the Soviets increasing their guarantee of purchases to \$40,000,000 in return for receiving the most-favored-nation treatment.
- 1937—Aug. 7—Litvinov answers Secretary Hull's declaration on world peace of July 16.
- 1937—Aug. 12—Levanovsky takes off for the third Trans-Polar flight.
- 1937—Oct. 29—The USSR accepts the invitation to attend the Nine-Power Conference in Brussels which opens on November 3.
- 1937—Nov. 25—The USSR contracts for space at the New York World's Fair.
- 1937—Dec. 11—Secretary of State Hull makes diplomatic representation to the Soviet Ambassador on behalf of Donald Robins.
- 1937—Dec. 14—The Chief Concessions Committee is abolished and the remaining concessions are put under the supervision of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade.
- 1938—June 5—Ambassador Davies on the eve of his departure to take up his new post in Brussels has interviews with Kalinin, Molotov and Stalin.
- 1938—July 12—Howard Hughes lands in Moscow on his round the world flight.
- 1938—Aug. 5—American-Soviet Commercial Agreement is extended for one year.
- 1938—Sept. 5—The Society of Jewish Farm Settlement in Russia terminates its work in the United States as being no longer necessary.
- 1938—Sept. 29—The text of President Roosevelt's appeal in connection with the Czechoslovakian crises and the Soviet reply are published in *Pravda*.
- 1939—Mar. 4—Laurence A. Steinhardt is named Ambassador to Moscow.
- 1939—Mar. 21—The Soviet proposal for a conference on the European situation is dismissed by the British as "premature."
- 1939—April 17—Kalinin sends a message to Roosevelt expressing approval of the latter's messages to Hitler and to Mussolini.
- 1939—May 10—Constantine Oumansky is named Soviet Ambassador.
- 1939—Aug. 2—The American-Soviet Trade Pact is extended for one year.
- 1939—Oct. 23—Murmansk authorities detain "City of Flint."
- 1939—Oct. 27—Soviet authorities order the "City of Flint" to leave Murmansk under its German crew.
- 1939—Dec. —The United States imposes three moral embargoes on the USSR in connection with the Finnish War.
- 1940—Feb. 6—Secretary Hull replies to Senator Pittman's letter regarding Soviet-American relations.
- 1940—Feb. 8—The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce announces the closing of its Moscow office.

- 1940—July 15—President Roosevelt issues an executive order sequestering "property in which Latvia, Esthonia or Lithuania or any national thereof has at any time thereon or since July 10, 1940, had any interest of any nature whatsoever. . . ."
- 1940—July 23—Acting Secretary of State Welles issues a statement condemning the admission of the Baltic States into the USSR.
- 1940—Aug. 6—The American-Soviet Trade Agreement is extended for one year.

Principal References on American-Soviet Relations

(An extensive bibliography of books and articles published up to 1928 is included in Dr. Schuman's book listed below. The following list therefore contains the most important books appearing since 1928 as well as the principal sources of documentary material on American-Soviet relations.)

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COUNTING NOSES IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE 1939 CENSUS

By ROSE M. SOMERVILLE

Not since the elections to the Supreme Soviets in 1937 and 1938¹ has there been such intensified countrywide "mass political explanatory work" and solicitation of popular interest and support as that which accompanied the All-Union Population Census of January, 1939. From the unsuccessful 1937 census there probably came some of the impetus to the careful planning of details and the elaborate educational campaign among the citizens which brought the 1939 enumeration to a satisfactory conclusion. All the census data have not yet been published; what has already appeared is of great interest, and more will undoubtedly be forthcoming currently. Basic to an understanding of the results is a knowledge of the procedures and concepts that were involved in attaining them, and it is with a description of this kind that the present article will concern itself.²

Earlier Censuses

The Russians are relative newcomers in the census business. The United States has been at it every ten years since 1790. Other countries early followed the American example; only the ponderous Tsarist regime waited until almost the twentieth century to put through a universal census. This inadequate enumeration of January 28, 1897, was the only precedent to which the young Soviet republic (RSFSR) could turn when, in the martial atmosphere of 1920, it paused in its struggle for existence and counted the noses of those not in embattled areas. Paper and pens were scarce, literate individuals who could serve as enumerators were few, the dangers to life and limb in those unsettled times were serious,³ but for a society committed to planning as

1. "The New Soviet Elections," *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, October, 1938.

2. Because the 1940 census in the United States is so recent an experience for most of us, some reference will be made to it from time to time.

3. So scarce were trained people at the time that a decree of Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR signed by Lenin provided for a temporary transfer of Red Army statisticians and other personnel to census work. Army experience proved useful, for census workers were often at the mercy of counter-revolutionary elements. Over 30 of them were killed, many were beaten, and still others died from illnesses contracted during their hazardous journeyings. (I. Sautin, *All-Union Census of 1939*, Moscow, 1938.)

a principle, taking stock of its people and its equipment was deemed a necessity. At the time of the 1920 population census an enumeration was also made of all factory-plant enterprises and handicraft work places.⁴ This was repeated in 1923 at which time a count was also made of urban population. By 1926 the federation of republics, the USSR, had come into being, and although socialism was largely still only a goal, the first of the Five-Year Plans was being conceived, and statistical data were needed to nourish the cherished embryo. The census in 1926 was essentially demographic; it was supplemented only by family cards filled out in cities and urban settlements. A Soviet commentary at the time stressed the fact that the agricultural, industrial, trade, professional and cooperative information which would have constituted an inventory of productive forces and would have allowed all elements to be taken into account for the construction of national economy was unfortunately too expensive to garner all at once. The Government decided to take first of all the population census "with the aim of counting the number of people, their nationality, social and professional position."⁵ Even this task cost them six million rubles which the new state's treasury could ill afford.

By 1937 the second Five-Year Plan was drawing to a close. A new constitution had been adopted for the USSR which reflected the vast changes that had come about in the economic structure and social relationships. Socialism, it declared, was no longer a goal but an achievement. Developments in the sphere of public health, new legislation concerning abortion, marriage, divorce, funds for large families, a network of creches, kindergartens, maternity homes were expected to effect still further changes in the Soviet population. A third Five-Year Plan was under discussion. Exact data were needed, and a census was scheduled for January, 1937. After it was taken, however, it was repudiated as unscientific⁶ and its results were not made public. This unusual occurrence gave rise amongst observers to various conjectures which continued to flourish in the soil of Soviet silence on

4. This industrial census had been taken first in 1918. Pre-revolutionary Russia knew only the questionnaires gathered together by factory inspectors in 1900, 1908, and 1912.

5. *Post. Ts.I.K. Sovnarkom USSR* 3 IX 26.

6. "The results of the census that took place in January, 1937, were considered invalid by the Council of People's Commissars because, in carrying it through, the Central Department of Statistics grossly violated the first principles of statistical science and the instructions approved by the Government," *Press Bulletin* No. 13, August, 1938.

the matter. Little by little, however, in Soviet publications there have been mentioned, sometimes by indirection, specific criticisms of the 1937 statistical procedures and instructions. These will be brought in at points where they are relevant to a discussion of the 1939 census.

The old saw of what Peter says about Paul revealing more about Peter than about Paul has something of an analogy in the census. The questions that a social system puts to its members are as revealing about the nature of that society as are the answers it receives. The 1926 census in the Soviet Union included a question on unemployment, another on physical deficiencies and mental illnesses. The Soviet Union under NEP still suffered from the ills characteristic of the old order of society; the census reflected this. By 1939 the list of questions had changed significantly. As indicative as questions included and omitted are the interpretations given to the questions (not to speak of the answers) by different social systems. How "nationality" shall be determined, what "marital status" means, who is "head of the household," and so on—the rules for taking the census in a particular country reveal much about a society's premises, its mores, its frame of reference; they should be required reading for students of that society.

It is the aim of census planners generally to take a "snapshot," but a world in flux refuses to "hold that pose" long enough to oblige them. Babies keep being born, trainloads of villagers visit cities, urban dwellers go off to work in other regions. The census has to devise techniques to offset the fluidity of its subject matter. In the Soviet Union with a population that had kept itself in a particularly mobile state, the attention of the census authorities was directed to this problem to the extent of making at least three of the sixteen census questions pertinent to the matter.

Administration

Some of the most marked contrasts between the 1937 and 1939 censuses can be found in their administration. As in all other large undertakings the question of personnel was pivotal. On July 26, 1938, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree, published in *Pravda* the next day, in which a population census was scheduled to be taken January 17, 1939.

simultaneously on the whole territory of the USSR. The decree outlined some of the administrative and personnel arrangements. Responsibility for the conduct of the census in the USSR was centered in the Chief of the Central Administration of National Economic Accounting attached to the State Planning Commission. Under him was organized the Bureau of the 1939 All-Union Census.⁷ In each union and autonomous republic, each krai and oblast, and also in major cities, a Bureau of the Census was set up under the Chiefs of the Administrations of National Economic Accounting of the republics, krais and oblasts. The city and raion inspectors of National Economic Accounting were assigned direct leadership in conducting the census in cities and raions and were in charge of census divisions set up under them.

City soviets and raion executive committees had to consider the qualifications of enumerators, instructor-controllers, and assistants to heads of census divisions, while the Councils of People's Commissars of republics and Executive Committees of krais and oblasts had to do the same for the higher personnel, the heads of census divisions and assistants to city and raion inspectors. The cooperation between center and periphery that is a characteristic of Soviet federalism manifested itself in many ways during the census preparations.

Except for the National Economic Accounting staff and for certain institutional workers,⁸ the census personnel was to be a temporary force, recruited in August and September, 1938, from the ranks of teachers, college students, salespeople, bookkeeping and clerical staffs of factories and collective farms, trained intensively for their particular task, and paid specially for their services in addition to retaining pay at their place of work. While such were the provisions of the decree, among the 400,000 census workers there were in fact to be many volunteers, particularly students. Even so, the personnel arrangements were in contrast to the 1937 census when a million census workers took part, all on a volunteer basis. The time element and better organization

7. Unlike the United States where decades of census-taking have seen the emergence of a permanent Bureau of the Census under the Department of Commerce, the USSR set up a Bureau of the Census for the 1937, and then another for the 1939, task.

8. In hospitals, sanatoria, maternity homes, etc. the census was taken by doctors, nurses, and medical students working from case histories wherever possible. Ship personnel were utilized as census workers on the Atlantic Ocean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, where Soviet vessels were sailing at the time.

and training of personnel permitted the unwieldy body of census workers that hampered the 1937 operations to be reduced in 1939 to a third in size.

In 1937 great emphasis was laid on the attainment of a *odnodnevnaia perepis* (one-day census), while in 1939 the keynote was caution. *Izvestia* of January 17, 1939, warned that in the conduct of the census, "most dangerous and harmful of all is haste," and paraphrasing a famous slogan, urged "accuracy, accuracy and still more accuracy." While the 1937 census was termed "one-day," actually, preceding the sixteen hours of data-gathering on January 6 (8 a.m. to 12 midnight), there was a so-called preparatory period from January 1 to 5 when the enumerators visited dwellings and in preliminary fashion filled out the census sheets, as well as a check-up period from January 7 to 11 when apartments were again visited and omissions and incorrect data were detected. In the short period from January 1 to 11 each dwelling on one-sixth the earth's surface was, except for certain areas, to be visited three times! At least this was the attempt, and the result was the omission of some of the population and incorrect recording of others by the breathless, excited enumerators. In 1939, a greater amount of time was allowed, retaining, however, the same division into preliminary, census, and control periods. The preliminary period in 1939 was truly that. In the five days, January 12 to 16, census takers visited the dwellings assigned to them, acquainted themselves with the terrain, made corrections on the maps supplied them, answered questions about interpretation of questions. They reminded the population that the "critical moment of the census" was to be midnight of January 16⁹ and that during the census period they would not only ask "where were you the night of January 16" but "who were your guests for that night." Recording of data in the preliminary period was enjoined; all writing was to wait for the census period, January 17 to 23 in the concentrated urban areas, and January 17 to 26 in rural localities with their more scattered population. The control period, in which a check was made on the accuracy of the population count, ran from January 27 to February 2 in urban areas and January 27 to February 5 elsewhere. Thus the 1939 census set January 12 to February 5

9. Only children born up to that moment were to be counted.

for the work to be done.¹⁰ Though longer than the 1937 period, it was remarkably little time in which to gather data for so large and multi-national a population.¹¹ The success of the census in the USSR is attributed by Soviet authorities not only to the personnel, time, and organizational characteristics but to the response met with on the part of the Soviet public.¹²

Public Participation

The educational campaign that characterized the 1937 census and even more the Supreme Soviet elections left a residue of political literacy that was utilized and improved upon in the months preceding January, 1939. "Let's all take part in the census!" was the slogan. Participation meant more than answering the census questions. For the factory, farm, or school administration it meant so organizing their affairs that able workers could be spared to join the ranks of census personnel. For the radio and newspapers, it meant giving interesting accounts of census preparations, explanations of procedures, stories of past censuses, and careful illumination of the aims the census would serve. The nearest thing to a headline that Soviet newspapers ever run is reserved for matters of great importance. When *Pravda* on January 18 and *Izvestia* the day before ran one on the census, the interest of the authorities in the subject was evident to all. For the city, village, oblast, krai and republic soviets it meant cooperation with the census administration, organizing their Soviet "actives" and other interested citizens in the community into Committees of Cooperation to aid in publicizing, lecturing on, popularizing the methods and purposes of the census. For

10. Some of the places difficult to reach were, in each census from 1897 to 1939, covered either at an earlier stage or else later than the dates set for the country as a whole. Thus in 1926 the northern border of the RSFSR saw the census begin during the summer months and end in the spring of 1927. Some regions of Transcaucasia, on the other hand, were registered several months before the December, 1926, count started. Similarly, the Wrangel and Komandorski Islands and the shores of the Arctic Ocean were already covered by December, 1936, before the 1937 census proper was undertaken. In 1939 the raions of the Far North were reached well after the January count had been completed and, consequently, the materials had not been worked over in detail by the time figures were made public.

11. The performance is the more noteworthy when the 1940 Census in the United States is recalled, with the count not only in isolated places but in major cities prolonged after scheduled time. Cf. *New York Times*, April 24, 1940, "17,000,000 Still Unlisted as Census Taking Lags."

12. The Tsarist enumeration had left no heritage of good-will toward census matters, according to accounts such as the following, given by an aged teacher who had participated in the 1897 Census. "The population then knew nothing about the census, and those who did, considered it as preparatory for new taxation and other unpleasantness. Everywhere people hid from the census takers, or locked their doors, so we could not get in. Following the instructions given us, we were compelled to call the police to break in doors. Nobody dared give a candid answer then. Many of us teachers, who were unbelievers, registered as Greek Orthodox, as otherwise we should have been thrown out of school and left without work." (*Moscow Daily News*, January 5, 1937.)

trade unionists, Komsomols, members of sport clubs it involved sponsoring exhibitions, running exciting events, conducting study circles and discussions. A "skiing agit-race" on the first day of the census was organized by a sports club in Voronezh, for example. In Soviet usage "agitation" is a word of educational as well as of exhortatory significance. The "agitators" were those engaging in *massovo-raziasnitelnaia* (mass-explanatory) work, and their methods ranged from serious discussion to amusing diversion. The importance attached to their work in stimulating the interest and understanding, and arousing the support of the population, was more than once mentioned in the Soviet press.

Discussion of the census was rarely limited to the coming event. Advantage was taken of this opportunity to dwell on how much each republic had achieved, and how great was the contrast with the state of affairs under previous censuses. Medical authorities not only explained the ways in which census returns would enable them to adapt their work to the population's needs (vaccination campaigns, etc.), but they reviewed their accomplishments in the sphere of public health under the Five-Year Plans. Details of the third Five-Year Plan were gone over. The world significance of the census came in for its share of attention. The census, the population was reminded, would be a kind of public bookkeeping for workers throughout the world to see.

Several months of lectures, discussions, newspaper comment, prepared the population for something beyond acquiescence; the census was welcomed as an exciting event. Gay banners, posters, slogans on the outside of census-centers imparted a note of gaiety. Some of the dwelling-places followed suit, and house facades brightened dull winter streets with portraits and flags. Certain places became quite sentimental. One house, according to a Kiev dispatch in *Pravda*, decorated its lobby wall with a placard: "Greetings, dear guest, Comrade Census-Taker." In Makhach-Kala (Dagestan ASSR) alert telephone operators plugged in with, "Don't forget—census starts January 17th." While the July decree had provided a court hearing for all citizens who evaded supplying census information or knowingly gave false answers, it was not on this kind of stimulus that the census relied for citizen cooperation. An understanding of the value to

themselves that this statistical task represented obviously gave the Soviet population no little sense of a stake in the matter.¹³

Language was no barrier to nose-counting in the multi-national Soviet Union. The sixty-five million census forms were printed in 22 languages. The educational program had raised to literacy the varied peoples, and census workers could be engaged amongst native sons and daughters. Hunters in the tundra volunteered to seek out the distant yurts with their nomadic dwellers. Skiis, dogsleds, airplanes were manned by people of all complexions and tongues. Garrulous grannies could detain visitors of their own nationality to pour forth proud tales of family accomplishments: two sons were scientists, the daughter a trade union representative, Alyoshka was entering college. And would the *shchetchik* stay and have some cake and tea. As census participants, Soviet citizens were "naturals."

When mid-January approached and the various census bureaus held conferences of census workers, the newspapers criticized inadequacies in the preparations. The elections to the Supreme Soviet had shown to what high levels mass educational work could be raised. Certain regions do not hold enough conferences. Some local organizations of the Communist Party look on the census as the affair only of National Economic Accounting organs. In Belorussia, school work was disrupted in certain regions by recruiting too many teachers for census work. And so on and so on. "Criticism and self-criticism" was contributing its bit to correcting errors in the census preparations. To one not familiar with this peculiar Soviet institution, the detailed enumeration of "weak spots" would have seemed ominous indication of incompetence, confusion, indifference, and almost certain failure to accomplish the task. Students of Soviet procedures, however, recognized in the loudness of the complaints the importance of the subject rather than any hopelessness of the situation. Not that inadequacies were absent from the actual census-taking; they were fewer, though, because of the "storm-signals."

13. Their attitude was strongly in contrast with the bitter objections raised by some Americans to certain of the questions in the 1940 census in the United States. This kind of opposition seems to have been a point of pride in the American Census Administration itself. Among the "unofficial observations" sent to the writer through the courtesy of the United States Bureau of Census, Chief of Public Relations, is one stating that "it takes considerable persuasion sometimes in this country to get answers to census questions—a healthy situation which does not prevail in some European countries."

The Questions

The list of census questions approved by the Council of People's Commissars was published widely on July 27th, 1938.¹⁴ From that day until the census was in full swing, articles appeared in Soviet publications explaining the problems that lay in giving correct answers to them. Typical of such was Professor V. Starovski's "The Sixteen Questions of the Census Sheet" in *Pravda* of January 13th, 1939, and from these much can be learned as to the actual interpretation of moot points.

Question 1: Relation to head of family?

While the July 26th decree included parentheses with such illustrations as "wife, son, mother, sister, nephew, etc.," the possibility was not ruled out that "husband" or "father" would also be a correct answer, for the criterion of headship was economic. As in the 1926 urban family card, the head of the family was considered "the one providing it with the principal means of subsistence." With the number of Soviet women workers on the increase and with employment of a lucrative nature open to them,¹⁵ the woman in the household can in many instances be its chief support. Just how the matter was settled when husband and wife were both steady wage earners at the same remuneration level, the writer has not been able to learn from the published materials. The question of headship is only seemingly simple; *Pravda* of January 13th, 1939, noted that many were finding it difficult to answer.

The 1937 census did not contain a question of this kind. Its inclusion in 1939 may be related to increasing emphasis in the Soviet Union on the family as an important unit in socialist society.

Question 2: Permanently residing here?

Question 3: For temporary dwellers

- 1. place of permanent dwelling?**
- 2. how long away?**

14. The 1937 census questions can be found in *Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii SSSR*, No. 25, May 29, 1936. *Post.* No. 237 of April 28th, 1936.

15. For tables, see *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, April, 1940, "That Soviet Standard of Living."

Question 4: For those permanently living here but temporarily absent, indicate this and show how long.

These questions were designed to make the census more precise, to reduce the possibility of counting some twice and missing others completely. Internal consistency in the definitions of "temporary dweller" and "temporary absentee" was a necessity if the device to offset population mobility was to be worth the considerable effort it entailed. According to both Professor Starovski and Chief of the 1939 All-Union Census Bureau Bozin (*Pravda*, January 11, 1939), "temporary dwellers" was the classification for those who usually live in a different city or village which they left *temporarily* not more than *six months* ago. The italicized words are important, for those who come to a place to take up permanent residence are considered permanent dwellers regardless of how short a time they have been in their new place of residence. Another group who answer "yes" to *Question 2* regardless of the time element are students living at the place they are studying, even if they arrived less than six months ago. Into the "temporary absentee" category fall those who spend the night from January 16th to 17th beyond the borders of their city or village, provided their absence was under six months. These "temporary dwellers—temporary absentees" are thus recorded in two places. At their places of permanent residence they are noted as *temporarily absent*. At the place where they spent the night of January 16th they are written down as *temporary dwellers*. To add to the elaborateness of the precautions against duplication and omission, a document (*spravka*) was given to each "temporary dweller" when recorded by the census taker. The individual had to keep his *spravka* until February 15th, for if he failed to produce it at the request of an enumerator his name was written down on a control form which, at the end of the census, was turned over for checking to the National Economic Accounting oblast administration at the place of the alleged recording of the individual. That thousands of "temporary dwellers" were anticipated as well as a fairly high percentage of mislaid *spravkas* can be seen in the publication of 35 million of these documents and 27 million control forms.

Theoretically the total number of persons registered as actually present should be equal to the total number recorded as perma-

nently domiciled throughout the country as a whole. The extent to which the two counts check is one index to the degree of accuracy of the enumeration. In the 1939 All-Union Census, it has been pointed out by Soviet writers, the figures showed a discrepancy of only 0.06 per cent. These precautions were in contrast to the 1926 procedure when the simple question had been asked: "how long have you been living here?" The 1937 census did not include even this check-up. Indeed, some of the severest criticism of the 1937 census has been directed against its exclusion of many individuals and the consequent minimizing of the size of the Soviet population. Contrary to Government instructions, the notes printed on each census sheet told enumerators to cross out all who had not spent the night of January 5th at home. Workers on night shifts, those at bazaars, in forest, steppe, etc., were among the missing in the 1937 count.¹⁶

While the 1939 rule concerning students will undoubtedly affect the figures for urban population and total figures for certain of the republics, the results will not be very significant, as it is mainly at institutions of higher learning that students reside.

With an expanding housing program which still does not meet the needs of a larger and more demanding public, the questions concerning the temporary or permanent character of their residence apparently must have aroused some uneasiness in the population, for Soviet newspapers before the census specifically declared that such queries had significance only in relation to the accuracy of the count and none at all in relation to problems of floor space.

Question 5: Sex (male, female)

Question 6: Age (for children under one year, in months)

The importance of correct figures on the number of men, women, and children, and the proportion at each age level, is evident in any society, and particularly so in one committed by its nature and specifically by its constitution, not only to utilize the labor power of each of its members but to provide free education, nurseries, medical care, old age pensions. For census

16. Sautin, I., *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

purposes, the Soviet citizen was informed, he was the age he had attained at his last birthday. It would seem quite simple to gather such data for all but those older folk who had been born into a system careless of vital statistics. But apparently even the young present a problem to census planners because of the tendency that exists to "round off" one's age. The 1926 census had revealed certain "leaps" in age groupings explicable only in such terms,¹⁷ and in 1939 the population was duly warned against this easy error.

Question 7: Nationality (natsionalnost)

Question 8: Native language (rodnoi yazik)

The federal structure of the Soviet Union, based as it is on the multi-national character of the society, necessitates the gathering of data showing the distribution of population according to nationality, the cultural level of each nationality, the number and training of national personnel. The various constituent republics look increasingly to the nationalities resident within their borders for leadership and manpower; not only the federal government but each republic has a vital interest in the answers to *Questions 7 and 8*.

Soviet commentators took a great deal of pride in these questions, both in their formulation and in the instructions for answering them. In capitalist countries, said Starovski for example, the query about nationality and native language is not "and cannot rightfully be put" during a census. "Bourgeois statisticians are usually interested in race, color of skin, etc. In the United States the question concerning nationality is formulated as follows: color or race. To say nothing of the fanatics of fascist Germany who consider as the fundamental task of the census the ascertaining of the quantity of Aryan blood."

Nationality and native language, Soviet enumerators were instructed, are written down just as the person questioned indicates. (For children, the parents answer.) Free self-determination of

17. Thus, in agricultural localities of the Uzbek SSR it was found that women had given their ages as follows: 19 years, 21,247; 20 years, 87,567; 21 years, 21,168. Professor Starovski cites several other examples of this tendency to answer the age inquiry incorrectly.

both nationality and native language was the principle by which the questions were to be answered.¹⁸

The 1937 census, too, had stressed this principle. The individual was instructed to give as his nationality that group with which he felt most closely identified and as his native language the one he used most naturally and freely. Not only may the nationality and native language fail to coincide, the Soviet population was told, for often people of one nationality speak in the language of another and consider it as their own (Russians who speak Ukrainian and vice versa, for example), but the nationality claimed by the individual need not coincide with the individual's extraction. "For instance," said one Soviet newspaper, "if a person has lived long in White Russia and become identified with White Russian culture, habitually reading and writing in that language, he has a full right to register as a White Russian, although he may be by extraction a Russian, Jew, or so on."¹⁹ (The phrase in this instance concerning reading and writing was apparently parenthetical for, judging from other Soviet commentary, literacy was not an element of consideration in this connection.)

The 1937 and 1939 All-Union Censuses, just as the 1920 RSFSR Census, put the question of nationality in terms of *natsionalnost* and not, as the 1926 Census put it, in terms of *narodnost*. While both these words can be translated as "nationality," there is a distinction between them of great importance both ideologically and statistically. An individual's *natsionalnost*, according to the *Bolshaia Soviet Encyclopedia* (volume 41), is ascertained by finding out the *natsia* (nation) to which he belongs. "Nation" is defined in that source according to Stalin's formula, as an "historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." In this "community of people called a nation," it is stressed, the oneness is neither racial nor tribal; emphasis is placed on its historical

18. In the 1940 Census in the United States, Question 10 asked for "color or race." Enumerators were instructed to class as negroes persons of mixed white and negro blood. Also, following instructions concerning those with some Indian blood, the enumerator was told: "With the foregoing exceptions, any mixture of white and non-white will be reported according to the non-white parent." For five per cent of the population in the United States there was a supplementary list of questions. One of these was "Mother Tongue (or Native Language): 38) Language spoken in home in earliest childhood. (Italics ours.)"

19. *Moscow Daily News*, December 24, 1936.

evolution. While many races and tribes in the past played a part in forming all contemporary nations, the Soviet reference states, nationality must be distinguished from race (an aggregate of physical characteristics—color of skin, shape of head, etc.), and also from tribe (an ethnographical category). In 1939 the interest of the Soviet Union lay in the national composition of the USSR and the Soviet citizen was asked with which *nation* he identified himself. In 1926 the aim, in terms of “*narodnost*,” was to ascertain the ethnographical composition of the country, and the individual had to state his tribal origin. He was cautioned not to substitute for his *narodnost* either his religion, his citizenship or his place of residence. Thus, in 1926, a person who had lived long in the Ukraine and considered himself a Ukrainian had to record himself as a Belorussian *if his forebears were Belorussian*. When he was in doubt, the 1926 census instruction told him, the *narodnost* of his mother was to be given preference.

Because the 1926 term differs so fundamentally from that operative in 1920 and in the recent censuses, the 1926 figures on nationality can hardly be correctly compared with those of the other enumerations. This statistical problem is recognized by Soviet authorities. Sautin, for example, in a recent article²⁰ cites specific examples of the strange results obtained when 1920 and 1926 figures were compared.

Question 9. Married?

As in 1937 the answer was “yes,” whether the marriage had been registered or not. It is possible that the census figures will show a smaller number of marriages than do in fact exist, for that same reluctance to register manifested by many couples may also influence their answer to this question. Of course, there is the mitigating factor in this situation that failure to register a marriage incurs no legal penalty; any failure to answer census queries, however, does have a penal consequence.

Widows, widowers, and divorced individuals answer this question in the negative.

The number of marriages constitutes important data in terms of the planning of housing, the anticipation of increased birth

20. Sautin, “The Population of the Country of Socialism,” *Bolshevik*, No. 10, 1940. For further discussion of the concepts of *natsia* and *narodnost*, see *Bolshevik*, No. 13, 1940. pp. 55-62.

rate, the allocation of consumers' goods. To Soviet lawmakers it had the added interest of demonstrating the effect of the June, 1936, legislation in the direction of "strengthening the Soviet family."

Question 10. Citizen of what country?

According to the Soviet constitution (clause 21), every citizen of a constituent republic is a citizen of the USSR.

Question 11. Literacy

- a) reads and writes or only reads?
in what language?
- b) or wholly illiterate?

In 1926 the question was formulated in the same way. The 1937 census had the query boiled down to "literate, or otherwise" which created no little difficulty. The Bureau of the Census confessed that this way of putting the question was not clear and cautioned that if a person could read, no matter how slowly, he was to be counted literate. In 1939, with the question more clearly formulated it was still necessary to warn that only those who could *neither* read nor write fell into the category of illiterates, and that those who could read, however slowly, were to record themselves as literate.

While the standard of literacy appears to be, and perhaps this is inevitable, somewhat a flexible one, the census question as formulated would seem capable of fulfilling its main purpose, that of ascertaining how many had been missed by the extensive literacy campaign so that study plans could be made for them.

Question 12. For students, indicate:

- a. full name of the educational institution, school or course
- b. in what class or in what course is he studying (for courses of one year or less, indicate "short term")?

Question 13. Did he finish middle or higher school?

Trained personnel, "cadres," all the more essential to the manning of the diverse and complicated tasks of a socialist society because of that society's heritage of illiteracy and imported

technicians, could not be obtained in sufficient numbers through the usual school network. Special courses of all kinds have therefore been supplied and effort has been made to bring the classroom to the adult at his place of work. Hence the roster of students in the regular schools would have been only a partial index of the number of cadres being prepared. The census question, which included all types of education except the omnipresent "study circles" and courses lasting less than one month, made possible a fuller picture to aid the Five-Year Plans. At the same time it was recognized that those plans had made possible the asking of this question. The 1937 census, with queries similar to those above, was the first Soviet census to seek data beyond the level of general literacy.

Question 13 in both the 1937 and the 1939 instructions was interpreted to mean that those who had finished the incomplete middle school (seven-year school) or had completed seven or more classes of the middle school (ten-year school) were to be recorded as having finished middle school. Individuals who had begun but not finished higher schools (of college and university level, and not to be confused with the "high schools" of other countries which are institutions of secondary education) were placed amongst those who answered "yes" concerning middle school.

Questions 12 and 13, combined with the other questions in the 1939 census, permit a breakdown of those studying, into age, sex, nationality and groups, and provide a view of the educational composition of Soviet population never before presented in such detail.

Question 14. Kind of occupation or other source of means of existence?

Question 15. Place of work?

The socialist nature of the economy in the USSR resulted in a kind of industrialization and a kind of agricultural organization which has given rise to many new occupations and professions which did not exist even at the time of the 1926 census. Apparently the 1937 Census had ignored certain of these occupations

typical of socialist society; Sautin gives the instance of the omission of "collective farm chairman." The 1939 instructions emphasized the need for very precise replies, even if necessary, a detailed description of the occupation involved. So diverse were the possibilities in answering the question that most voluminous of all the dictionaries compiled by the Bureau of the All-Union Census was the Dictionary of Occupations with its 17,000 titles. Criticism of the 1937 dictionaries mentions the fact that in the one on occupations were included such classifications as lackey, prostitute, governess, vagrant!

Individuals in process of changing from one type of work to another were written down under the last position actually occupied. Study was not an occupational classification under census rules. Those who worked, and studied in special courses at the same time, were recorded according to their occupation. Those who did not work but spent all their time in study were divided into two groups: those receiving stipends were recorded as such and those without stipends were designated "dependents." Those in hospitals who were not chronic or mental cases gave their occupation before illness.

Housewifery was not an occupation within census regulations. Housewives were recorded as "dependents" and like all others without occupation or independent source of income had to record the source of their means of existence (an individual, a stipend, a pension, etc.).

While employment in the Soviet Union has been voluntary, "he who does not work shall not eat" is a constitutional principle fairly successfully implemented by social pressure. This was often demonstrated during the 1939 Census. Witness, for example, an account given in a Soviet publication of how the census was taken on a train. Soviet trains, in general, are little census bureaus all year round, for in the incessant camaraderie and chatter which characterize them, each individual usually manages to tell the story of his life at least once. For this reason a train was not the place to seek the privacy which the census enjoined. In January, 1939, the Moscow-Leningrad express was apparently no exception. Volunteer student enumerators made the rounds. In one particular case, we are told, "the eyes of his

co-travelers are fixed on the healthy young man who says that he is unemployed in a country where everyone is guaranteed a job. *It is up to him to explain.*" (Italics ours). He tells them that he has finished studying and is going to rest a month at his parents'. This almost stumps them because in terms of the census question he would certainly seem to be a "dependent." But after lively discussion it turns out that he will receive his stipend for another month, or until he begins work, and the group triumphantly watches him register to this effect.²¹ This reveals a different state of affairs from that in 1926 when the census sheet contained a question on unemployment, "how long," "former occupation," etc.

Question 16. In what social group does he belong: to group of workers, employees, collective farmers, cooperative handicraftsmen, individual farmers, non-cooperative handicraftsmen, people of free professions, or employees of a cult and non-working elements.

The final question on the census sheet, this was regarded as particularly important. Stalin's analysis of the class composition of the Soviet population in his report on the draft constitution in 1936 had indicated the general course of development. Statistical materials were eagerly awaited. It was in regard to the matter of class composition that the 1937 Census had been found particularly wanting. "Enemies of the people in the 1937 Census violated the instructions approved by the Government, making a muddle out of the question concerning social groups."²² The violations, judging from the instances given by Sautin, showed a significant tendency in a particular direction, namely, to increase the number of individual farmers, dependents, and non-working elements.

Workers and employees, while often grouped together in Soviet statistical tables, were definitely separated in the 1939 Census question. The exact line of demarcation between them was not clearly revealed in the Census Regulations, although it was undoubtedly shown in one of the dictionaries used in working over the data collected. However, the Regulations do, in

21. *Moscow News*, January 30, 1939.

22. *Pravda*, January 13, 1939.

another connection, give specific instances of *sluzhashchie* (employees), which, together with other Soviet writings on the subject, provide at least some clue to the use of the employee category in the 1939 Census. "Economist-planner," "senior engineer," "statistician-instructor," "bookkeeper," "cashier," are some of those mentioned in the Regulations as "employees." In terms of Soviet analysis of classes, as indicated specifically in Stalin's reports of November 25, 1936, and March, 1939, employees belong to the social stratum of Intelligentsia, and in this fact may perhaps be found the utility of the distinction drawn in the Census between workers and employees. With Soviet society consisting, according to authoritative formulation, of two classes, workers and peasants, and with the working intelligentsia constituting a stratum and not a class, any attempt to ascertain the class composition of the Soviet population must separate the intelligentsia, of which the employees make up a large proportion, from the two classes out of which the main membership of the intelligentsia is now drawn.

A thorough examination of census findings should provide valuable insight into a question such as this: at which stage of his development into an administrator does the Soviet worker join the ranks of employees. The whole matter also has interesting ramifications into the sphere of the famed objective of "eliminating the difference between mental and physical labor."

"Collective farmer" was a social group that included not only members of a collective farm permanently working there but members of their families, even if at the time of the census the latter were busy exclusively with caring for livestock and performing agricultural work in their own subsidiary economy.²³

"Individual farmers" was the classification for those people, neither members of collective farms, industrial and fish cooperatives, or cooperatives of invalids, nor in the families of such members who made agriculture their chief occupation. Dependents of individual farmers were placed in this same social grouping, but members of individual farmers' families who had an occupation other than individual farming fell into another social group depending on their occupation. Workers and employees,

23. The model constitution for the Soviet *artel* provides that, in addition to working the socialized sector, each farm household can work a small individual garden of its own.

possessing subsidiary agricultural holdings (independent of size, income and imposition of agricultural tax) were not included as individual farmers.

Into the category of cooperative handicraftsmen the 1939 Instructions placed those individuals who were members of all sorts of industrial and fishing cooperatives and also cooperatives of invalids. But individuals working for hire in those cooperatives and not member shareholders in the artel were listed as workers or as employees.

The category "people of free professions" aroused many inquiries but the published answers do not go into much detail. The Instructions of July 26, 1938, stated that into this group would go "individuals whose work is by its nature not connected with the permanent work in a certain institution or undertaking (writers, composers, artists, lawyers, etc.)." It would seem likely that into this category were placed only a small proportion of all writers, composers, etc., in the Soviet Union, since the trend has been for such individuals to attach themselves to the permanent work of a particular institution or to several wherever possible; composers, writers may teach; artists may participate in a particular theatre's undertakings, etc., etc. Like employees, this social group is part of the stratum of Intelligentsia, of which mention was made above.

"Non-working elements" was not expected to be a frequently utilized classification. With exploiting classes wholly liquidated, Soviet commentators stated, only individual cases would be found of those not occupied with socially useful work. Amongst these would be second-hand dealers, individuals living on unearned income, and those unable to state the source of their means of subsistence.²⁴ The enumerators were not to include in this category either those who had lost their ability to work or those who lived on the income earned by a Soviet toiler. These people were to be included in the social group of the one supporting them.

Between *Questions* 14 and 16 there is certainly a very real distinction. The query about occupation would seem, in general, directed towards finding out the techniques and skills of which

24. Commentary on the results of the census indicated that "employees of cults" were also included among "non-working elements." Cf. Chief of Demographic Division I. Pisarev's article in *Problemy Ekonomiki*, No. 7, 1940, p. 83.

the population was capable, and currently developing, while that on social groups would seem designed to measure the effects of socialization on the society's class structure. The rules for answering the two questions differed so widely that the official Instructions cautioned against using the answers to 14 as a basis for determining the answer to 16.

Not that occupation was irrelevant to the matter of social groups; the instance given above concerning members of the families of individual farmers shows a very close relationship. But this relationship is not conceived of as automatic or simple. A few illustrations of the different answers given in similar circumstances to *Questions* 14 and 16 will perhaps help to clarify. Under *Question* 14, the recipient of a pension or a stipend, if he did not work, was written down according to the source of his means of existence (stipend, pension, etc.); the important point was that he was not occupied, not using a skill. Under *Question* 16 this individual was recorded under the social grouping to which he belonged before receiving the stipend or pension. If he had not worked before, then, like the whole category of "dependents" he was put in the social group of those on whom he had depended for support.

Perhaps an even clearer instance of the differences between occupational and social groupings under the rules of the Soviet Census of 1939 is that involving members of the families of workers and employees. Under *Question* 14 such individuals who were occupied only on the family's subsidiary economy were recorded under the term "secondary agriculture," while under *Question* 16 the dependents of workers and employees were placed in the social group of those supporting them, whether workers or employees. And still another illustration of difference: farmers, whether collective or individual, who at the moment of the census, were working in industrial undertakings, construction work, etc., were written down under this very occupation, according to instructions relating to *Question* 14; *Question* 16 asked if agriculture were their chief occupation and then put them into either the collective farmer or the individual farmer grouping. Those members of the families of collective farmers who may have worked only on their subsidiary economy were nevertheless included as collective farmers. Judging from the discussion surrounding the decree of May 27, 1939, which recommended a certain number of workdays on the collective sector

as prerequisite to the title of collective farmer, the census category will include certain individuals who contributed little or nothing to collectivized agriculture. *Question 14* was not interested in whether a person was an individual or a collective farmer. It wanted to know if he were a bee-keeper or a truck farmer. This distinction between occupational and social data becomes even more patent when it is seen that certain individuals are second-hand dealers under *Question 14* and non-working elements under *Question 16*.

With *Question 16*, the list of queries ended. The 1937 census had included a question on religious belief. The 1939 census, and this applied to the one in 1926 as well, did not inquire at all into the religious views of the Soviet population.

Tabulating the Results

The task of working over the materials of the Tsarist census was dragged along for almost eight years. Four years were required for the 1920 data. For the 1926 census full results were obtained only in 1931. The 1937 census saw an elaborate mechanized apparatus set up of which the 1939 census workers made full use, and which enabled them to publish their main findings within four months.

The procedures utilized in 1939 were described as follows: The millions of census sheets were packed into boxes and sent to the three accounting stations at which the "very accurate, 'clever' machines" were centered. One station was at Moscow, another at Leningrad, and the third at Kharkov. In each station they were received by a "department of care of materials" and sent to a shop of perforation where all the writing, translated into the language of numbers, was carried over to special perforated cards. These little cards served for all future accounting operations.

Pressing the keys of the machine the operator punched small round apertures in the card corresponding to the code numbers on the census sheet. With these apertures the sorting machine could count the number of cards for any of the sixteen questions. The cards were sorted by electricity at the rate of 450 cards a minute.

All of the technical equipment of the accounting machine stations was supplied by Soviet enterprises, it was emphasized,

although some adding machines for special census purposes had been imported for the 1937 census. Reliance was not placed on machines alone, however. Experienced statisticians and economists analyzed the data arrived at with the help of the machines, and subjected them to "logical control."

For years to come the 1939 Census returns will constitute reference material of an authoritative kind. The many volumes which are expected to be issued (for the 1926 data, more than 56 appeared) will be used for many and diverse purposes.²⁵ But important as its data-gathering aspect was, the All-Union Census played still another role, the values of which will also be manifested for some time to come. In terms of organizational experience, widespread participation by experts and laymen in all fields, aid to popular understanding of statistical science, the 1939 census was an important landmark of Soviet public education.

25. In some connections, however, the information obtained is already incomplete; for the election to the Council of the Union, for example, the population calculation must also include the 23 million who became Soviet citizens after the enumeration.

RESETTLEMENT OF POPULATION DURING THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN

by M. SONIN

[Translated and Abridged from *Problemy Ekonomiki*

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The planned distribution and redistribution of the labor force of the Soviet Union is of primary concern to the Communist Party and Soviet Government. As stated in the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"It is imperative for the planned development of our national economy that there be maximum utilization of the labor force and that it be so distributed, both territorially and throughout the various branches of economy, as to result in its most efficient use. The Soviet Government must immediately address itself to this problem."¹

A further increase in the productive capacity of the Soviet Union and the proper distribution of its labor force inevitably necessitate the resettlement of large sections of our industrial and agricultural population. This must be done in order to develop new, formerly backward areas, to populate uninhabited regions, and to supply labor for new industrial centers.

The exceptional rates of development planned for sections of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia and, above all, the Far Eastern District, with their tremendous natural resources, depend ultimately on the presence of human beings to exploit those riches. The territorial distribution of our population and the distribution of industry and agriculture are closely related. The decentralization of industry envisaged by the third *Piatiletka* is essentially a problem of resettling our labor force.

1. Program and Rules of the VKP(b), Gospolitizdat, 1938, p. 36.

Pre-Revolutionary Population Distribution

In pre-revolutionary Russia the labor force was distributed most irrationally and unequally throughout the country. More than two-thirds of large-scale industry was located in the cities of central Russia, in St. Petersburg and in the Don Basin. On the other hand, only 6.1 per cent of all industrial enterprises were to be found in the vast territories of Central Asia and the East: 87 per cent of the coal was produced in the Don Basin; 96 per cent of the oil in the Caucasus,—this despite the fact that the main resources of fuel were to be found east of the Urals. Cement was produced in the South, far from the areas where it was ultimately used. The textile industry was in central Russia at a great distance from the source of raw material. Agriculture in the East was extensive rather than intensive; only a tiny area of the Far Eastern District was sown to crops, and Eastern Siberia was also very backward in that regard. Vast areas suitable for cattle-raising were utilized only to a negligible extent.

The distribution of population all too faithfully reflected the unnatural distribution of industry and agriculture. The following table requires no comment.

	<i>Population per sq. kilometer</i>	<i>Rural population per sq. kilometer</i>
European Russia	25.4	22.1
Caucasus	26.2	22.8
Siberia	0.8	0.7
Central Asia	3.0	2.6

(Source: "Statisticheskji Sbornik Ts.S.K.")

In the course of years, the Soviet Government has basically altered this situation. Our country is putting into practice the principle of bringing industry close to the source of power and raw material, and of developing areas which were previously backward. That tremendous progress has already been made is evidenced by the establishment in the East of powerful new centers of the coal, metal and machine-building industries, and by the new geographic distribution of agriculture.

Economic Development of the Soviet East

The country's new eastern coal and metal-producing center now produces more than did all of Tsarist Russia. Eastern

Siberia and the Far Eastern District, formerly extremely backward, developed with particular rapidity during the second Five-Year Plan (1932-1937). In 1938, when large-scale industry in the Soviet Union as a whole had reached nine times the level of 1913, Eastern Siberia had reached eleven times that level, and the Far East, ten times.

The first Five-Year Plan (1929-1932) found the sources of raw materials and of power in the Far East very poorly developed. Today, however, there exist the following new industries: machine-building, oil refining and sugar refining. Powerful industrial centers have been created in areas absolutely uninhabited before the Revolution: Komsomolsk, Bureia, Birobidzhan, Raichikha, Magadan, Kolyma and others. The fishing industry of that district has become of great importance in the national economy, producing one-fourth of the total output of the country. These new industries of the Far East and the increased production of the old have led to the construction of new ports and railways, particularly the Baikal-Amur trunk line.

In recent years another economically important section of the Soviet Union has undergone exceptionally rapid development. This is Eastern Siberia, including Irkutsk and Chita Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and the Yakutsk and Buriat-Mongolian Autonomous Republics.

The eastern districts of the Soviet Union, particularly the Far East, are, in the course of fulfilling the third Five-Year Plan, solving a number of new economic problems, which were raised at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party in 1939. Chiefly affecting these regions is the demand that "irrational long hauls be eliminated, and areas which were formerly economically backward be further developed."² The implementation of the first part of this program requires, specifically, the organization of totally new industries capable of supplying the tremendous demand for cement, plaster, chemical fertilizers, glass and consumers' goods. As a result of these efforts, the Far Eastern District is to become, by the close of the third Five-Year Plan, an

2. Resolution of the XVIII Congress of the VKP(B) on Molotov's speech.

economically balanced, first-rate industrial region, strengthening the economic and military power of the USSR in the East.

Agriculture also made considerable progress in these regions during the first two *Piatiletkas* (1929-1937). In the first place, the sown area is almost 100 per cent collectivized. The average area of a kolkhoz is 4,500 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acres) and the level of mechanization of agriculture in the Far East is among the highest anywhere in the Union. Practically every collective farm is served by a Machine-Tractor Station; in 90 per cent of the major agricultural operations, tractors and combines are used. The collective and State farms are served, all told, by more than 7,500 harvester combines and 3,500 trucks and autos.

Despite these favorable circumstances, less than one-tenth of the arable land is now being utilized, due to the extreme shortage of labor. The area actually sown to crops per kolkhoz in the Far East is only $1\frac{1}{2}$ times larger than the average for the USSR as a whole, despite the vastly larger kolkhoz lands. For example, each collective farm in the Buriat-Mongolian ASSR possesses more than 6,500 hectares of land (over 16,000 acres). In the Chita Oblast, the average acreage is even higher, reaching 22,000 per farm (9,000 hectares). It is obvious that under existing conditions of labor shortage, even these lands already in the possession of collective farms which have available great numbers of machines cannot be made use of in their entirety. Moreover, millions of acres of excellent pasture lands must idly await the immigration of large numbers of farmers from other parts of the USSR.

Historical Background of Eastward Migration

In his writings on pre-Revolutionary population movements, Lenin demonstrated that they could be traced, basically, to a spontaneous flight of the peasantry from poverty and ruin. In Tsarist Russia nearly one-third of the peasantry possessed no horses or farm equipment whatsoever; 15 per cent sowed no crops; 65 per cent were poor peasants (*bedniaki*) and 20 per cent were middle peasants (*seredniaki*).

Numerous survivals of feudal usages rendered even more acute

the relative over-population of the pre-Revolutionary countryside brought about by the development of capitalism. The ruined "surplus" population of the villages, owning an infinitesimal bit of land and perpetually in a state of semi-starvation, was ready, in Lenin's words, "to flee not only to Siberia but to the end of the world."³ The number of migrating peasants increased rapidly after the emancipation of the serfs. From 1861 to 1885, 300,000 peasants fled beyond the Urals, some 12,000 per year. From 1885 to 1894, the figure rose to 450,000, or 45,000 per year; from 1895 to 1905, 1,440,000, or 131,000 per year; from 1906 to 1913, 3,274,000, or 409,000 per year. In all, more than five million peasants trekked to Siberia in the period from 1885 to 1913.⁴

At the outset, the Tsarist Government restrained this migration in the fear that the landlords would be left without farmhands and tenants. However, its fear of the suffering and rebellious peasantry was even greater. Beginning in the 90's, the government began to encourage the migration, with very definite objectives in mind. The government hoped thereby possibly to secure a radical improvement in the situation, or at the very least, to quiet the peasantry and render the situation less dangerous.⁵ It also utilized the emigrants to Russify its colonial border areas, and, by forcing the natives off their land, sowed hatred between them and the Russians.

The "assistance" rendered the migrants consisted of placing them aboard ordinary freight cars and sending them, as often as not, to territories where it was all but impossible to scratch a living from the soil. It also extended small loans *after* homes had been built and the soil tilled, that is, after the most difficult stage had been passed. The Tsar's officials did not bother to determine whether the areas set aside for settlement were suited to agriculture. Often the settlers were brought to the dense taiga or the un-watered steppes, which their petty individual economy was utterly unable to master. As a result, the majority of the settlers were ultimately defeated in their attempts to

3. Lenin, *Collected Works* (in Russian), Vol. XV, p. 524.

4. "Migration Statistics," *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Granat Russian Bibliographical Institute*, Vol. 31, 11th Ed.

5. Lenin, *Collected Works* (in Russian), Vol. XV, p. 524.

establish themselves on the "free" land. That 50 to 60 per cent returned to the places from which they had come⁶ demonstrated the utter bankruptcy of the government policy with regard to settlement. Of 1,552,000 persons migrating beyond the Urals in the years 1906-1908, barely one-third overcame the hostile forces of nature and primitive agriculture; 284,984 returned to their points of origin, utterly penniless. Of the remaining 703,414, the majority died of starvation, cold or disease, some fell into bondage to old settlers, while a few ultimately became part of the urban proletariat.⁷

Migration Under the Five-Year Plans

The progress toward an eastward decentralization of industry and agriculture, made during the Five-Year Plans, has had a most profound effect on the geographic distribution of the population. Planned migration began in 1925. However, from 1925 until Oct 1, 1929, only 450,000 people were re-settled in the eastern areas of the USSR, or about 90,000 a year. But during the first two *Piatiletkas*, the number of settlers began to show a marked increase. This was particularly true of industrial workers.

From 1926 to 1939 more than three million persons moved from the most heavily populated central districts to the Urals, Siberia and the Far East,—more than a quarter of a million per year. In percentage of the total population of the Union, Central Asia grew from 5.2 to 6.2 per cent, Eastern Siberia increased from 2.55 to 3.1 per cent, and the Far East, from 0.8 to 1.4 per cent. In absolute figures, including natural increase, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East grew by 5,900,000 during this fourteen-year period (1926-1939). This figure, representing a 33 per cent gain, compares with an increase of 15.9 per cent in the population of the USSR as a whole. The relative importance of migration in this total is indicated by the fact that natural increase accounted for one-fifth of the gain in the Far East, and one-third in Eastern Siberia.

6. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 532, and Vol. XVI, p. 373.

7. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 532.

Urbanization

In addition to the eastward migration, there occurred, during these same years (1926-1939), a considerable flow of collective farm labor to the established industrial centers of the country. Five and a half million persons migrated from the districts of Vologda, Kalinin, Smolensk, Yaroslavl, Riazan, Orlov, Kursk, Voronezh, Tambov, Penza, Kuibyshev and the Mordvian ASSR to Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky and other smaller cities.

Obviously, despite the fact that the second Five-Year Plan contained no unified schedule of migration, such a plan worked itself out in the course of events. However, this relative planlessness had a negative result in that virtually no migration for the purpose of opening up new areas to agriculture took place. The purely industrial character of the migration of 1926-1939 is borne out by the figures on relative growth of urban and rural population. In Eastern Siberia and the Far East, the rural population increased only 17.5 per cent (4,000,000 to 4,700,000) while that of the cities multiplied three times (from 890,000 to 2,980,000).

The settlers arriving during the period under discussion came from various geographical areas and sections of the population. Some of them were skilled workers from Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine and other cities of European Russia. This group, forming, numerically, a very small portion of the total, played a role far out of proportion to their numbers in building the new industries described above, and in getting them in working order. The vast majority of workers in the new enterprises, however, were formerly collective farmers in the central areas of European Russia and the Volga Region. These workers were recruited in organized fashion (in proportion to the decreased number of hands required to work the farms from which they came, as new machines were acquired). Many of these workers brought their families with them, or sent for them after arriving.

More than two million industrial workers have been recruited from the farming population in this manner during each of the past five years, but for most of these factory work has been a seasonal activity. The lumber and peat-mining industries, seasonal in character, have annually burdened the railroads with the transportation of more than 100,000 workers to and from

the farthest reaches of the Union (40 per cent of the total travel beyond their native districts for this purpose). The situation was further complicated by the fact that, until recently, labor recruitment was carried on by the commissariats in any district without regard to their proximity to the place of work. As a result, situations arose in which workers were ferried three to five thousand miles each way, from the Ukraine to the Far East, for instance, crossing the routes of others who lived much closer but who had been recruited to work in other areas.

Present Organization of Industrial Migration

A number of steps have been taken to correct this situation. Workers for the Far East can now be recruited only from the Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash and Mordvian ASSR's, and from the districts of Kursk, Tambov, Kuibyshev and Kirov. The fish industry is now permitted to recruit only in the area of Krasnodar and the districts of Stalingrad and Saratov. Moscow, Lenin-grad, Archangel and other places where an increased force is needed also have assigned to them strictly delimited zones wherein they may contract with collective farms for additional labor.⁸

Further, only five industries may now recruit labor outside the district in which the enterprises are located: coal-mining, lumbering, peat-mining, inland and coastal water transport and capital construction. The Far Eastern district may, however, recruit workers anywhere for work in new industrial establishments.

While eliminating the incongruities described above, these measures do not yet solve the main problem which is to create a permanent labor force for all branches of economy east of the Urals. The problem can only be solved by large-scale permanent migration of agricultural and industrial workers and their families. The main source of these migrants has been, and will continue to be, the most densely populated sections of the country. These areas still possess large reserves of labor which can immediately be drawn upon for resettlement in the East.

8. The decision as to whether or not a person is to leave the farm for any other place of work has been entirely a matter for the individuals concerned to settle. The function of the recruitment contracts between industrial plants or construction projects, and the farms, is to inject an element of planning into the flow of labor from the countryside. With these contracts to go by, the enterprise seeking labor knows exactly how much to expect from any given region, while the farms are guaranteed against being left short-handed and the individual's rights in the collective farm are protected during his absence.—*Trans.*

It is estimated that the following numbers of collective farmers are now immediately available for resettlement:

<i>Districts and Autonomous Republics</i>	<i>Number Available</i>
Tambov	200,000
Voronezh	300,000
Penza	197,000
Kursk	250,000
Orlov	203,000
Kirov	112,000
Kuibyshev	195,000
Mordvian A.S.S.R.	142,000
Tatar A.S.S.R.	227,000
Chuvash A.S.S.R.	140,000
	<hr/>
	1,966,000

These possibilities are attested to by the fact that half a million workers annually are even now recruited from these areas in an organized manner.

During the third Five-Year Plan, 600,000 additional industrial workers will be needed in Eastern Siberia and the Far Eastern district alone; 200,000 of these will have to be brought from other parts of the country. With the members of their families, the total number of new settlers in these districts will reach 800,000. The industrial settlers arriving in 1940 will largely be occupied in the production of building materials, coal-mining, lumbering, production of iron and steel, railway and water transportation and machine building, and the Government will encourage them to settle permanently. Obviously, extensive preparations will have to be made to house this mass of people and to create all facilities necessary for their health, education and cultural development. Homes are being built not only by the commissariats responsible for this function, but also by the individual settlers themselves who are financed and supplied with building materials for this purpose. The industrial commissariats engaged in large-scale capital construction in Siberia are, however, required to arrange as quickly as possible for their own permanent labor force.

The entire problem of organized migration is, unfortunately, still hampered by lack of legislation to cover all the problems it poses. Such codification is necessary to do away with the

existing haphazard practice of various commissariats which have been in the habit of creating their own "laws" to meet situations not covered by existing statutes. It is necessary to decide at once such matters as, for example, the advisability of extending to recruits for industry certain concessions which have been granted to agricultural settlers. In any case, these pioneers of industry should certainly be extended the same privileges, such as tax exemptions and higher wages, as are enjoyed by workers in the Far North. Migration to Siberia would also be greatly stimulated by special measures to assist the settlers in obtaining furniture and other household goods.

Agricultural Migration

As indicated by the figures for the ten districts quoted above, it is estimated that a full five million farmers will be available for agricultural and industrial resettlement, during the course of the third *Piatiletka*. A majority of these live in areas where no new land is available and their income would not increase very rapidly if they remained. It is to their personal interest, therefore, as well as to that of the country as a whole, to move to Siberia where there are vast tracts of virgin soil. Many have already expressed a desire to do so. But agricultural resettlement, although ultimately even more important than the recruitment of workers for new industrial centers, presents far greater difficulties.

Before farmers can be sent to any new territory, the most suitable land must be chosen and cleared. The best location for the central buildings of the new collective must be selected and the layout planned. Roads must be built; lowlands drained; irrigation canals dug. For the farmers themselves, homes, schools, libraries, clubs, doctors' offices with full equipment, children's nurseries, stores for the co-ops and bathhouses are but a few of the structures that have to go up. Stables, barns and silos must also be erected.

Equally complex is the group of problems connected with populating the new collective farm and establishing it on a functioning basis. The settlers with their entire families must be transported from the point of origin to their new homes; they

must be financed until the first crops are in; and cattle must be supplied and transported.

All these matters are in the hands of the Central Resettlement Administration of the Council of People's Commissars and its subdivisions throughout the country. Its main attention is centered on organized migration to virgin territory from areas where there is insufficient land fully to employ the energies of the existing population. Its other functions include the moving of farm populations from densely populated areas to virgin territory within any given administrative subdivision of the country; resettlement of farmers from areas condemned for new industrial enterprises, hydroelectric projects; and the economic organization of nomads and semi-nomads. It provides free transportation for persons, cattle and property, and medical care from the point of departure to the point of arrival.

In order to lighten the difficulties attendant upon uprooting one's entire family and starting life anew, farm settlers are granted certain exemptions and privileges. Back taxes are cancelled, and for a period varying from five to ten years, depending upon individual circumstances, they are freed from payment of the agricultural tax, the tax for cultural purposes, and compulsory delivery of grain and certain other products. They may turn in personally-owned grain, fodder, potatoes and cattle at their point of departure and receive equal quantities of the same upon arrival at their ultimate destination. They also receive free food and seed grains. Further, sections of state and district-owned forests are set aside for charcoal-making. When available, new homes and stables are given them, and long-term credits are extended for all necessary repairs and improvements.

The areas most in need of settlers,—and to which they are being sent,—are the Maritime and Khabarovsk districts of the Far East; the Krasnoyarsk area, Irkutsk and Chita districts and Buriat-Mongolian ASSR of Eastern Siberia; the Altai area and large portions of the districts of Omsk and Novosibirsk in Western Siberia; the district of Chkalov and Cheliabinsk in the Urals; Kazakhstan and many districts of the Central Asian Republics.

Hitherto agricultural resettlement has consisted simply of the movement of individual families from Europe to the East. As

of this year, however, emphasis is being placed on the resettlement of entire groups of families, as described above, for the purpose of organizing entire new collective farms or adding to those which are short-handed. Experience has already demonstrated the superiority of this method of migration, for groups of families coming from established farms already have the habit of working together with mechanical aids, and the necessary division of labor already exists.

Major emphasis is now being placed on careful preparation in advance of the arrival of settlers. The government has decreed that each year's resettlement program must include a section devoted to measures to be taken to prepare for the arrivals expected the following year. To guarantee that families will not arrive at incompleting settlements, it is now a rule that the head of the family or another able-bodied member shall come first, and the family follow only when things are ready for them. In the first months of this year, more than 5,000 heads of families arrived at new settlements under this arrangement. It is expected that they will have completed all preparatory work within the year, following which their families will join them. Meanwhile, the kolkhozes to which they have been attached credit them with work-days toward a share in the year's income in money and kind, on the basis of the amount and type of work performed by each individual, and the kolkhozes from which they are leaving give their families aid. In 1939, more than 10,000 households,—35,000 persons,—settled in the East: less, however, than was originally planned, the difference being due to insufficient preparations for the arrival of the families of the settlers. In 1940 it is planned to provide for the resettlement of 35,000 families,—140,000 people; in 1941 and 1942 even greater numbers will arrive.

Agriculture in Eastern Siberia and the Far East is developing with exceptional rapidity. In order to guarantee a considerable increase in the harvest of grain, and a sufficiency of potatoes and vegetables for the growing population, the sown acreage in the Far East will be increased by 30 per cent during the third Five-Year Plan, including land planted to technical crops, especially sugar beets. Milk sheds and similar zones for truck gardening

are being set aside in the vicinity of each new industrial area. Eastern Siberia will continue its development as the main stock-raising area of the country, while a considerable increase in the grain harvest is also expected in this region. The plan provides likewise for high rates of development, particularly as regards intensification of agriculture, in Western Siberia, the country's main wheat region. As a matter of fact, it is to be expected that the planned increase in agricultural production in these areas will be exceeded by far, for the plans were based on the expected increased productivity of the existing population.

As for the rate of resettlement, it is determined mainly by the speed with which the country can be prepared to assimilate the new arrivals, for, as far as the number of people whom it can ultimately support is concerned, there is virtually no limit. As an indication of the practical limitations to be faced, it should be noted that in 1938 and 1939, it was possible to place the settlers in the homes of local people who had moved to the cities. At the present time, this possibility no longer exists, and housing becomes an immediate major problem. Sharing the responsibility for this with the local administrations and government must be the collective farms which will benefit by the arrival of additional workers, and those from which they leave, which will benefit by virtue of the fact that there will be a smaller group remaining to share the output of the comparatively limited lands available in the more densely populated regions of the country. The latter should send out building brigades, part of which can later return while the families of those remaining go east.

Problems of Planning Migration

The question arises: should collective farms be permitted to reach into their untouchable reserve funds in order to aid migrants? In my opinion, the collective should have the right to do so in the case of group migration—for instance if in a community of, say, 100 households where as many as 15 or 20 households are to move to the Far East. Of course, a general meeting of the collective would have to be called to take so serious a decision, and the decision should be subject to the

approval of the County (Raion) Executive Committee. I propose that the forthcoming Congress of Collective Farmers discuss this suggestion.⁹

It is also essential to determine the average cost of a number of standard operations necessary to the preparation of a new settlement,—something which is of considerable importance and about which nothing has yet been done. For example, we must know the ultimate cost per hectare of the expeditions which determine which new lands are most suitable for settlement. The cost of surveying, of clearing the soil, and of construction in each geographical region must be determined, as must the types of buildings necessary in each region and the general characteristics of the places most suitable for settlement. We must also know how long it should generally take to prepare each kolkhoz for human occupation and productive operation.

Further, we must be in a position to know which regions that are apparently short-handed simply suffer from improper utilization of their existing labor resources, and which must actually be aided by organized immigration. A balance-sheet of available labor against forces needed must be drawn up district by district and republic by republic. This accounting must reveal existing disproportions not only between geographical districts, but also between the various branches of our national economy. It must take into account the increased productivity per person already achieved in agriculture and the further increases which may reasonably be expected, so as to enable us to know what reserve forces we may be able to count on in planning the next steps in agriculture, industry and resettlement.

Our task is complicated by the fact that the Five-Year Plans have been drawn up on an economic, and not on a geographical, basis. Productivity of labor, the number of workers needed in

9. Several decrees have been issued in the past year, implementing the plans for agricultural resettlement: Decree of Dec. 22, 1939, to increase production of cotton in Uzbekistan by irrigation projects, provides for the settlement of 58,600 families on 205,000 ha. of land; Decree of Feb. 29, 1940, to increase cotton production in Tadzhikistan, provides for moving 13,000 households from mountain districts to 50,000 ha. of land serviced by new irrigation projects; Decree of April 22, 1940, to increase long-staple cotton production in Turkmenistan calls for resettlement of 15,000 households from within the Republic (including nomads) on 104,000 ha. of newly irrigated land; Decree of April 25, 1940, to increase tea, citrus fruit and grape culture in Georgia, provides for the resettlement of 10,380 households on 63,000 ha. of land in the Colchis and Abkhazia which is to be drained or irrigated. All the decrees provide for the funds necessary for moving these families. The last decree, in detail, explains that the selection of the families to be moved from the mountain regions will be by local choice and by consent. The members of collective farms who move will receive their share of all the collective farm funds, including their share of the "indivisible" reserve funds.—Ed.

any given field, and similar problems, have all been calculated in this manner (except in agriculture and local industry where it has been done geographically), but the integration of these plans to give a complete picture of these factors within a given locality is an undertaking we have but recently begun.

The third Five-Year Plan does, however, compile the most important statistics for each principal district and republic,—a step which raises socialist planning to a new level. As soon as the extension of this accounting on a county by county basis has been completed, the State Planning Commission will work out a unified plan for agricultural and industrial resettlement which will become an integral part of the third Five-Year Plan.

RESULTS OF THE SOVIET CENSUS

(The following is an abstract from an article appearing in Bolshevik, No. 10, May, 1940, entitled "The Population of the Soviet State," by I. Sautin. Some additional material has been added from the following articles: D. Bozin, L. Dubrovitskii, "First Results of the 1939 All-Union Census," Planovoe Khoziaistvo, No. 6, 1939; D. Bozin, "Population of the Socialist State," Problemy Ekonomiki, No. 5, 1939; "Population of the Soviet Union," Bolshevik, No. 15-16, 1939; I. Pisarev, "Population of the Socialist State," Planovoe Khoziaistvo, No. 5, 1940; I. Pisarev, "Results of the 1939 Census," Problemy Ekonomiki, No. 7, 1940. These articles give an indication of what importance Soviet authorities attach to the data compiled from the census.)

At the present time the analysis of the materials from the 1939 Census is being completed. Data is already available on the distribution of population by social groups, by branches of economy, production, occupation, age, literacy, education, nationality, and family status. Analysis of all the returns will be finished in the near future.

On January 17, 1939, the date on which the census was begun, the total population of the USSR was 170,467,186,¹ an increase of 15.9 per cent as compared with the population on December 17, 1926, when the last All-Union census was taken. During this same period the population of Europe increased by approximately thirty-two million, or 8.7 per cent.

The Basis for Population Changes

During the last twelve years the Soviet Union has developed into a powerful industrial nation and its small-scale agriculture has been converted into large-scale collectivized agriculture. In the same period the national income of the USSR increased from 21.7 billion rubles in 1926 to 105 billion rubles in 1938; per capita national income increased 4.2 times. This

1. Since that time, the population has been increased by the addition of 13,000,000 from former Poland; 4,000,000 from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; 2,880,000 from Lithuania; 1,950,000 from Latvia; and 1,120,000 from Esthonia, bringing the total to approximately 193,000,000.—Ed.

growth in the industrial strength of the country finds reflection in the increased production of industrial goods, rising from 15.9 billion rubles in 1926 to 106.8 billion in 1938, while the per capita production rose from 108 rubles in 1926 to 624 rubles in 1938.

At the same time the rural areas have changed substantially. In 1926 only 1.7 per cent of the peasant households were collectivized, but in 1938 collectivization had taken in 93.5 per cent. The sown area had increased from 110.3 million hectares in 1926 to 136.9 million in 1938, and the growing efficiency of agriculture has made possible the extension of cultivated land and the increase of output, so that the harvest well exceeds the maximum harvest of old Russia. The present organization of agriculture makes it less and less affected by unfavorable weather conditions, so that, for instance, despite bad weather in 1938 and 1939 in many parts of the Union, the harvest was larger than the best harvests of old Russia. With a decrease in the rural population of 6.2 million, agricultural production was 25 per cent greater in 1938 than in 1926.

Urbanization

The enlargement of old industrial centers and the establishment of new ones in all republics have brought a rise of 29.6 million in urban population, more than doubling the number in 1926. This increase is caused not only by the natural growth in urban population but by a considerable redistribution of population between the rural districts and the cities. In 1926 there were 709 cities and 125 towns. Now there are 922 cities and 1,448 towns. Table I shows the classification of these cities.

From 1926 to 1939 the natural increase in rural population was 18.2 million people, but during the same period 24.4 million people migrated from the rural areas to the cities, leaving a net decrease of 6.2 million. In Soviet society the migration from village to city assumes particular importance as an integral part of the industrialization of the country. It is planned to obtain 1.5 million workers per year from the collective farms, where their labor is no longer necessary because of the increased efficiency of modern mechanized agriculture. (See article on page 74 of this issue.) For instance in 1939, 1.9 million workers used

TABLE I

	Dec. 17, 1926		Jan. 17, 1939	
	No. of cities	Population 1,000	No. of cities	Population 1,000
Moscow	1	2,029.4	1	4,137.1
Leningrad	1	1,690.1	1	3,191.3
Cities from 500,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants	1	513.6	9	5,852.5
Cities from 400,000 to 500,000 inhabitants	3	1,291.5	5	2,140.7
Cities from 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants	2	631.7	3	1,093.0
Cities from 200,000 to 300,000 inhabitants	4	972.7	20	4,949.2
Cities from 100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants	21	2,860.4	43	6,069.2
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Total cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants	33	9,989.4	82	27,432.8
Cities from 50,000 to 100,000	57	3,903.2	92	6,703.9
<hr/>				
Total cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants	90	13,892.6	174	34,136.6
Cities and towns with up to 50,000 inhabitants	744	12,421.5	2,196	21,773.3
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Grand Total	834	26,314.1	2,370	55,909.9

[Source: *Problemy Ekonomiki*, No. 5, 1939, p. 43]

tractors and combines on the collective farms. Without the help of the machine-tractor-stations the same work would have necessitated 9.9 million farmers. From 1922 to 1925 the cultivation of one hectare of sown area on individual farms necessitated 20.8 man-days; the production of one centner of grain—3.2 man-days. On the collective farms in 1937 one hectare of sown area absorbed 10.5 man-days and one centner of grain 1 man-day. These figures give an indication of the possibilities of transferring the rural population to the industrial areas, while at the same time increasing agricultural output.

Geographical Redistribution

With the general increase in population, there have been considerable variations as between different republics and regions in the rate of growth. While the average for the whole USSR was a 15.9 per cent increase, Table II indicates the much more rapid rise in some areas.²

The areas gaining most rapidly in population are seen to be the Far East, the Central Asian Republics, the Far North and the great industrial centers. To offset this, there has been a decrease of 10 to 15 per cent in the population of the crowded agricultural districts of Central Russia.

2. For the population figures by Republics, see *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, July-October, 1939, pp. 138.

TABLE II
PER CENT INCREASE IN POPULATION 1926-1939

Kirgiz SSR	45.7
Armenian SSR	45.4
Tadzhik SSR	43.9
Azerbaidzhan SSR	38.7
Uzbek SSR	37.6
Georgian SSR	32.3
Turkmen SSR	25.6
Sverdlovsk Oblast	53.
Novosibirsk Oblast	53.
Irkutsk Oblast	49.
Chitinsk Oblast	73.
Khabarovsk Krai	136.
Moscow Oblast	74.
Leningrad Oblast	44.
Stalinsk Oblast (Ukraine)	91.

[Source: *Bolshevik*, No. 10, 1940, p. 16]

Social and National Composition of the Population

The change in the social groupings within the Soviet population is given in Table III.

TABLE III

	1913	1928	1937	1939
Workers and employees	16.7	17.3	34.7	49.73
Collective farmers and cooperative handicraftsmen	None	2.9	55.5	46.9
Individual farmers and non-cooperative handicraftsmen	65.1	72.9	5.6	2.6
Bourgeoisie (landlords, merchants, kulaks)	15.9	4.5
Others (students, pensioners, Army)	2.3	2.4	4.2	..
Non-working population	No data	No data	No data	0.04
Not listed	No data	No data	No data	0.73

[Source: *Bolshevik*, No. 15-16, 1939, p. 113 and *Bolshevik* No. 10, 1940, p. 17]

The present census is the first which gives accurate data on the nationality composition of the population. The 1926 census asked for information on national origin (*narodnost*) instead of on nationality (*natsionalnost*). Although the 1920 census of the RSFSR contained a question regarding nationality as in 1939, the results of this census were never published in full. Consequently there is no accurate basis of comparison regarding nationality groupings. When the census material from the Far North is completed, there will be for the first time exhaustive data on all the nationalities of the country, including information on the age groupings, literacy, occupation, etc.³

3. For preliminary returns on nationality groupings see page 99 of this issue.

Some indication of a leveling-up process which is leading to the complete elimination of social differences between nationalities is the increasing number of intermarriages between different national groups: in 1927 only 7.5 per cent of the marriages in the Ukrainian SSR were between people of different nationality; by 1937 this figure had increased to 19 per cent. In the Armenian SSR the corresponding percentages were 1 per cent in 1927 and 7.4 per cent in 1937. Among the Kazakh people, intermarriages were 4.6 per cent of the total in 1936 and 7 per cent in 1937.⁴

Occupational Composition

Data on the occupational distribution within the population is not yet complete, but already it reflects clearly the changes taking place in Soviet economy. Table IV, for instance, gives figures on the persons engaged in metal trades and Table V shows the number in agricultural specialties.

TABLE IV

	(In Thousands)	
	1926	1939
Total Metal Workers	981.0	4,331.1
Turners	63.5	432.3
Milling Machine Operators	5.0	65.2
Other Lathe Operators	14.9	240.5
Electro-Automatic Welders		109.5
Moulders	11.3	137.6
Press and Stamp Operators	8.9	55.2

[Source: *Bolshevik*, No. 10, 1940, p. 19]

TABLE V

	(in Thousands)	
	1939	
Chairmen of Special Meat & Dairy Farm Divisions (<i>Kolkhoznie Tovar'nye Fermi</i>)	200.5	
Heads of Tractor Brigade	97.6	
Heads of Field Brigade	549.6	
Heads of Livestock Brigade	103.1	
Brigade Heads	89.3	
Section Heads	466.5	
Heads of Farm Laboratories, Seed Selection and Yarovization ..	16.9	
Tractor Drivers	803.1	
Combine Operators	131.2	
Total	2457.8	

[Source: *Bolshevik*, No. 10, 1940, p. 19]

4. *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 5, 1940, p. 19.

In 1926, many of these professions did not exist and there were only about 4,200 tractor drivers in all. Similarly in many industries, as for instance in the building trades, there were none of the modern technical professions. Conversely, in mining and in the oil industry many of the occupations involving manual labor which were enumerated in past censuses have been displaced completely.

Cultural Development

The census of 1939 bears witness to the improved cultural level of the population: 81.2 per cent of those over 9 years of age are now literate, as compared with 51.1 per cent in 1926 and 24 per cent in 1897. (For fuller data see page 97.) This increase has been particularly rapid in the national republics. Furthermore, it has not been confined to the urban population, and the gap in literacy between men and women is being closed in the Central Asian Republics. For instance, in 1926 the figures for literacy among women were: Tadzhik SSR—less than 1 per cent; Uzbek SSR—6.5 per cent; Kirgiz SSR—7.4 per cent; and Turkmen SSR—7.7 per cent. The present level of literacy for women in the same republics is 65.2 per cent; 61.6 per cent; 63 per cent, and 60.6 per cent, respectively. These figures are, of course, related directly to those on education (see page 98.) There are now 223 students per thousand population in the USSR and the highest levels are again in the non-Russian republics, with the Tadzhik SSR reaching 394 per thousand. The great bulk of these students throughout the country are in elementary and secondary schools—totalling 31 million out of 37.9 million. Another five million are in the general elementary courses for adults, and the remainder study in the higher educational institutions. It is interesting to note that 89.4 per cent of the population with secondary education are under 39 years of age, which means that they received their education under the Soviet regime. Similarly, 70 per cent of those with higher education are in the same age group. The resulting increase in the Intelligentsia is indicated in Table VII.

TABLE VI

	(In Thousands)	
	1926	1939
Engineers, Architects and Construction Supervisors	32	305
Middle Technical Personnel	175	836
Agronomists	18	90
Other Agro-Technical Personnel	13	114
Scientific Workers (Including Professors and Teachers of Higher Educational Institutes)	14	93
Teachers	348	1201
Cultural—Educational Workers (Journalists, Librarians, Club Directors)	59	495
Art Workers	54	174
Doctors	70	155
Middle Medical Personnel (Feldshers, Nurses, etc.)	130	607
Bookkeepers, Accountants, etc.	375	1769

[Source: *Bolshevik*, No. 10, 1940, p. 22]

Conclusions

In summary, the 1939 census shows the following characteristics of population changes in the Soviet Union. First of all there is the very rapid natural increase in population. While the birth-rate figures are not complete, some preliminary figures can be given. In 1938, the birthrate per thousand was 28.5 in Moscow, 27.4 in Leningrad and Kiev, 27.7 in Kharkov, 33.9 in Baku. This compares with 1936 figures of 13.5 in New York, 14.1 in Berlin, 11.5 in Paris, 13.6 in London, 21.7 in Rome.⁵ For the USSR as a whole the birthrate exceeded the deathrate in 1938 by 115.7 per cent as compared with 31 per cent in the United States.⁵ For some republics in the USSR this figure is much higher, as for example, 266.7 per cent in White Russia, and 234 per cent in Georgia and Armenia.⁶

The second characteristic of the population as indicated by the census, is that the overwhelming preponderance of the people have been brought up and received their education under the Soviet regime. Finally, some of the most interesting material relates to the development of the non-Russian nationalities, both from the point of view of their economic and technical improvement and of their cultural level. Although the educational and health level in the Central Asian Republics still lags considerably behind the other regions, the rate of improvement is higher than

5. *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 6, 1939, p. 24.

6. *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 6, 1939, p. 31.

elsewhere. These changes, taken with the redistribution of population as between town and country and as between west and east which is revealed in the Census returns, mirror the Soviet planning of the geographical allocation of productive enterprises, both agricultural and industrial.

APPENDIX

INFORMATION FROM THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL-ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING OF GOSPLAN, U.S.S.R., CON- CERNING DATA OF THE ALL-UNION CENSUS OF POPULATION, 1939.

As a result of studying the materials of the 1939 All-Union Census of Population, the Central Administration of National-Economic Accounting of Gosplan, USSR, obtained the characteristics of the composition of the population of the USSR, as of January 17th, 1939, according to age, literacy, education, nationality and social groups, in relation to 169,519,127 people out of a total number of 170,467,186. The calculation has not yet been completed of the materials for the *raions* of the Far North where the census was taken at a later date.

I. Age Composition of the Population of the USSR According to the 1939 Census

(Excluding Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia)

Age Group	Number of Individuals	% of Total
Up to 7 Years	31,412,232	18.6
8-11	16,409,098	9.7
12-14	13,336,151	7.9
15-19	15,124,176	8.9
20-29	30,639,041	18.0
30-39	25,332,993	14.9
40-49	15,235,864	9.0
50-59	10,867,408	6.4
60 Years and Older	11,129,290	6.6
Age Not Indicated	32,874	0.0
Total	169,519,127	100.

II. Literacy of the Population of the USSR 9 Years and Older

(Excluding Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia)

Percentage of Literacy

Entire Population on	(All—9 and over)			(9 to 49 years)			(50 years and up)		
	Men	Wom.	Total	Men	Wom.	Total	Men	Wom.	Total
Feb. 9, 1897	35.8	12.4	24.0	39.1	13.7	26.3	20.5	6.5	13.3
Dec. 17, 1926	66.5	37.1	51.1	71.5	42.7	56.6	40.6	11.4	24.5
Jan. 17, 1939	90.8	72.6	81.2	95.1	83.4	89.1	64.5	24.9	40.9
of which									
<i>Urban Population</i>									
Feb. 9, 1897	63.3	39.3	52.3	65.5	43.1	55.6	48.7	23.1	34.9
Dec. 17, 1926	85.3	67.6	76.3	88.0	73.9	80.9	67.5	35.9	49.3
Jan. 17, 1939	95.7	84.0	89.5	97.6	91.0	94.2	82.2	46.5	61.1
<i>Rural Population</i>									
Feb. 9, 1897	31.1	8.6	19.6	34.3	9.6	21.7	17.0	4.1	10.5
Dec. 17, 1926	61.9	30.0	45.2	67.2	35.3	50.6	35.6	6.3	19.6
Jan. 17, 1939	88.2	66.6	76.8	93.8	79.2	86.3	56.9	15.8	32.3

III. Literacy of the Population of the USSR—9 Years and Older
by *Union Republics*, According to the 1939 Census.
(Excluding Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia)

Per Cent of Literacy—9 Years and Older

<i>Union Republic</i>	<i>Dec. 17, 1926</i>			<i>Jan. 17, 1939</i>		
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>
R.S.F.S.R.	72.0	40.2	55.0	92.3	73.0	81.9
Ukrainian SSR	75.5	40.9	57.5	94.8	76.8	85.3
Belorussian SSR	71.5	35.8	53.1	90.7	68.1	78.9
Azerbaidzhan SSR	33.2	16.4	25.2	81.5	64.5	73.3
Georgian SSR	55.5	39.4	47.5	86.1	74.6	80.3
Armenian SSR	49.5	19.2	34.5	85.0	62.4	73.8
Turkmenian SSR	16.5	7.7	12.5	73.3	60.6	67.2
Uzbek SSR	14.2	6.5	10.6	73.6	61.6	67.8
Tadzhik SSR	6.2	8	3.7	77.7	65.2	71.7
Kazakh SSR	32.6	12.5	22.8	85.2	66.3	76.3
Kirgiz SSR	22.1	7.4	15.1	76.7	63.0	70.0
USSR	66.5	37.1	51.1	90.8	72.6	81.2

IV. Educational Levels of the Population of the USSR
(Excluding Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia)

Number of Persons With:

<i>Age Group</i>	<i>MIDDLE EDUCATION</i>			<i>HIGHER EDUCATION</i>		
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>
Up to 29 Years ..	5,153,426	4,419,568	9,572,994	169,774	123,479	293,253
30 to 39 Years ..	1,250,852	927,792	2,178,644	325,308	134,290	459,598
40 to 49 Years ..	483,292	372,430	855,722	143,469	64,895	208,364
50 and Up	290,305	278,250	568,555	88,609	29,686	118,295
Age Not Shown ..	1,617	990	2,607	334	253	587
	7,179,492	5,999,030	13,178,522	727,494	352,603	1,080,097
Per Thousand Population ..	88.6	67.8	77.7	9.0	4.0	6.4

V. Educational Levels of the Population of the USSR
by *Union Republics*, According to the 1939 Census
(Excluding Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia)

Number of Persons With:

<i>Union Republic</i>	<i>Middle Ed.</i>	<i>Higher Ed.</i>	<i>Per Thousand Population</i>	
			<i>Middle Ed.</i>	<i>Higher Ed.</i>
RSFSR	8,319,706	706,653	76.8	6.5
Ukrainian SSR	2,928,212	222,154	94.6	7.2
Belorussian SSR	434,526	25,005	78.0	4.5
Azerbaidzhan SSR	234,481	21,592	73.2	6.7
Georgian SSR	401,407	39,681	113.4	11.2
Armenian SSR	104,480	7,505	81.5	5.8
Turkmenian SSR	57,856	4,032	46.2	3.2
Uzbek SSR	241,903	19,421	38.6	3.1
Tadzhik SSR	40,287	2,982	27.1	2.0
Kazakh SSR	368,316	27,822	59.9	4.5
Kirgiz SSR	47,348	3,250	32.5	2.2
USSR	13,178,522	1,080,097	77.7	6.4

[Source: *Izvestia*, April 29, 1940. Earlier official returns can be found in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 6, 1939, part of which were published in *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, July-October, 1939.]

VI. NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF POPULATION OF USSR,
ACCORDING TO THE 1939 CENSUS

(excluding West. Ukraine and West. Belorussia)

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number of persons including families</i>	<i>Percent of total</i>
Russians	99,019,929	58.41
Ukrainians	28,070,404	16.56
Belorussians	5,267,431	3.11
Uzbeks	4,844,021	2.86
Tatars	4,300,336	2.54
Kazakhs	3,098,764	1.83
Jews	3,020,141	1.78
Azerbaidzhanians	2,274,805	1.34
Gruzians (Georgians)	2,248,566	1.33
Armenians	2,151,884	1.27
Mordvinians	1,451,429	0.86
Germans	1,423,534	0.84
Chuvash	1,367,930	0.81
Tadzhiks	1,228,964	0.72
Kirgizians	884,306	0.52
Dagestan peoples	857,371	0.50
Bashkirs	842,925	0.50
Turkmenians	811,769	0.48
Poles	626,905	0.37
Udmurts	605,673	0.36
Mariis	481,262	0.28
Komis	408,724	0.24
Chechens	407,690	0.24
Osetins	354,547	0.21
Greeks	285,896	0.17
Moldavians	260,023	0.15
Karelians	252,559	0.15
Karakalpaks	185,775	0.11
Koreans	180,412	0.11
Kabardinians	164,106	0.10
Finns	143,074	0.08
Estonians	142,465	0.08
Kalmyks	134,327	0.08
Letts and Letgauls	126,900	0.07
Bulgarians	113,479	0.07
Ingush	92,074	0.05
Adigeians	87,973	0.05
Karachaevs	75,737	0.04
Abkhazians	58,969	0.03
Khakasians	52,602	0.03
Oirots	47,717	0.03
Kurds	45,866	0.03
Balkarians	42,666	0.03
Iranians	39,037	0.02
Lithuanians	32,342	0.02
Chinese	29,620	0.02
Czechs and Slovaks	26,919	0.02
Arabs	21,793	0.01
Assyrians	20,207	0.01
Others	807,279	0.48
Total	169,519,127	100.00

VII. POPULATION OF USSR (WITH FAMILIES) BY SOCIAL GROUPS
(EXCLUDING WEST. UKRAINE AND WEST. WHITE RUSSIA)

<i>Social groups</i>	<i>Number of persons including families</i>	<i>Percent of total</i>
Workers, city and rural	54,566,283	32.19
Employees, city and rural	29,758,484	17.54
Collective farm members	75,616,388	44.61
Cooperative handicraft workers	3,888,434	2.29
Noncooperative handicraft workers	1,396,203	0.82
Individual peasants	3,018,050	1.78
Nonworkers	60,006	0.04
Those not indicating social group ..	1,235,279	0.73
TOTAL	169,519,127	100.00

Procedure in the Admission of the Baltic States Into the USSR*

The Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, convened in August, adopted laws which joined four new republics to the twelve already included in the Federation, and changed the size of several of the older republics. In June, 1940, the Karelian Autonomous Republic (formerly part of the R.S.F.S.R.), with its large Finnish population, had been raised to the status of a Union Republic and to it was added territory along its western border which had previously been held by Finland. This twelfth Union Republic was named the Karelian-Finnish SSR. In accordance with articles 34 and 35 of the federal constitution, it had elected deputies to the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR who could then participate in the Seventh Session, at which the Union was further expanded.

Because they are of interest in indicating the procedure for adding new republics to the Soviet Union under the 1936 Constitution, the meetings of the Seventh Session will be described here in some detail.

On August 1st, when the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, A. A. Andreev, opened a joint meeting of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, he included in his remarks greetings to the plenipotentiary commissions of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian parliaments, and the delegations from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Molotov, in his speech on foreign policy delivered the same day, explained the events leading up to the presence of the delegations, and on the succeeding days the Supreme Soviet devoted itself to the formal enlargement of the Federation. On August 2nd, with the Chairman of the Council of Nationalities, M. M. Shvernik, presiding, the Moldavian-Bessarabian-Bukovinian-Ukrainian problem was presented for consideration. The Moldavian Autonomous Republic, a part of the Ukrainian SSR, asked to be united with the Moldavians of Bessarabia to form a Union Republic. The Ukrainian SSR assented to this ("The territory of Union Republics may not be changed without their consent," Art. 18 of Constitution) and

* For events leading up to the application for admission by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, see *News Chronology* under *Baltic States*.

asked that there be included within the Ukrainian SSR the northern part of Bukovina as well as the Khotinsk, Akkerman and Ismail uyezds of Bessarabia "where the Ukrainian population is predominant."

Delegations from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina voiced their desire for immediate union with the Moldavians and Ukrainians of the USSR. They were invited by the chairman to sit among the deputies of the Supreme Soviet.

The Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, voting separately, then passed a law making the Moldavian SSR the 13th Union Republic and including the above-designated uyezds of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the Ukrainian SSR "under the principle of the free development of nationalities."

On August 4th, with Andreev again in the chair, the Supreme Soviet heard the Acting President and Prime Minister of Lithuania, Justas Paletskis, who headed the plenipotentiary commission of the Lithuanian Seim, ask consideration for the request of the Lithuanian people that the Lithuanian SSR be taken into the Soviet Union. He spoke in Lithuanian; a Russian translation followed. Other members of the commission also urged the acceptance of the Lithuanian Republic in the Union, and a decision to that effect was subsequently taken.

Further, it was decided that the precise boundaries between the Lithuanian SSR and the Belorussian SSR were to be drawn up by the two republics and presented to the USSR parliament for consideration. The Supreme Soviet also authorized its Presidium to name the day when elections were to be held in the Lithuanian SSR for deputies to both chambers of the federal parliament, in accordance with the population and nationality provisions in Articles 34 and 35 of the Constitution.

On the recommendation of the Belorussian Government, a deputy asked the Supreme Soviet to consider a proposal that would unite to the Lithuanian Republic the Svientsianskii Raion and parts of other districts in Belorussia in which the Lithuanian nationality constituted a majority. Thus the distinctly Soviet system of state organization on the basis of a union of nations was twice invoked by the Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet. The Ukrainian Republic was enlarged by acquiring Ukrainians of Northern Bukovina and parts of Bessarabia, and the territory of the Belorussian Republic was decreased so that its Lithuanians

might live under one administration with people of their own nationality in the new Soviet Republic of Lithuania.

The multi-national character of the USSR was further stressed, when on succeeding days, Acting President and Prime Minister of Latvia, Kirchensteins, and Lauristen, a member of the plenipotentiary commission of the State Duma of Esthonia each presented a request of his people that they be permitted to enter the USSR. Professor Kirchensteins spoke in Latvian, and Lauristen in Esthonian. Citing the Uzbek people as an example of the success of the Soviet policy on nationalities, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, speaking his native language, welcomed Latvia's entry into the "friendly family of peoples of the Soviet Union." On the authorization of the Sovnarkom of the USSR, he introduced the law, which was then adopted, making the Latvian SSR the fifteenth Republic of the Soviet Union. Deputy Kuusinen then did the honors for Esthonia, in Finnish, and with the adoption of the bill introduced by him (on the authorization of the Sovnarkom), the Esthonian SSR became the 16th Union Republic, and raised to an estimated total of 23 million those Soviet citizens who had not been numbered among the 170,000,000 counted in the 1939 census.

Article 146 of the Soviet Constitution places the power to amend in a two-thirds vote of each house of the Supreme Soviet, and the Seventh Session devoted its final deliberations to changing the three clauses of the Constitution which were affected by the above-enumerated changes in the government structure: Article 13 listing the republics which "on the basis of voluntary association" and "having equal rights" form the federal state, was amended to include the new republics; Article 23 was changed so that the Moldavian Republic was no longer listed as part of the Ukrainian SSR; Article 48, which defines the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was amended to include 16 Vice-Chairmen instead of the 11 formerly determined by the eleven-republic federation. Kuusinen of the Karelian-Finnish SSR was elected one of these vice-chairmen by unanimous vote; the other four will undoubtedly be chosen as soon as the new republics have elected their deputies to "the highest organ of State power of the Soviet Union" (the date for the elections to be set by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR). Lithuania, with her population of about 2.8 million

will send more than twice the number of deputies to the Soviet of the Union than Esthonia, with approximately 1.1 million. Latvia, with about 1.9 millions will send a number just between the two, but all three new Union Republics will have exactly the same representation (25 deputies each, according to Article 35) in the Soviet of Nationalities, which has equal rights with the other chamber.

The new republics will also draw up new constitutions "which shall take into account the peculiarities of the republic," according to Article 16 of the Soviet Constitution. (These constitutions, since adopted, differ from those of the older Union Republics mainly in that they provide for a higher degree of private enterprise.)

R.M.S.

NEWS CHRONOLOGY

Newspapers are named primarily for convenient reference, although the same items may appear in other newspapers. The date given is the date on which the event occurred, while the number in parentheses following the name of the newspaper indicates the date of the paper in which the report appeared.

*The texts of decrees, treaties, etc., referred to in the items marked with an asterisk are available in full at the office of the American Russian Institute.



INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Administration

FEBRUARY

- 27—New regulations on titles in the scientific and academic professions are announced.—*Izvestia* (27)
- 29—Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Potemkin, is appointed Commissar of Education in the RSFSR, replacing P. A. Turkin.—*New York Herald Tribune* (1)

MARCH

- 9—Molotov is given the Order of Lenin on his fiftieth birthday.—*New York Herald Tribune* (10)
- 29—The Supreme Soviet meets and Molotov delivers a speech explaining the stand of the USSR on the war situation.—*Izvestia* (30)

APRIL

- 3—The Supreme Soviet adopts a budget of 179.9 billion rubles, with military expenditures at 57 billion.—*New York Times* (4)
- 4—The Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet closes after incorporating the Karelo-Finnish Republic as the 12th Union Republic and adopting a record defense budget.—*New York Herald Tribune* (5)
- 6—A new regulation is issued requiring that foreign residents must pay all bills in foreign money.—*New York Times* (7)
- 6—New income tax law is announced for all whose salaries exceed 150 rubles per month, beginning at 1.20 rubles on 150 rubles per month. New laws on the culture-housing tax and on compulsory insurance are introduced.—*Izvestia* (6)
- 17—TASS announces the establishment of six economic councils under the Council of People's Commissars.—*New York Times* (18) [For details, cf. *The Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, July 5, 1940.]
- 18—The Commissariat of Power Industry is divided into the Commissariats of Power Stations and of Electrical Industry.—*Izvestia* (18)
- 22—The seventieth anniversary of Lenin's birth is widely marked in the Soviet press.—*New York Herald Tribune* (23)
- 28—The Commissariat of Timber Industry is divided into the Commissariats of Paper and Cellulose Industry and of Timber Industry.—*Pravda* (28)

MAY

- 5—Press Day is celebrated throughout the Soviet Union.—*New York Herald Tribune* (6)
- 21—The legal marriage age for Turkmen girls is raised from 16 to 18.—*New York Herald Tribune* (22)
- 28—The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR meets in Moscow.—*New York Herald Tribune* (29)

JUNE

- 26—The Soviet work week is changed to six days and one day of rest and the working day is changed to eight hours for the majority of workers. *New York Herald Tribune* (27) [cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, July 5, 1940.]

JULY

- 4—A list of dangerous occupations is published in which the six-hour working day is retained.—*Pravda* (4)*
- 9—A Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic composed of the Moldavian ASSR in the Ukraine and of Bessarabia is formed and will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet for ratification.—*New York Times* (10)
- 13—A decree is issued providing penalties for sub-standard quality production.—*Pravda* (13)*
- 18—An order is issued providing penalties for workers on machine-tractor-stations who leave their jobs without due cause.—*Pravda* (18)*
- 24—All males in the Soviet Union between the ages of 19 and 50 not previously registered are required to do so during the first two weeks in September.—*New York Herald Tribune* (24)

AUGUST

- 1—At the opening session of the VII meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Molotov delivers a report on foreign policy.—*Pravda* (2)*
- 1—A report is issued on the decisions taken by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. on the harvest and deliveries of agricultural produce; on the administration of the law regarding the change in the working week; on the recommendation for the formation of a Commissariat of Soviet Control.—*Pravda* (1)
- 2—The Supreme Soviet votes to create the Moldavian SSR as the thirteenth constituent republic in the USSR, which will include the major part of Bessarabia and the former Moldavian ASSR. The remainder of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina is to be added to the Ukrainian SSR.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 6—The Supreme Soviet votes to admit Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia as the 14th, 15th and 16th constituent republics of the USSR.—*New York Herald Tribune* (7)
- 11—A decree is issued providing punishment for larceny in industry and other misdemeanors on the job.—*Pravda* (11)*
- 11—An order is issued providing that cases involving unwarranted absence from work, under recent labor decrees, will be tried by a single judge.—*Pravda* (11)

Agriculture

FEBRUARY

- 1—A decree is issued on wool deliveries.—*Izvestia* (1)

MARCH

- 1—A decree is issued on increasing cultivation of cotton in Tadzhikistan.—*Izvestia* (1)*
- 18—A decree is issued on crop rotation in the Ukraine.—*Izvestia* (18)

APRIL

- 7—A decree is issued providing for a new system of agricultural produce deliveries to the State, based on fixed quantities according to arable acreage. It also requires that collective farms breed horses for military purposes.—*New York Times* (8)*
- 12—A decree is issued on compulsory grain and rice collections.—*Izvestia* (12)*
- 21—A decree is issued to increase cultivation of grain in eastern regions.—*Izvestia* (21)*
- 23—A decree is published aiming at increased production of citrus fruits, tea and vines in the Georgian Republic.—*New York Times* (27)*

MAY

- 18—A decree is issued on obligatory deliveries of seed crops.—*Pravda* (18)

JUNE

12—A decision is taken to continue the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in 1941.—*Pravda* (12)

AUGUST

1—An order is issued on the harvest.—*Pravda* (1)*

Art and Science

MARCH

10—Mikhail Bulgakov, author of the Soviet play "Days of the Turbins," dies at the age of 49.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)

19—The first cyclotron to be built in the Soviet Union is to be installed in the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute in Leningrad.—*New York Times* (20)

APRIL

29—A Slovak delegation arrives to participate in the celebration of the 175th anniversary of the death of the Russian scientist and poet, Lomonosov.—*New York Times* (30)

Aviation

APRIL

29—Four well-known Soviet flyers—Golovin, Piontovsky, Alexandrov and Kolaidobrov—are killed in an airplane accident.—*New York Herald Tribune* (30)

MAY

22—Three Red Army men are reported to have made a group parachute jump from a height of 31,488 feet, using oxygen apparatus until they opened their parachutes, 2600 feet from the ground.—*New York Times* (23)

JULY

23—Major Kharakhanov, Soviet parachute jumping champion, breaks the world record in this field jumping from a height of 12,443 metres and falling 11,800 metres before releasing his parachute.—*Daily Worker* (24)

AUGUST

18—Aviation day is celebrated in the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (18)

Defense

APRIL

16—The Soviet Black Sea fleet starts maneuvers.—*New York Herald Tribune* (17)

22—It is announced by radio that Soviet naval exercises have started in Far Eastern waters and are continuing in the Black Sea.—*New York Times* (23)

MAY

1—The annual May Day parade in Moscow features an impressive display of Soviet air power.—*New York Times* (2)

6—Stricter discipline in the Soviet Navy is urged by the newspaper *Red Fleet*.—*New York Times* (7)

8—Marshal Voroshilov is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman of the Defense Council, Marshal Timoshenko is made People's Commissar of Defense, leaving his position as commander of the Kiev Military District.—*New York Times* (18)

8—Military ranks and titles are introduced in the Soviet Army and Navy.—*Pravda* (8)*

23—An editorial in the *Red Star* states that People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko has ordered that officers enforce the ruling that Red Army men must salute their superiors.—*New York Times* (24)

JUNE

30—United States military experts state that the Soviets landed tanks by plane in Rumania. These tanks are said to weigh 5 to 7 tons and are equipped with machine guns.—*New York Times* (July 1)

JULY

- 2—The Baltic Fleet completes maneuvers which included a mock battle involving bombing planes.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 10—Lieut. Col. Mikhail Kirponos is named commander of the Leningrad military district.—*New York Times* (11)
- 11—Maneuvers are completed in the Trans-Caucasian military district.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 27—People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov announces that 168 warships will be added to the Soviet Navy during this year.—*New York Times* (28)
- 28—Navy Day is celebrated with exercises and parades in the Pacific, the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas, and the northern areas.—*New York Times* (29)

AUGUST

- 7—It is reported that the Soviet Navy is holding maneuvers in the Pacific.—*PM* (7)
- 12—The system of political commissars who have equal authority with commanders in the Red Army and Navy is abolished.—*Pravda* (13)*
- 16—General K. A. Meretskov is appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Red Army, replacing Marshal Shaposhnikov who is named Vice-Commissar of Defense.—*New York Times* (16)

Economic Life

APRIL

- 12—*Pravda* reports that the Soviets are making rapid progress in developing the oil fields of Galicia.—*New York Herald Tribune* (13)
- 20—It is reported that geologists believe Kamchatka is richer in oil than Sakhalin Island and a special trust for the industrial prospecting of Kamchatka oil has been established.—*New York Times* (21)

MAY

- 7—The 66-mile Samur-Dvichinsk Canal, paralleling the Caspian Sea coast north of Baku, is opened.—*New York Herald Tribune* (8)
- 15—Plans are announced for the construction of a huge hydro-electric development on the Upper Volga near Kazan.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)

JUNE

- 28—The Joseph Stalin, a new turbo-electric vessel, leaves Leningrad to open a new sea route to Stettin.—*New York Times* (29)

JULY

- 1—It is announced that a new internal loan amounting to 8,000,000,000 rubles, running for 20 years and bearing 4 per cent interest, will be floated.—*New York Times* (2)
- 4—M. Sedin is appointed Commissar of the Oil Industry, replacing Lazar M. Kaganovich.—*New York Times* (4)
- 10—Samokhalov is relieved of his post as People's Commissar of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. P. F. Lomako is named in his place.—*New York Times* (11)
- 10—The establishment of a seaplane passenger air service between Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk is announced.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)
- 11—The first collective farm is established in Latvia.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 16—Former monastery lands are being distributed to landless peasants in Bessarabia.—*New York Herald Tribune* (17)
- 10—The Dnieper-Bug-Vistula Canal is opened for navigation.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)
- 21—The People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy offers prizes for discoveries of gold and platinum deposits.—*New York Times* (22)

Miscellaneous

MAY

- 11—On the fifteenth anniversary of the Society of the Militant Godless, President Yaroslavsky announces that there are 3,000,000 militant atheists in the Soviet Union.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Europe—General

FEBRUARY

- 20—TASS denies an Italian report that Soviet troops have crossed the Turkish border by mistake.—*Izvestia* (20)
- 29—Premier Saydam of Turkey announced today that Turkey does not intend to make war on the Soviet Union and he denied reports that Turkey was on the verge of war or of mobilization of her army. He stated: "All rumors that 'incidents' have arisen between the Soviet Union and us are without foundation and have a tendentious character."—*New York Herald Tribune* (1)
- 29—The British officials deny that they have as yet requested Turkey to allow them to send warships through the Dardanelles.—*New York Times* (1)

MARCH

- 6—Chamberlain announces in the House of Commons that after consultation with the French, it has been decided not to publish the White Book on the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations last summer.—*New York Times* (7)
- 8—A ship line between Odessa and Varna, Bulgaria, is inaugurated.—*Izvestia* (8)
- 11—TASS announces the completion of negotiations for a trade and navigation pact between the Soviet Union and Iran.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 12—The first flight of a commercial plane over the new Soviet-Bulgarian air line is completed.—*New York Times* (13)
- 13—It is reported from Rome that the Soviet Union is about to initiate trade talks with Italy.—*New York Times* (14)
- 13—It is reported from Stockholm that negotiations are under way for a Scandinavian defense alliance.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)
- 14—The Polish government in exile issues a White Book on events leading up to the war.—*New York Times* (15)
- 18—The Swedish foreign office announces that the Soviet Union has given formal diplomatic assurances that it will have no further territorial demands in northwestern Europe.—*New York Times* (19)
- 20—TASS issues an authorized statement to the effect that the Soviet Union would regard the Scandinavian defense alliance as incompatible with the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty because it would be aimed against the USSR.—*Herald Tribune* (20)
- 21—Cross, Minister of Economic Warfare, tells the House of Commons that there is evidence of large purchase in the United States of war materials, especially copper, by the USSR.—*Herald Tribune* (22)
- 21—TASS denies the reports circulating abroad that the Soviet Union is making demands on Sweden and Norway.—*New York Times* (22)
- 21—Afghanistan denies rumors that there is danger of an attack on it by the USSR.—*Izvestia* (22)
- 23—TASS denies the reports that Molotov is planning to visit Germany.—*New York Times* (24)
- 23—The first regular plane on the new Sofia-Moscow route arrives in Sofia.—*New York Times* (24)
- 24—Viscount Halifax implies in a speech that Finland would be restored following the war.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 25—The USSR and Iran sign a treaty of commerce and navigation.—*New York Times* (27)
- 27—Jacob Surits, Soviet Ambassador to France, is recalled at the request of the French Government.—*Izvestia* (27)

APRIL

- 2—In an interview in Washington, Sir Stafford Cripps declares that the close economic and political relations between the USSR and Germany could be broken if the Western Powers, including the United States, would resume normal economic relations with the Soviet Union.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 5—Lord Halifax hands a note to the Swedish and Norwegian Ministers stating that the Allies can not remain indifferent if the two northern countries permit any extension of German or Russian power in their territory. The communication also is reported to state that any attempt by the USSR on Finland or Finnish ports would be regarded as prejudicial to the Allies.—*New York Times* (6)
- 6—Premier Koht of Norway issues a statement that Norway must carry on normal trade relations with all countries, or be in danger of being drawn into the war.—*New York Times* (7)
- 7—Conferences in London between the British diplomats to the Balkans and Sir William Seeds, Ambassador to Moscow, will begin, regarding the possibilities of tightening the blockade in that area.—*New York Herald Tribune* (8)
- 8—Germany invades Denmark and Norway as the Allies begin mining of Norwegian waters.—*New York Times* (9)
- 9—In the House of Commons the question is raised as to Soviet imports of oil from the United States through Vladivostok and purchase of oil, tin and rubber from the Netherlands Indies. R. H. Cross, Minister of Economic Warfare, replies that he does not believe these exceeded Soviet needs.—*New York Times* (10)
- 10—It is reported from Hungary that Germany has demanded control of all Danubian shipping.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)
- 11—An *Izvestia* editorial states that the German military action in Denmark and Norway was provoked by the Allies' violations of the neutrality of those countries.—*New York Times* (11)
- 11—A TASS dispatch denies the truth of the statement by the Berlin correspondent of the *New York Times* that a majority of the German troops that occupied Narvik arrived there by rail via Leningrad and Murmansk.—*New York Times* (12)
- 15—A TASS statement denies that the Germans ever asked Premier Molotov for permission to ship German troops to Narvik via the Murmansk railroad.—*New York Times* (16)
- 15—The British Ministry of Economic Warfare produces figures purporting to prove the British opinion that vast quantities of supplies entering the Soviet Union at Vladivostok are being transferred to Germany.—*New York Times* (16)
- 20—A Yugoslav mission goes to Moscow to negotiate a trade and payments convention.—*New York Times* (21)
- 20—Ambassador Maisky is reported seeking to reopen trade talks between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.—*New York Times* (21)
- 24—Ambassador Maisky and British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Butler confer on Soviet-British trade possibilities.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 24—The Yugoslavian Vice-Premier, V. Matchek, states that the impending trade treaty between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia will be followed by the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 25—A *Pravda* article accuses H. St. J. Philby, British Orientalist and Near East expert, of heading agents who incite national and religious discord in the Arabian countries.—*New York Times* (26)
- 25—Regular air service between Moscow and Stockholm via Riga is announced. The service is to start May 3.—*New York Herald Tribune* (26)

- 25—A Yugoslav economic delegation arrives in Moscow to negotiate a trade treaty.—*New York Times* (27)
- 28—The Soviet trade union organ, *Trud*, accuses Italy of trying to blackmail the Allies while the latter are facing severe difficulties.—*New York Times* (29)
- 29—Maisky delivers a note to Viscount Halifax, giving the Soviet position on possible British-Soviet trade talks.—*New York Herald Tribune* (30)

MAY

- 1—It is announced from Berlin that the German Industrial Financial Corporation is ready to grant cheap credits to German manufacturers dealing with the Soviet Union. The credits are to be used chiefly for buying raw materials.—*Herald Tribune* (2)
- 4—A TASS dispatch denies that the Soviet Union warned Germany about Sweden and the occupation of the Aland Islands, but it reports that there has been consultation between the two countries, in accordance with the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, in regard to Sweden's neutrality.—*Pravda* (4)
- 5—The newspaper, *Red Fleet*, states that there is a danger of a Franco-British offensive in the Near East.—*New York Times* (6)
- 5—It is reported from Bucharest that the Soviet tanker Sakhalin arrived in Constanza with a cargo of refined oil bound for Germany.—*New York Times* (6)
- 8—Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax and Ambassador Maisky confer again on proposed Anglo-Soviet trade talks.—*New York Times* (9)
- 9—Soviet officials deny that Moscow is contemplating a reported Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslavian military alliance.—*New York Herald Tribune* (10)
- 10—A TASS dispatch denies the *London Daily Express* story that the Soviet Union is effecting a Pan-Slav policy and encouraging Rumania to help Yugoslavia if the latter is attacked by Italy.—*New York Herald Tribune* (10)
- 11—A trade and navigation treaty between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is signed.—*New York Times* (12)
- 11—A Moscow radio broadcast stresses the mutual interests of Sweden and the Soviet Union in maintaining peace in the Baltic and predicts increased trade between the two countries.—*New York Times* (12)
- 12—A proposal by Yugoslavia for economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Balkan Entente is announced.—*New York Herald Tribune* (13)
- 14—A Swedish trade delegation arrives in Moscow.—*New York Herald Tribune* (15)
- 18—In a speech before a Party Congress, the secretary of the White Russian Communist Party accuses England and France of stirring up trouble in the Near East as a possible center for war against the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (19)
- 21—The newspaper, *Trud*, states that if the European war is of long duration the time factor is on the side of the Allies because of their huge raw materials resources and because of the backing of the United States.—*New York Herald Tribune* (22)
- 22—A Soviet note rejects Britain's terms that Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations be carried out on a war basis and accept recognition of the blockade of Germany.—*New York Times* (23)
- 24—Sir Stafford Cripps is appointed by the British Government to go to Moscow for further discussion on Anglo-Soviet trade, subject to acceptance by the Soviet Government.—*New York Times* (25)
- 27—Sir Stafford Cripps and a small British trade mission leave for Moscow.—*New York Times* (28)

- 27—The Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratifies the Soviet-Yugoslavian trade and navigation treaty.—*New York Herald Tribune* (28)
- 27—It is reported that Sweden has asked the Soviet Union for transport facilities for Swedish exports via Murmansk.—*New York Times* (28)
- 29—The Soviet Government rejects Sir Stafford Cripps as a special trade envoy.—*New York Herald Tribune* (30)
- 29—Sir Stafford Cripps is named Ambassador to the USSR.—*New York Times* (30)
- 30—The Soviet Government withdraws troops from the Hungarian border and Hungary suspends plans to call more reserves into her army.—*New York Times* (31)
- 31—Soviet Ambassador to Bulgaria, Arkadii Lavrentev, arrives in Belgrade to exchange ratifications of the Soviet-Yugoslavian trade treaty.—*New York Times* (June)

JUNE

- 2—It is reported from Budapest that Hungarian troops have been moved from the German and Yugoslav borders toward the sections of Hungary bordered by Slovakia, Rumania and the Soviet Union.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 3—The Soviet Government approves Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to the USSR.—*New York Herald Tribune* (4)
- 5—The Soviet Government approves the appointment of Erik Labonne as French Ambassador to the USSR.—*New York Herald Tribune* (6)
- 7—It is announced from Bucharest that the Soviet Union is sending a Minister Plenipotentiary to Rumania.—*New York Times* (8)
- 10—Italy declares war against France and Britain.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)
- 12—French Ambassador Erik Labonne and British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps arrive in Moscow.—*New York Times* (13)
- 12—Italian Ambassador Rosso arrives in Moscow, as Soviet Ambassador Gorelkin returns to Rome.—*New York Times* (13)
- 13—Arkadii Lavrentev is named Soviet Ambassador to Rumania, relieving him of his post as Minister to Bulgaria.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)
- 14—*Komsomolskaya Pravda* publishes a letter from a French soldier exhorting Frenchmen to fight for a "free, independent and traitorless France."—*New York Times* (15)
- 15—It is announced that the Soviet Union and Germany signed a "border incidents" agreement on June 10.—*New York Times* (16)
- 16—A TASS dispatch denies a British report that the Soviet Union is supervising a strengthening of anti-aggression pacts among Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia for resisting German and Italian expansion eastward.—*New York Times* (17)
- 16—A TASS dispatch repudiates a United Press report that the Soviet Union has promised to aid Sweden if that country is attacked.—*Daily Worker* (17)
- 18—Turkey announces to the British and French envoys that the situation is too confusing for her to make a definite commitment under the mutual-assistance pact with the Allies, as a result of Italy's entrance into the war.—*New York Times* (19)
- 23—The body of the Bulgarian Minister to Moscow, Theodore Christoff, who died in Moscow a few days earlier is flown to Sofia on a Soviet plane.—*New York Times* (24)
- 24—Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are established, with Victor Plotnikov named as Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade and Milan Gavrilovitch as Ambassador to Moscow.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 24—A TASS dispatch denies rumors that negotiations are being conducted between the Soviet Union and Turkey for the conclusion of a treaty and that Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoglu is preparing to come to Moscow.—*Daily Worker* (25)

- 26—Premier Saydam of Turkey tells his Parliament that Turkey has decided not to enter the European war.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)
- 27—Rumanian airlines suspend all commercial service to leading Bessarabian cities, following reports that clashes between Soviet and Rumanian planes have taken place there.—*New York Times* (27)
- 28—Sir Stafford Cripps presents his credentials to Kalinin.—*New York Times* (29)
- 30—The Bulgarian Cabinet approves a proposal to trade hides and other commodities to the Soviet Union in return for construction steel.—*Daily Worker* (July 1)

JULY

- 3—Molotov receives a Danish trade delegation.—*Daily Worker* (4)
- 3—The Turkish Government denies reports that the Soviet Union has demanded concessions from Turkey involving the Dardanelles.—*New York Times* (4)
- 3—An agreement is signed establishing direct telephone and telegraph connections between Germany and the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (4)
- 5—*Izvestia* publishes the documents of the Fifth and Sixth German White Papers purporting to show Anglo-French plans for an attack on the USSR.—*Daily Worker* (6)
- 5—Germany and the Soviet Union reach agreements under which the German Consulate at Leningrad will be reopened; new German consulates will be opened at Batum and Vladivostok and Soviet consulates at Hamburg, Koenigsburg and Vienna.—*New York Times* (6)
- 6—A semi-official Turkish news agency denies the German charges that the Allies had sought permission to fly over that country in order to bomb the Baku oil fields.—*New York Times* (6)
- 11—The new Bulgarian Minister P. Stamenoff arrives in Moscow.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 11—TASS denies rumors that the Soviet Union has presented Turkey with demands for territorial concessions.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 18—King Boris of Bulgaria receives the credentials of the new Soviet Ambassador Lavridev.—*New York Times* (19)
- 22—A German commission arrives in Moscow to discuss the removal of Germans from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.—*New York Herald Tribune* (23)
- 24—It is reported that the Soviet staff in London, negotiating a trade pact, will leave for Moscow shortly.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 24—A TASS dispatch denies rumors that the Soviet Union has contracted to supply England with \$800,000,000 worth of airplanes.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 28—It is announced in Moscow that a Soviet-Afganistan commercial agreement was signed several days earlier.—*New York Times* (29)
- 28—Ambassador Maisky protests to the British Foreign Office against the freezing of Baltic balances in British banks.—*New York Times* (29)
- 29—An Iranian delegation arrives in Moscow to discuss transport problems.—*New York Herald Tribune* (30)

AUGUST

- 1—Molotov reports to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on Foreign Policy.—*Pravda* (2)*
- 2—Turkey denies sending additional troops to its eastern provinces.—*Pravda* (2)
- 20—It is reported from Amsterdam that weekly service is to be opened between Rotterdam and Leningrad.—*New York Times* (21)
- 22—TASS denies rumors of Turkish-Greek-Soviet military conversations.—*Pravda* (22)

BALTIC STATES

MARCH

- 16—A conference of the three Baltic states concludes with a communique expressing satisfaction with the end of the Soviet-Finnish war and reiterating their position of absolute neutrality.—*New York Times* (17)

APRIL

- 2—Lithuania notifies the League of Nations that it will not cede back the territory of Vilna.—*New York Times* (3)

MAY

- 29—A Soviet Foreign Office communique states that Red Army men have "disappeared" from the garrison in Lithuania.—*New York Herald Tribune* (30)
- 29—Molotov protests to Lithuania over kidnaping and torture of five Red Army men to extract military information. He demands that immediate steps be taken to investigate and to prevent recurrence of such incidents.—*Industria* (30).
- 30—It is reported that the Lithuanian Government answered the Soviet Government's protest against the disappearance of Red Army men from Soviet garrisons in Lithuania and states that a special commission to investigate the matter has been appointed.—*New York Times* (31)
- 30—The Leningrad City Soviet establishes a forbidden zone comprising seven administrative districts bordering on Estonia. Residence and travel in this zone is to require special permission.—*New York Times* (31)

JUNE

- 2—Premier Molotov announces that he has received the Latvian Minister of War, accompanied by the Latvian Minister to Moscow.—*New York Times* (3)
- 4—It is reported from Kaunas that 64 persons were arrested in Vilna in connection with Soviet charges that Red Army men had been kidnapped from their garrison in Lithuania.—*New York Times* (5)
- 10—Lithuanian Foreign Minister Urbsys arrives in Moscow to join in the talks between the Lithuanian Premier and Soviet officials.—*New York Times* (11)
- 14—Molotov sends note to Lithuania: 1. protests that kidnapings and murder of Red Army men by Lithuanian police and mass arrests of workers employed on the Red Army barracks and in restaurants violate Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Pact by making position of Soviet troops in Lithuania untenable; 2. denounces secret adherence of Lithuania to Latvian-Estonian military alliance as direct violation of Pact; 3. demands immediate formation of a government willing and able to carry out terms of Pact, and free passage into Lithuania of sufficient additional Soviet troops to enable Pact to be effective and to prevent further provocations against Soviet garrisons.—*Pravda* (16).
- 15—Lithuanian Government accedes to these demands. Soviet troops arrive in Kaunas.—*Pravda* (16).
- 15—Lithuanian Government headed by M. Merkys retires.—*New York Times* (16).
- 16—Smetona and party flee Lithuania to Germany where they are interned.—*Pravda* (17).
- 16—The Latvian and Estonian Government agree to demands similar to those made on Lithuania on the grounds of secret meetings held by the Baltic military alliance and of attempts to draw Finland into it.—*Pravda* (17).

- 17—The official Latvian news agency issues a denial of the Soviet charge that a military alliance existed between Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.—*New York Herald Tribune* (18)
- 17—A new Lithuanian cabinet is installed with Justas Paleckis at the head.—*New York Times* (18)
- 20—A new Latvian cabinet is formed with August Kirchensteins as Premier.—*New York Herald Tribune* (21)
- 21—A new revolutionary government is set up in Estonia after Estonian workers seized the main government buildings. The new cabinet is headed by Dr. Johannis Vares with all the Ministers active Socialists.—*New York Times* (22)
- 21—First act of the new Latvian Government is a declaration of amnesty for all political prisoners. It declares its intention of fulfilling Latvia's obligations under the Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR.—*Pravda* (22).
- 22—A TASS dispatch denies the recent newspaper reports that the Soviet Union had concentrated 100 to 150 divisions of troops in the Baltic countries. It states that there are not more than 18 or 20 and that implementation of the mutual assistance pacts with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were the reasons for this troop movement, rather than the desire to put pressure on Germany.—*New York Herald Tribune* (23)
- 22—The New Esthonian Government announces that election will be held for all bodies from municipal organs to State Duma "in order to guarantee real representation to the people." It declares its intention of :1. dissolving all organizations directed against the welfare of the people; 2. eliminating national hatreds and guaranteeing rights to national minorities; 3. developing foreign trade in close cooperation with the Soviet Union.—*Pravda* (23).
- 23—Lithuanian Government provides free medical services for the people. The Sejm is dissolved.—*Pravda* (24).
- 23—Latvian Government guarantees freedom of speech, press and assembly.—*Pravda* (24).

JULY

- 3—It is announced from Kaunas that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have dissolved the Baltic Entente formed in 1934.—*New York Times* (4)
- 3—The political commissar system is introduced in the Latvian and Esthonian armies.—*New York Times* (4).
- 4—Latvian Cabinet denounces its predecessor for having usurped the functions of the Sejm which had not been convened for six years; announces elections to be held July 14 and 15 in accordance with Art. 6 of the Latvian Constitution, on basis of universal, equal, direct and secret ballot with proportional representation.—*Pravda* (5).
- 5—New Latvian election law provides that all citizens over 21 can vote. Candidates for the Sejm will be placed on the ballot upon submission of petitions bearing 100 voters' signatures.—*Pravda* (6).
- 5—Esthonian Government legalizes the Communist Party of Esthonia.—*Pravda* (6).
- 6—New parliamentary elections are announced for July 14 and 15 in Estonia and Lithuania.—*Pravda* (6).
- 6—Lithuanian Ministry of Finance decrees rent reduction of 20 to 25 per cent. Property of those who fled the country is confiscated.—*Pravda* (7).
- 6—Election platforms of the "Alliance of Working People" in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia include the following planks: Land to the landless, cancellation of back taxes; increase of wages; safety measures; illness and accident insurance; pensions for the aged and incapacitated; increase of medical services; mother and child assistance; democratiza-

of the army; democratic rights of free speech, press and assembly, inviolability of person and property, and equal rights for national minorities.—*Pravda* (7).

- 8—In each of the three Baltic countries the "Alliance of Working People" slate includes labor leaders, scientists, writers, agricultural workers. The opposition is charged with ridiculing the election and urging termination of harvest work and the slaughter of livestock.—*Pravda* (9).
- 10—Lithuanian "Alliance" denies that its candidates would force collectivization or persecute the religious, urges peasants to prevent landowners from killing cattle and spoiling grain.—*Pravda* (11)
- 12—Lithuanian Cabinet decrees state control over banks and industry.—*Pravda* (13)
- 12—Latvia raises wages of lowest paid workers by 15 to 20 per cent.—*Pravda* (13)
- 13—Estonian local election commission annuls petition of candidates opposing "Alliance" on grounds that signatures were secured through promises of patronage, and by lifting planks from the "Alliance" platform, etc.—*Pravda* (14)
- 14—Russian language is to be taught in Latvian schools.—*Pravda* (15)
- 15—Lithuanian Government dissolves Smetona's "Union of Riflemen" and orders all arms surrendered in forty-eight hours.—*Pravda* (16)
- 17—First figures on Baltic elections: Latvia, 1,179,649 voted, constituting 94.7 per cent of all eligible to vote, 27,919 ballots were spoiled by having the candidates' names crossed out; Lithuania, 1,386,569 voted or 95.51 per cent of those eligible and of these 99.19 per cent cast their ballot for the "Alliance" slate; Estonia, 591,030 voted or 84.1 per cent of electorate of which 92.8 per cent voted for "Alliance" candidates. Only the candidates of the "Alliance" appeared on the ballot. Failure to submit their platforms to the Election Commission is given as the grounds for ruling the others invalid.—*Pravda* (17).
- 17—50,000 march in a demonstration in Tallinn, carrying slogans demanding that Estonia join the USSR.—*Pravda* (18).
- 18—Latvian Prime Minister Kirchensteins, at demonstration of 200,000 after elections, calls for a Soviet Latvia; his hearers demand admission into the Soviet Union.—*Pravda* (19).
- 19—Soviets of Workers' Deputies are elected in workers' districts and big factories in Kaunas.—*Pravda* (20)
- 20—President Ulmanis of Latvia is removed.—*New York Times* (20).
- 20—Latvian Cabinet grants Prime Minister Kirchensteins temporary presidential powers in connection with summoning the Sejm.—*Pravda* (21).
- 21—The Baltic Parliaments declare their countries to be Soviet Socialist Republics.—*Pravda* (22).
- 21—The parliaments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia vote to petition the Soviet Union for membership.—*New York Herald Tribune* (22)
- 23—The Latvian and Lithuanian Parliaments decree the nationalization of land, the banks and large scale industry.—*Daily Worker* (24)
- 23—Estonia makes similar nationalization provisions.—*Pravda* (24).
- 23—Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania limit size of individual farms and redistribute excess acreage among landless peasants.—*Pravda* (23).
- 23—Commissions to draft Soviet constitutions are set up by the new Baltic Parliaments.—*Pravda* (24).
- 25—Lithuanian workers set up factory committees to check on production.—*Pravda* (26).
- 27—In all three Baltic countries nationalization regulations provide for counter-signature of plant directors' order by government commissars or by trade union representatives or by workers' committee.—*Pravda* (28).

- 29—The Polish Government delivers a note to the U. S. State Department reportedly protesting against the taking over by the Soviet Union of certain territory which had been incorporated in Lithuania.—*New York Times* (30)
- 30—Estonian educators resolve to institute free education and to introduce Russian language courses.—*Pravda* (31).

AUGUST

- 1—Supreme Soviet of the USSR, meeting in Moscow, considers Baltic application for admission into the Soviet federation.—*Pravda* (2).
- 3—Lithuania is admitted as the 14th Union Republic of the USSR.—*Pravda* (4).
- 4—A general 20 per cent wage increase is made in Estonia.—*Pravda* (5).
- 5—Latvia is admitted as the 15th Union Republic.—*Pravda* (6).
- 6—Estonia is admitted as the 16th Union Republic, bringing the Soviet population to 193,000,000.—*Pravda* (7).
- 8—The Estonian University abolishes tuition fees.—*Pravda* (9).
- 9—Lithuanian land commissions set aside mansions of landowners for schools, libraries, rest homes, hospitals and other social institutions; day nurseries are organized in homes of wealthy residents of Kaunas who fled abroad.—*Pravda* (10).
- 9—It is reported from Rio de Janeiro that a Latvian steamer, chartered by a Baltimore firm, is boarded by Brazilian marines as it attempts to sail for Baltimore, after receiving orders from the Soviet Government to proceed to Murmansk.—*New York Times* (10)
- 10—The Stakhanov movement is reported spreading in the Baltic Republics.—*Pravda* (11).
- 12—Foreign nations are requested to close their consulates in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania by August 25.—*New York Herald Tribune* (13)
- 13—Civil marriages are decreed as the only legal marriages in Lithuania; religious ceremonies are permitted after the civil ceremony.—*New York Times* (14)
- 15—The Consuls of the Baltic states in New York City refuse to recognize Soviet rule in their respective countries.—*New York Herald Tribune* (15)
- 15—The Estonian Consul in Montreal states that orders from the Soviet Estonian Government that Estonian ships must fly the Soviet flag have been countermanded by the Estonian legation in London.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)
- 18—A Latvian steamer is detained by Peruvian port authorities at the request of the Latvian-American owners. The vessel was about to sail for Vladivostok.—*New York Herald Tribune* (19)
- 22—The Soviet Government postpones the closing date for American consulates in the Baltic States until September 5.—*New York Times* (23)
- 23—The Baltic parliaments meet.—*Pravda* (24).
- 25—The new parliaments adopt new constitutions in which provision is made for the existence of private economy to a certain extent. The parliaments declare themselves to be temporary Supreme Soviets and elect members of Councils of People's Commissars.—*Pravda* (26).
- 26—Workers' families in the new Soviet republics are moved into unoccupied apartments, those with large families receiving preference. New libraries and art schools are opened and new publications started.—*Pravda* (28).
- 26—The Supreme Soviet of Lithuanian votes to move the capital from Kaunas to Vilna.—*New York Times* (27)
- 26—It is reported from Rio de Janeiro that there has been sabotage on the Latvian steamer to prevent it from sailing to Murmansk.—*New York Times* (27)

FINLAND

FEBRUARY

- 20—TASS denies that the Soviets are operating the foreign owned nickel mines in Finland.—*Izvestia* (20)
- 29—The American-Scandinavian Foundation issues an appeal, signed by leading Swedes, urging the United States "to come to the assistance of Finland soon and in every possible way."—*New York Herald Tribune* (1)

MARCH

- 1—A loan of \$20,000,000 is offered to Finland, after the President signs a bill expanding the capital of the Export-Import Bank. Also \$15,000,000 is offered to Sweden and \$10,000,000 to Norway.—*New York Times* (2)
- 4—TASS issues a denial that the Soviets have been directing their bombing against civilians in Finland.—*Izvestia* (4)
- 5—The Soviet Government apologizes to Sweden for an air raid on a Swedish town on February 21.—*New York Herald Tribune* (6)
- 6—It is learned in Stockholm that the Soviet terms for ending the Finnish war have been submitted to Helsinki through the Swedish Government.—*New York Times* (7)
- 8—Ambassador Steinhardt confers with Molotov, but President Roosevelt denies in his press conference that the United States has been asked to mediate in the Soviet-Finnish conflict.—*New York Herald Tribune* (9)
- 8—It is announced by the French Foreign Office that Finland must make a new appeal to the Powers or to the League, if she expects to receive greater assistance.—*New York Times* (9)
- 9—It is reported from London that two weeks earlier Ambassador Maisky had approached the British foreign office to transmit peace proposals to Helsinki, similar to those now under discussion. The British Foreign Office is said to have refused to do so on the grounds that the terms were too severe. The British Government then, the report continues, again asked Sweden and Norway what their policy was in regard to the transit of regular troops to assist Finland. Both governments restated their neutrality policies. It was subsequently reported that Sweden would consider permission for transit of not less than a full army corps of 80,000 men.—*New York Herald Tribune* (10)
- 11—Secretary Hull says at his press conference that Ambassador Steinhardt will probably talk to the Finnish delegates in Moscow, but the United States has not played and will not play a major role in the negotiations.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 11—It is reported officially from London that on February 22 Ambassador Maisky submitted to Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, proposals for ending the war in Finland, to be transmitted to Helsinki. London declined to do so, on the grounds that the terms would leave Finland helpless.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 12—Chamberlain announces in the House of Commons that the British and French governments are prepared, in response to an appeal from the Finns, to use all available resources at their disposal to aid Finland.—*New York Herald Tribune* (12)
- 12—Daladier announces in the Chamber of Deputies that 50,000 French soldiers have been standing ready since February 26 to leave for Finland, in accordance with the decision taken at the meeting of the Supreme War Council February 5, but that Finland had not yet appealed for the help.—*New York Times* (13)
- 13—A treaty of peace is signed between Finland and the Soviet Union, ceding the Karelian Isthmus, the Rybachi peninsula and part of Finnish Karelia, as well as granting a lease on Hangoe.—*New York Times* (13)
[For text, see *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, April, 1940]
- 13—President Roosevelt reiterates in a memorandum to the press his statement of December 1, 1939, and praises the valor of the Finns.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)

- 15—The Finnish Parliament ratifies the peace with the USSR.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)

APRIL

- 1—Foreign Minister Gunther of Sweden reveals to Parliament that the Allies made their first request to permit the transit of troops to aid Finland on March 2.—*New York Herald Tribune* (2)
- 7—Ivan Zotov, former Soviet envoy to Latvia, is named envoy to Finland. Juho Paasikivi is named Finnish envoy to the USSR.—*New York Times* (8)
- 9—Petsamo is turned over to Finnish authorities in accordance with the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty.—*Izvestia* (14)
- 14—A TASS dispatch states that in conformity with the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty the Soviet-Finnish frontier commission has fixed the new border between the two countries and has settled the procedure for demarcation.—*New York Herald Tribune* (15)
- 15—A Swedish Foreign Office statement declares that the Soviet Union will pay Sweden an indemnity of 40,000 Swedish Kroner for bombing Pajala during the Soviet-Finnish war.—*New York Times* (16)
- 15—Soviet-Finnish diplomatic relations are resumed as Paasikivi presents his credentials as Finnish Minister to the Soviet Union to Kalinin.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)

MAY

- 4—TASS denies that the USSR offered to trade Viborg for the Aland Islands and Petsamo.—*Pravda* (4)
- 10—TASS denies that negotiations are being conducted for a mutual assistance pact between the USSR, Sweden and Finland.—*Pravda* (10)

JUNE

- 2—A communique from the Leningrad military headquarters places Finnish casualties in the recent Soviet-Finnish campaign at 85,000 dead and more than 250,000 wounded.—*New York Times* (3)
- 28—Soviet-Finnish trade treaty is signed.—*New York Times* (29)*

JULY

- 17—It is reported from Helsinki that Finland has acceded to Soviet demands for the demilitarization of the Aland Islands.—*New York Herald Tribune* (18)
- 24—A TASS dispatch states that the Finnish Society for Friendship and Peace with the Soviet Union is showing increased membership.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 26—Finland ratifies the Soviet-Finnish trade pact signed June 28.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)*

AUGUST

- 2—A TASS dispatch accuses the Finnish police of persecuting members of the Society for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in Helsinki.—*New York Times* (3)

RUMANIA

APRIL

- 20—TASS denies that Rumania and the USSR have agreed to withdraw their troops 10 km. from their respective borders.—*Izvestia* (20)

JUNE

- 28—TASS issues the notes that passed between the Soviet and the Rumanian Governments in regard to the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (29)
- 29—Red Army troops retreat to the agreed line of demarcation after the mistake of proceeding too deep into Rumania.—*New York Times* (30)

JULY

- 2—A TASS dispatch announces that the Red Army troops are installed along the border of the ceded territory in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.—*New York Herald Tribune* (2)
- 3—*Krasnaia Zvezda* reports that more than 2,000 deserters from the Rumanian Army have entered Bessarabia.—*New York Times* (4)

- 5—A TASS dispatch denies reports in British newspapers that a Moscow radio broadcast told of an appeal from the Rumanian population for aid from the Red Army against another power to which the Rumanian Government had turned.—*Daily Worker* (6)
- 8—King Carol of Rumania assures Soviet Ambassador Lavrentev that Rumania is seeking the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (9)
- 19—A TASS dispatch denies a report of the London radio that Soviet troops had occupied "another 12 districts" in Bukovina.—*Daily Worker* (20)

JULY

- 22—Soviet and Rumanian officials in Bucharest deny reports that the Soviet Union has sent a note to Rumania demanding that the latter form a people's government.—*New York Herald Tribune* (23)
- 27—It is announced that the Rumanian Government has assured the Soviet Union that it would not interfere with Bessarabians desiring to move from Rumania into the territory recently acquired from Rumania by the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (28)
- 28—The Soviet Foreign Office protests to the Rumanian Minister against repeated Rumanian attempts to hinder the evacuation of Bessarabians to their "fatherland."—*Daily Worker* (29)

AUGUST

- 13—TASS distributes a Soviet newspaper article which asserts that Bulgaria's claim to the southern Dobruja section of Rumania is justified.—*New York Times* (14)
- 16—It is reported from Bucharest that 300,000 Jews in Northern Moldavia and non-Soviet Bukovina have applied for admittance to the Soviet Union.—*New York Herald Tribune* (17)
- 27—Bucharest reports that there have been land and air clashes between Rumanian and Soviet troops in Northern Moldavia.—*New York Times* (28)

FAR EAST

MARCH

- 5—In a release to the press, Sir Stafford Cripps announces that he has just returned to Chungking from a trip to Moscow, by way of Sinkiang. In regard to Sinkiang, he stated: "There is no evidence of Russian military occupation or administration in any place I visited."—*New York Times* (6)
- 6—Ambassador Maisky visits the British Minister of Economic Warfare and insists on the release of the Soviet ship *Selenga* detained in Hongkong since January 13.—*New York Times* (7)
- 13—Tokyo protested to Moscow against an alleged flight of Soviet planes over Southern Sakhalin.—*New York Times* (14)
- 16—A further border clash on Sakhalin was reported in Tokyo.—*New York Times* (16)
- 18—Arita reported in the Japanese Parliament that negotiations for a long term fishery agreement had been begun and that he was confident the difficulties in regard to Sakhalin could be settled.—*New York Herald Tribune* (19)
- 27—Maisky protests to Halifax against the detention of Soviet ships in Hongkong. The *Selenga* was stopped January 13 carrying tin, antimony and wolfram. The *Mayakowsky* was carrying copper from Mexico.—*New York Times* (28)
- 29—British authorities in Hongkong turn over the two Soviet freighters to French authorities to be taken to Indo-China.—*New York Times* (30)

APRIL

- 1—Chiang Kai-shek reports at the meeting of the People's Political Council that Soviet support to China has been considerably stronger since the end of the Finnish war.—*New York Times* (2)

- 2—In a speech to Parliament Chamberlain announces that the British blockade will be intensified with its extension to the Pacific.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 4—Japanese Navy spokesmen threaten to take action against any blockade action by the British in the Chosen Straits.—*New York Herald Tribune* (5)
- 4—It is reported from London that the British have replied to Japanese objections to a blockade in the Pacific by saying that it intended to continue to exercise its rights as a belligerent. The British seem to be primarily concerned with shipments of rubber from the Netherlands Indies.—*New York Times* (5)
- 6—Tokyo welcomes assurances that any British blockade action in the Pacific will respect Japanese interests.—*New York Times* (7)
- 7—It is announced that the Japanese trade delegation which has been in Moscow since January 10 will leave shortly.—*New York Times* (8)
- 9—Sir Stafford Cripps in an interview states that the greatest peril for China is the possibility of a Russian-British war.—*New York Herald Tribune* (9)
- 14—It is reported that Japanese Ambassador Togo was authorized to confer with Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoian on the possibility of resuming Soviet-Japanese trade talks which were interrupted earlier this month.—*New York Times* (15)
- 16—Shao Li-tse is named China's Ambassador to the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (17)
- 20—TASS denies the rumor that the USSR is prepared to pay "any price" for an agreement with Japan.—*Izvestia* (20)
- 21—The Domei News Agency in Tokyo reports that Soviet patrol vessels seized six Japanese fishing boats off Northern Korea.—*New York Times* (22)
- 30—The Soviet press denies a Japanese story that the Soviet Ambassador to China has demanded better relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.—*Pravda* (30)

MAY

- 13—A Moscow paper predicts Japanese attempts on the Netherlands Indies, with Britain's forced retreat from the Far East as a result of European developments.—*New York Times* (1)

JUNE

- 6—It is announced that the Soviet Government is establishing an Arctic station on Big Diomed Island in Bering Strait.—*New York Times* (7)
- 9—*Pravda* states that America's entrance into the European war would jeopardize her Pacific possessions.—*New York Herald Tribune* (10)
- 9—An agreement is reached between the Soviet Union and Japan on a precise demarcation of the Manchoukuo-Outer Mongolia frontier area in the Nomonhan district which was under dispute last year.—*New York Times* (10)
- 11—Kalinin receives the new Chinese Ambassador, Shao Li-tse.—*Daily Worker* (12)
- 14—The Japanese Government requests all the Powers, including the Soviet Union, that have citizens residing in Chungking to evacuate them to places of safety.—*New York Times* (15)
- 26—It is announced that the British have released the Soviet freighter *Selenga* which had been detained in the Pacific and taken to French Indo-China last January while it was on its way from the United States to Vladivostok.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)
- 26—Buildings of the Soviet Embassy in Chungking were destroyed when Japanese bombers flew over the city.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)

JULY

- 5—The Soviet Consulate at Peiping is closed.—*New York Herald Tribune* (6)

- 6—It is reported that Soviet demands have been made in London that the Burma Road be kept open, since the Soviet Union ships goods to China over that road as well as through Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. This is said to be complicating Britain's decision to accede to Japan's demand that the Burma Road be closed.—*New York Times* (7)
- 6—Chiang Kai-shek makes an appeal to 'friendly powers' especially the Soviet Union and the United States for immediate material help to China.—*New York Herald Tribune* (7)
- 8—Takichiro Suma, Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, denies that Japan is discriminating between the Soviet Union and Britain in demanding that the latter cease traffic with China by closing the Burma Road. "When and how the Japanese Government will protest to Moscow regarding transport of arms to Chungking we cannot say at present," Suma is quoted as saying.—*New York Times* (9)
- 10—A TASS dispatch gives Soviet airplanes lost last year in border fighting against the Japanese as 143, with Japanese losses 660 planes.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)
- 10—TASS denies that the Soviet Government was consulted regarding the closing of the Burma Road. It states that Ambassador Maisky was notified that the agreement between Britain and Japan had been concluded.—*Pravda* (19)
- 27—A new Soviet-Chinese trade pact is signed.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)

AUGUST

- 26—TASS reports that the mixed commission to demarcate the Manchoukuoan-Outer Mongolian border in the Nomonhan sector has achieved "positive results."—*New York Times* (27)

UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY

- 9—It is made known that it was necessary to make diplomatic representations to get the American technical assistants in Soviet oil refinery construction released from their contracts, under the moral embargo. The engineers report that the Soviet Union can produce gasoline with a rating from 80 to 85 octanes by adding tetraethyl lead.—*New York Herald Tribune* (1)

MARCH

- 11—The American Cargo War Risk Reinsurance Exchange has agreed to offer coverage against capture of exports to the Americas, Australia, Africa and the East Indies, with the exception of cargoes to Russia, the Mediterranean and Black Sea.—*Herald Tribune* (11)
- 14—Jesse Jones announces that \$20,000,000 is still available for a loan to Finland. Hull indicates that the moral embargo against sales of airplanes and airplane gasoline manufacturing equipment will be continued.—*New York Times* (15)
- 15—The closing of the Moscow office of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce is announced.—*New York Times* (15)

APRIL

- 2—After a conference with Ambassador Oumansky, Hull announced to the press that the moral embargo is still in effect against the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (3)
- 7—The American freighter, *Wildwood*, with a 4.5 million dollar cargo for the USSR is ordered back to Tacoma, Washington.—*New York Times* (8)
- 13—The Amtorg Trading Corporation enters a libel suit against the American-owned steamship, *Wildwood*, which docked at Tacoma, Washington, after turning back in mid-Pacific with a cargo destined for Vladivostok.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)
- 18—The American freighter, *Wildwood*, which was held in a libel suit by the Amtorg Trading Corporation is released.—*New York Times* (19)

- 22—Senator Vandenberg tells the United States Senate that he supports ex-President Hoover in seeking to sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (23)
- 22—Conviction of M. Gorin, manager of the Soviet West Coast Tourist Bureau, on charges of espionage is upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals.—*New York Times* (23)
- 24—It is announced from Washington that the United States Maritime Commission has not only stopped all ships seeking charter for the Soviet Government but has been "cracking down" on the movement of goods to the Soviet Union without charter by American ships.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 28—U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Laurence Steinhardt, leaves Moscow for Rumania.—*New York Times* (29)

MAY

- 29—Ambassador Steinhardt returns to the United States.—*New York Times* (29)

JUNE

- 12—Soviet Ambassador Oumansky holds conversation with Secretary of State Hull, reportedly to protest against the stoppage of shipments of machine tools to the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (13)
- 19—About two-thirds of a cargo of machine-tools and dies, purchased by the Soviet Union, are released for shipment to Vladivostok via the Swedish motorship *Ecuador*.—*New York Herald Tribune* (21)

JULY

- 23—Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, issues a statement condemning the Soviet Union for "annihilating" the Baltic republics and stating that the United States will continue to recognize the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian Ministers.—*New York Herald Tribune* (24)
- 26—The United States Maritime Commission announces that it has approved the charter of an American tanker to take gasoline purchased by a Soviet firm to Siberia.—*New York Times* (27)

AUGUST

- 6—The Soviet-American trade pact is extended for one year with the Soviet Union agreeing to purchase \$40,000,000 of American goods; the Soviet Government reserves the right to suspend purchases if American defense restrictions make deliveries too difficult.—*New York Herald Tribune* (7)
- 7—The United States Maritime Commission grants the Soviet oil trust the right to charter two American tankers to take American gasoline to the Soviet Union.—*New York Herald Tribune* (8)
- 13—The United States Government agrees to comply with the request of the Soviet Government to withdraw embassy and consular officials from the Baltic States.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)
- 15—In reply to reports in America that Alaska is in danger of an attack from Siberia, *Pravda* states that a Soviet campaign in the press to regain Alaska is "non-existent."—*New York Times* (16)

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